PLAN DE GESTIÓN DEL CRONOGRAMA 35

In play we can find a phenomenon that allows for a way of living that remains open and within reality in order to allow for change and reduce the practice of ideologically- motivated violence. In other words, understanding reality as play makes it possible to live with conflictual reality. The simple suggestion that this phenomenon inspires is ‘to play’. This implies a notion of political freedom that requires moderation in order to include the existence of social discord within a society.

If we understand reality as play, then such an understanding creates a schism in the political thinking about democracy and rights that has been handed down to us from the Enlightenment that sought to ground the optimal form of government in a given set of rights agreed upon by all and pertaining to all people in order to escape the hostility of the state of nature. The political problem of conflict and division is from the perspective of peace and the optimal form of government (in which its people can be free under the idea of freedom safeguarded by fundamental laws and rights and acted out through institutions) a problem that needs a solution. However, that same problem is from the perspective of play a necessary component of an open and flexible society that practices

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‘liberty’ instead of confining it to an idea. The practice of liberty within a society includes social discord and thus resistance, whilst the ‘idea’ of freedom seeks deliverance from resistance. To substantiate this point, I would like to attend to two passages in Claude Lefort’s Machiavelli and the Veritá Effetuale. The first gives us a clarification of what we can understand as the practice of liberty. Here, Lefort summarizes political freedom based on Machiavelli’s Discorsi effectively.

Political freedom is […] the affirmation of a mode of coexistence, within certain borders, such

that no one has authority to decide the affairs of all, that is to say, to occupy the site of power.

[…] Freedom[…] implies the negation of tyranny, whatever its variants might be. But it implies,

too, the negation of every instance of authority that arrogates unto itself the knowledge of what the common good is; that is to say, it implies the negation of philosophy inasmuch as philosophy claims– be it by distinguishing the ideal from reality– to set the norms of social organization, to conceive what the good life of the city and of the individual in the city is.71

Here, again, we see an accusation against idealist political theory: freedom is not an idea but something that can only be realized in practice. This mode of coexistence implies from the outset the existence of different interpretations of what is ‘the good’ next to one another. As such this form of political freedom includes that freedom can never be absolute or even sovereign, since, as beings that live next to one another, we are restricted by those that stand next to us. Since none can have absolute authority - even if these ideals come from the best intentions - there is no univocity in a society that has actual political freedom.

Indeed, this notion of political freedom characterized by the valuation of pluralism and toleration is also at the bottom of liberal democratic theory. However, the valuation of pluralism and toleration is not enough to achieve those valuations in practice when committed to an ontology of seriousness. Historically, the incompatibility between valuing pluralism and toleration and an ontology of seriousness is shown by the hypocrisy of liberal democratic societies in the face of their colonial past and the long road of women’s emancipation. Presently, the incompatibility is reflected in the repeated utterance of the failures of the multicultural society on the one hand, and the politically paralyzing practice of identity politics on the other hand. Both cases reflect the need to be

71 _{Lefort, Writing: The Political Test. p.133 See here also the idea, according to Thomas Berns, that philosophy} cannot understand war.

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free from any kind of threat which is typical of an ontology of seriousness that favors peace. In the case of the reproaches of multiculturalism, the liberty and freedom of liberal democratic societies is confined to a single culture tradition which defeats the actual practice of liberty that makes a multicultural society possible in the first place. In the case of identity politics, the issue salience of the protection of the identity of a group will make any form of cohesive political action that requires a give and take of all parties concerned impossible. In seriousness, toleration means acceptance of the deviations from a standard. However, real difference and the overlap of interests make harmony impossible. What if those deviations pose a threat to the standard? When push comes to shove, serious meaning will take precedence over and above the practice of liberty. The problem is not liberal democracy itself, but that the actual practice of liberty that liberal democracy espouses is either hypocritical or unsustainable when committed to an ontology of seriousness.

