Etapa de construcción
CAPÍTULO 5. LOGÍSTICA INTERNA DE MATERIALES
5.1 Plan operacional de obra
5.1.2 Planificación de instalaciones auxiliares
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Background of the Case
★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★A 1941 New Jersey law gave school districts the authority to provide transportation for children to and from private and parochial, as well as public, schools. The board of education for the township of Ewing, New Jersey, established a plan to reimburse parents for the cost of public transportation to and from these schools.
A local taxpayer, Everson, objected to having his tax money used to pay for transporting children to religious schools. A New Jersey district court ruled in Everson’s favor, noting that the 1941 law was unconstitutional under the state constitution. However, New Jersey’s highest court reversed the lower court’s decision. Everson then appealed to the United States Supreme Court and the Court took the case to consider the First Amendment issues involved.
Constitutional Issue
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The Supreme Court’s Decision
★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★The Court held by a 5 to 4 majority that the New Jersey law was constitutional. Justice Hugo Black wrote the majority decision. He interpreted the religious clause of the First Amendment to mean: “Neither a state nor the federal government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion over another. . . . No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach and practice religion.” In the words of Jefferson, the clause against the estab- lishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between Church and State.’” However, said Justice Black, the wall had not been breached here.
Black then examined whether the New Jersey statute constituted unlawful taxation in support of religion. He also noted that the First Amendment prevents a state from hampering the free exercise of religion. He reasoned that if the statute provided only for “public welfare legislation” benefiting all citizens equally, then withholding those benefits would result in discrimination against religion. Tax subsidized bus fares, he concluded, fell into the same category as police and fire protection. Such benefits are available to the public as a whole. He went on, “The state contributes no money to the schools. It does not support them. Its legislation . . . does no more than provide a general program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools.”
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Therefore, the New Jersey law was valid, since the First Amendment only “requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and nonbelievers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.”
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Dissenting Opinion
★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★Justice Wiley Rutledge disagreed with the Court’s verdict. In his dissent, Rutledge wrote that the cost of transportation is no less a part of the cost of education or religious instruction than teachers or textbooks. He continued, “The very purpose of the state’s contribution is to defray the cost of conveying the pupil to the place where he will receive not simply secular, but also and primarily religious teaching. . . .” On this ground the reimbursement for transportation costs is not allowable.
Justice Rutledge continued, quoting the writings of Presidents Madison and Jefferson often to support his argument that the New Jersey program could not be justified as a public safety expenditure. He considered the transportation to be aid to church-related schools.
In the view of Justice Rutledge, “It does not make the state unneutral to withhold what the Constitution forbids it to give. On the contrary, it is only by observing the prohibition rigidly that the state can maintain its neutrality and avoid partisanship. . . .”
DIRECTIONS: Answer the following questions on a separate sheet of paper.
1. What reasons did Justice Black give for supporting the constitutionality of the New Jersey law?
2. Do you think the Court’s ruling allowed the state to pay for transportation to private, nonreligious
schools?
3. On what principle did Justice Rutledge base his dissent?
4. Do you think Justice Black would have reached the same decision if the New Jersey law had provided
for the state to pay part of the salaries of teachers in parochial schools? Explain your answer.
5. Do you agree with Justice Black’s ruling or Justice Rutledge’s dissent in this case? Give reasons for