Planificación de medidas preventivas de los puestos de Dirección y Responsables de área . 92

If the strategic goals of political parties structure politician behavior in elections, then the strategic goals of individuals structure their own work in a legislature in reaction to party behavior. Legislators wishing to remain within their institution behave in systematic ways that are distinct from the behavior of those that wish to move to another institution. Politi-cians with progressive ambition use each elected position as a way to move up to a more

desirable office, while those with static ambition forge long careers in the same institution (Schlesinger 1966; Palmer and Simon 2003). The EP is characterized as an institution that houses both static and progressive kinds of legislators, those looking to return to national office and using the EP as a “stepping stone," and those whose main interest lies in EU politics (Daniel 2015, 6).⁵ Politicians both coming from and seeking to return to national politics will behave differently in the EP than their Europe-inclined peers, especially with respect to their relationship with their national party. Therefore parties must consider an individual’s career ambitions when considering who will serve in the EP.

A substantial body of literature exists addressing the role of individual legislators’ per-sonal ambition, and the relationship between experience and legislative activity (Daniel 2015, 2013; Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard 2009). This research suggests that individuals with goals in European careers behave very differently from their nationally inclined colleagues (Borchert 2011; Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard 2009). These authors argue that politi-cians seeking national political careers will adhere to national party preferences and those seeking careers in the EP will be much more integrated into the European party system.

Once in the EP, they argue that nationally ambitious politicians will seek to preserve the sovereign powers of the member state and will be less supportive of integrative policy. In contrast, those seeking careers in the EP will work with the EPGs to increase the power of the Eurpoean institution in which they serve (Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard 2009).

These type of politicians have become more distinct over time, as the EPGs and the EP it-self evolved and became more powerful (Kreppel 2001). When conflict arises between EPGs and national delegations, European ambitious MEPs have incentives to cater more to their EP colleagues than their national peers. These groups have a large amount of control over leadership positions in the EP so any desire to grow your career in the Parliament must be realized through these groups. In contrast, those wishing to return to national politics are much more likely to side with their national peers to show that they are “good" party politicians in hopes of ultimately gaining a more lucrative seat back home.

5Daniel (2015) also mentions the long held belief of EP scholars that the EP is a retirement home for national politicians that spend the last few years of their careers in the EP before leaving politics all together.

Daniel(2015) and I both find this is no longer the case in the most recent sessions of the EP. However, even if this were the case, I would consider these politicians to really have no career ambitions, having already experienced their glory days in office.

Political career goals are explicitly linked to party candidate selection because national parties choose whom to place on the ballot. Individuals determine their behavior based on their goals for their careers in the future. National parties determine the implications of choosing certain candidates to seek and possibly gain office in the EP relative to their more general party objectives. Candidate recruitment and nomination mechanisms are impor-tant for the type of representative a party gets (Wessels 1997). Recruitment and selection strategies determine how several thousand eligible citizens are narrowed to a pool of a few select people that are able to run for elected office and represent the party (Mühlbock 2012;

Putnam 1976). In most western democracies, this recruitment process has produced a pro-fessional core of politicians that make careers out of public office and tend to be highly educated, male, and middle aged (Wessels 1997). These professional politicians are more likely to maintain the structure of centralized party leadership and accountability to elites over the pressures of interest or citizens groups (Gunther and Diamond 2003; Norris 1997a;

Ware 1979). If candidate selection and list placement is the privilege of elite leadership then we are more likely to see candidates selected that represent the interests of the elite as the result of a party’s electoral strategy. The stronger a MEPs ties are with their national party, the more likely they will be loyal agents for the party when serving in an institution. There-fore candidates with national government experience or previous national party leadership will provide better representation of a party’s interest. If some parties value policy making more than maximizing office, they will likely choose these “high" quality candidates that are experienced in working at the European level; namely incumbents with several years of experience. If they value office over policy, which is the case especially in situations where the election is serving as a referendum on the national government, they may seek to put candidates on the list that are the most recognizable even though they may be “low" quality candidates with little experience working in Europe or little desire to forge a career there (Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard 2009).