Planes empresariales por la igualdad

After he came to power, Gaddafi announced that the policy that would underpin the subsequent years of his reign towards the major powers would be based on that of the Non-Aligned countries. Gaddafi’s ideology of nonalignment is based mainly on his anti-capitalism and anti-communism. From his point of view, this rejection ‘stems not from any Maoist-type commitment that the US and the USSR are equally imperialist

466 _Ibid 467 _Ibid

468 _{St. John, R B., Redefining the Libyan revolution: the changing ideology of Muammar al-Qaddafi,}

The Journal of North African Studies, Volume 13, Issue 1, (2008), pp. 91 – 106

469 _{St. John, R B., The Soviet Penetration of Libya, The World Today, Vol. 38, No. 4, Royal Institute of}

International Affairs (London, 1982), pp. 131-138,

470 _{TNA, FCO 39/1067, report about Libyan relations with the Soviet Union, January 1972.}

175

super-states, but from nationalism and religion’. At a nonaligned states meeting in Algiers in September 1973, Gaddafi said:

The true meaning of neutrality is the liberation of a state from all those types of ties and the defence of liberty in the Third World from both Eastern and Western influence. To be nonaligned is to be aware of the attempts made by the United States and the USSR to dominate the Third World. Both seek the realisation of their own self-interest economically and strategically; the big powers have no concern for the smaller powers

.

However, Gaddafi described the Soviet Union as a friend to the Arab States. Gaddafi has been critical of United States and the West, accusing them of being on the Israeli side in the Arab-Israeli conflict, while he had the opposite view about the Soviet Union. Gaddafi believed that the Soviet Union was more supportive in the conflict between the Arabs and Israel, and supportive of Arab rights. Also, the Soviet Union had supplied the Arabs and Libya with weapons, while the West had not. Both parties, Libya and the Soviet Union, were against the US sponsored peace process. The USSR was opposed to the United States’ monopolising role in the biggest events in the Middle East and, particularly regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Soviets lacked a role in the Arab-Israeli negotiations. Gaddafi considered the peace talks between Egypt and Israel to be a betrayal of the struggle of the Arabs and Palestinians. Despite the ideological and political differences between the Soviet Union and Libya, this agreement was considered one of the best examples of mutual self-interest.473 However, the Suez crisis of 1956, Western military interventions in Lebanon and Jordan in 1958 had proved the limitation of the Soviet’s ability to deter such actions,

472 _{El-Warfally, M G., Imagery and Ideology in US Policy Toward Libya 1969-1982, University of}

Pittsburgh Press, (London, 1988), pp. 57-59

176

as well as the limits of Soviet willingness to act as a military protector and not just a military supplier its allies.474

Gaddafi's policies were not consistent with Soviet policy in the Arab region, at a time when he was suffering from not making any progress in the relationships with Britain and America. Gaddafi personally called the Iraqi ambassador in Tripoli twice in mid- February 1972 and expressed his deep concern over the government of Iraq’s intention to sign a friendship agreement with the USSR. Gaddafi considered the Iraq-Soviet friendship to be dangerous for the future of relations between Libya and Iraq as well as for the Arab unity.475 _{Gaddafi took the same position over the Russian-Syrian}

Friendship Treaty.476 Gaddafi's policy was not just inconsistent with the policies of the Soviet Union in the Arab region, but beyond that it was critical of Russian policies on the Indian subcontinent. Gaddafi explicitly declared his displeasure of the Soviet intervention in the India-Pakistan war and the Soviet Union's support for India against Pakistan.477 _{On 2 February 1972, in an interview with the Lebanese weekly magazine}

Al-Sayad, Gaddafi was reported as saying that ‘The Soviet Union is pursuing an

imperialist role similar to that of the United States in connection with the role played by the USSR in the Indo-Pakistan war’.478

Later, Gaddafi sent a message to Indira Gandhi (Indian Prime Minister 1966-1977) strongly criticising the Indian-Soviet treaty.479_{The Libyan government newspapers,}

474 _{Breslauer, G W., Soviet Strategy in the Middle East, p 4}

475 _{TNA, FCO 39/1067, Libya/Iraq/ Soviet Union, letter from Tripp to FCO, 24 February 1972}

476 _{TNA, FCO 39/1067, Libya/Iraq/ Soviet Union, letter from Tripp to FCO, 26 February 1972}