If resolving discord undermines the actualization of values such as pluralism and toleration, then staying true to those values means accepting social discord. Now, we turn to the second passage that shows that political freedom is bound up with social discord from the outset. To aspire to a society with political freedom entails that

The best republic yields no solution to the political problem. (Let us understand the best

republic as the one whose institutions are not condemned to be fixed and settled, with

everything serving to prop up an oligarchy; it is the one in which there is “the most life.”) It

distinguishes itself, rather, by its tacit abandonment of the idea of a solution, by the welcome it extends to division and, under the effect of the latter, to change.72

The attempt to solve the political problem relies on a serious understanding of reality. Yet, rather than solving the problem, it worsens the problem. The importance, here, lies in the idea of tacitly abandoning the idea of a solution. In other words, we still attempt to make the world a better place, but with the acknowledgement that ‘a better place’ can be a very specific interpretation and that the costs of achieving that specific goal, which means superseding other interpretations of ‘a better place’, outweighs the goal itself. This relies on political freedom that, through the presence of difference in interpretations, indulges social discord. Since there is no absolute claim of authority, discord (as the contestation

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between ideas in public debates, for instance) can lead to change. But that political freedom, which is characterized by the ‘tacit abandonment of the idea of a solution’, also allows to engage with the tragic of human existence. Since there is no absolute authority of the good, it is possible to change. Rather than solving the problem, the possibility to transform society when necessary should be incorporated. When a crisis creates a schism between a system of thought and a corresponding praxis and undermines the explanatory purposes of a system of thought, then the flexibility to confront such a crisis is much easier to achieve in a society that practices liberty. From the outset, there is an acknowledgement of the absence of any grounding of reality which provides the flexibility to confront the experience of the tragic.

One may ask how such a society can be stable in the sense that social discord can lead tensions to such heights that it must erupt at some point. However, this is again an issue of seriousness in which social discord is negatively valued. Here, we will turn our attention directly to play and see how play is valuable in thinking the positivity of conflict. If conflict is embraced in political life understood in terms of play, then there is a certain time and place, and rules to ventilate such tensions. Within play we are in contest with other players, but the aim remains within play. Play is an immanent concept that restricts ideology from transcending political reality. Rivalries within play are not rivalries between two systems of thought in which the one is regarded as ultimate truth and the other as false from their respective points of view. Within play, rivalries are a necessary component to keep playing. The true playful spirit of the politician does not see the opponent as a threat to be overcome for the attainment of a higher purpose or absolute dominance, but as part of the interaction inherent in the perpetual struggle to find the best course of action with the limited knowledge that we have. Reflecting on eighteenth century debates in the English House of commons Huizinga writes:

Personal rivalries are always at work, keeping up a continual match between players whose object is to checkmate one another, but without prejudice to the interests of the country which

they serve with all seriousness. […] the spirit of fellowship would allow the bitterest of

opponents a friendly chat even after the most virulent debates. […] There is no doubt that it is

51 relationships underlying the political machinery permits it to “play”, thus easing tensions

which would otherwise be unendurable or dangerous – for it is the decay of humor that kills.73

The use of this example is not to say that eighteenth century England did not have any flaws and presented a perfect image of political freedom outlined above, but it serves to illustrate that within play, opposition is not a problem. The seriousness to serve the country in the playful spirit of parliamentary debates is not a seriousness that presupposes an ideal state that must be attained by whatever means necessary, but as inherently bound to political life which means engaging with the problems and issues that arise through a contestation of ideas that might better the country’s state. The enmity and rivalry between opponents and the tension between them are satisfied in the play of political debates. Tensions will ease for there is an area in which these tensions can be played out and be resolved that works according to certain rules that are taken to be playfully serious and immanent. However, this entails that we uphold a different stance towards our ideological preferences than we do in seriousness. Parliamentary debates are healthy, insofar as the use of those debates remains within their immanent purpose. This is only possible when ideology is informative of reality rather than absolute. This requires moderation; the ideological preferences one may have are integrated with the knowledge that those preferences are susceptible to resistance in the political realm. As such, play changes what we do with ideology. Our ideological preferences are never considered to be grounding of reality. True tolerance is not the acceptance of deviations, but the acceptance of difference as fundamental to reality that is without a standard.

To sum up, the alternative is to ‘abandon the idea of solution’ that includes the practice of freedom which requires moderation in our ideological preferences. To reiterate, these points are also at the core of liberal democratic theory that emphasizes pluralism and toleration. However, when committed to seriousness the discord that is inevitably linked up with these points will undermine the realization of those values.