477 _{TNA, FCO 39/1067, Libyan relations with the Soviet, January 1972}

478 _{TNA, FCO 39/1067, Libyan Soviet Relations, letter from R. A. Beaumont to A. D. Parsons Esq, 4}

February 1972

177

particularly A-Thawra, waged a war on the Russian attitude towards the 1971 India- Pakistan war, concluding that the Soviet Union was the chief culprit for supplying India with arms, for its treaty with India, and for supplying India with political support in the UN.480 _{Unpublished British documents show that during the first visit of Libyan}

officials led by Major Jallud, the Soviet Union strongly criticised Libyan newspapers, which in turn had criticised communism and Soviet foreign policy.481 _{Gaddafi also}

criticized Soviet policy in Africa. He helped non-Communist countries, or those that followed a non-communist system. In August 1971, Gaddafi gave considerable assistance to President Jaafar Al-Nimeiry, former President of the Sudan, to foil a coup attempt by some members of the Communist Party there, which was believed to have the Soviet Union backing.

It does not appear that the political and ideological courses of Gaddafi towards the Soviet Union greatly differ from those towards the West, but his disputes with the West, especially Britain, were sharper and deeper. While the situation between Libya, Britain and America went from bad to worse, even as far as the description of Libya as a state sponsor of terrorism, the situation was not comparable with the Soviet Union. At the political level, Gaddafi was against the Western and Soviet interference in the Arab region, and on the ideological level, Gaddafi considered communism and capitalism as equally major enemies of Third World countries. On several occasions Gaddafi was described by the Western governments as a terrorist supporter: he did indeed give funds

480 _{TNA, FCO 39/1067, Libyan relations with the Soviet, January 1972}

178

to the IRA, Sinn Fein, the Red Army faction in West Germany and the Abu Nidal organisation.482

Gaddafi believed that, in the issue of Arab-Israeli conflict, American and British policy was based on support of Israel at the expense of the Arabs, while he saw the position of the Soviet Union as the opposite. Another important point is that the policy of Gaddafi in fighting against American imperialism and limiting American and British influence was matched by the same goal on the part of the Soviets in the Arab region and in Africa. Policy towards the oil industry was also different, as described in the previous chapter.

The Soviet Union's goal of rapprochement with Libya can be clearly seen in the light of Soviet goals in the Mediterranean region and efforts to find a foothold in the region. Moreover, the Soviet and Western governments were in conflict over spheres of influence, especially after the expulsion of the Soviets from Egypt and the extension of the US influence there. Thus Libya became more important to the Soviet Union.483

Therefore, Soviet policy towards Libya was based on three elements:484

• The supply of Soviet arms to break the dependence of the Arab states on the

West and to create a new dependence.

• The creation of a political and economic relationship with such states based on the calculated self-interest of each party.

482 _{Simons, G and Dalyell, T., Libya: The Struggle for Survival, p. 263}

483 _{Ronen, Y., Gaddafi’s Libya in World Politics, Lynne Rienner Publisher, (United States, 2008), p. 83.}

St John, R B., The Soviet Penetration of Libya

179

• A vague ideological solidarity based on anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-Zionism, revolutionary change and socialism.

The success of the Soviet Union in this strategy would give them many advantages that would undoubtedly affect Western influence in the Mediterranean region. For the Soviet Union to obtain even limited access to Libyan port facilities would mean a major advance for the Soviet navy in the Mediterranean and enhance its ability to monitor the US Sixth Fleet there and oher allied navies. This could also lead to the Soviets gaining access to Libyan air facilities, which would threaten NATO and cause great concern. For instance, 'immediately after the 1967 war, the number of Soviet naval vessels rose to about sixty. Assuming the Soviet move to be an attempt to outflank NATO, the West established the Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean command which included the United States, France, Great Britain and Italy. This surveillance group was established to counter the Soviet submarine forces assumed to be the greatest threat to the U.S Sixth Fleet'.485

The Soviet Union tried to extend its influence over sectors of the Libyan army by supplying arms and Russian experts to Libya, but this penetration was limited.486 _Libya

also relied on other foreign advisers, including Pakistanis and Cubans, which also limited direct Soviet leverage in Libya.487

485485 _{Jacobsen, R B., Soviet Sea Power in the Mediterranean: a foreign policy tool, George Washington}

University, Washington DC, (1975), p 56.

486 _{NTA FCO 93-1870, Libya/Soviet Union, letter from Mr Tomky to Mr Daunt and Mr Fergusson, 1979}

180

Soviet-Libyan relations and the British view of this relationship