In 1893 war broke out between the Pioneers and Ndebele which ended in the defeat of the Ndebele and the death of Lobengula (Ranger, 1960). The BSAC had promised each recruit of the 1893 war 6 000 acres of land, land rights and a share in the loot of Ndebele cattle (Palmer, 1977). The 1893 War in Matebeleland marked the beginning of the tyranny of economic paternalism in Rhodesia. It was noted that the BSAC basked in unaccustomed favour and prosperity for roughly two years after the end of the war. According to Birmingham and Martin (1983: 254):
As hopes of rich gold discoveries in Matebeleland flared and flickered, both the BSAC and the settlers turned to a more thoroughgoing looting of the ‘natural economy’ of the Shona and Ndebele. Between October 1893 and March 1896 anything from 100 000 to 200 000 cattle were seized from the Ndebele; forced labour became widespread; and the collection of hut tax, first imposed ‘illegally’ in May 1893, was stepped up after imperial sanction was received in 1894.
The defeat in 1893 spelt disaster for the Ndebele. According to Loney (1975), the Ndebele were robbed of most of their cattle which were divided as loot, and of their best land. Palmer and Parsons (1977) comment that these ‘conquest lands’ on which white farming later established itself, were acquired without any regard whatsoever for existing native rights. It is little wonder therefore that the land issue was a cause of much bitterness in Zimbabwe. Following the defeat of the Ndebele in 1893, the British enacted the Matabeleland Order-in- Council which culminated in the creation of two reserves, Gwaai and Shangani, for Ndebele settlement in the dry and infertile part of the country (Tshuma, 1998).
According to Palmer and Parsons (1977), the entire Ndebele homeland was expropriated following the defeat of Lobengula in 1893 and land on which Ndebele kraals were situated (Loney, 1975) was given to the volunteers or sold off to farmers and speculators.
The indigenous occupants were told to work for the new owners or move on. Two totally inadequate reservations, Gwaai and Shangani, not fit for human settlement, were set aside for Ndebele settlement (Loney, 1975). Rodney (1972: 233) had this to say about the reserves:
100 In a reserve, the major means of production was the land. But the quantity and fertility of
the land allocated was entirely inadequate to support the number of Africans who were driven in. The reserves were reservoirs of cheap labour, and dumping grounds for those who could not be accommodated within the money economy of the racist southern section of Africa.
It should be noted that the loss of land and cattle among the Ndebele meant the destruction of the traditional socio-economic systems, loss of status, and loss of economic and social independence. According to Berlyn (1966), cattle are the wealth of the African people. Although the 1893 war did not affect the Shona to a great extent, the Shona did not expect Rhodes’s people to occupy the country permanently (Loney, 1975).
Despite owning the best land, development in white commercial farming encountered numerous obstacles namely: the lack of; capital, equipment, and regular supply of labour, the rinderpest and later the east coast fever which decimated cattle, and the locust and drought which preceded the First Chimurenga (Palmer and Parsons, 1977). Furthermore, the early white settlers were completely ignorant of local conditions and potential for agriculture although a few had an agricultural background. The situation was exacerbated by the unwillingness of the blacks to work for the white men hence the introduction of forced labour,
chibharo (Palmer and Parsons, 1977). Forced labour was a result of labour demand in the mines and farms. The whites also introduced taxes namely; the hut, poll, dog and cattle taxes in order to raise revenue to cover their administration costs (Loney, 1975). In 1894 the BSAC imposed a tax of 10 shillings per hut. This tax created hostility on the indigenous population who saw no reason why they should pay for a hut they had built themselves. Moreover whites with incomes of less than £400 for a single man and £1000 for a couple were exempt from taxes. In 1904 taxes were increased and the 10-shilling hut tax gave way to a £1 poll tax on each male native with a further 10-shilling tax on each wife after the first (Loney, 1975 and Ranger, 1960). The BSAC also charged the natives £1 for cattle and dog tax.
The importance of these taxes should not be underestimated as they forced the once reluctant black agricultural population into the labour market to earn enough for the taxes.
To improve the quality of the labour force it was considered advisable to adopt a paternal attitude, a policy later required by law. Employers provided accommodation, food, and where necessary, appropriate clothing; many also provided medical and other social services.4
4G. Kay, Rhodesia: A human Geography (London, 1970), p. 55. Kay makes these observations while
101 The African tax revenue enabled the BSAC to subsidize the development of European farming and mining. However neither taxation nor paternalism solved the mining industry’s labour problem. It was noted that tax increases did improve the supply of labour locally but they also tended to push a significant number of local peasants further out into the regional economic system, benefiting the Transvaal mines. As noted by Van Onselen (1976) when tax was increased in 1901 many of the Ndebele turned to the Rand to earn the necessary cash. This annual fluctuation of labour was not favourable to the capitalists (BSAC) at this time when they were trying to attract capital and maximise production. Short-term labour, for example, was resented by the capitalists because it did not enhance productivity which industry looked for.
Paying taxes compounded the bitterness felt by the Ndebele after the loss of land and cattle in the 1893 war. The bitterness was manifested in the outbreak of yet another war, the First
Chimurenga (1896-7). As if their loss of cattle was not enough, the Ndebele lost more cattle as a result of the outbreak of rinderpest in 1895. According to Loney (1975), the situation was further aggravated by drought and locusts that destroyed crops. These misfortunes also befell the Shona. The interpretation of these misfortunes by the spirit mediums united the Shona and Ndebele in fighting against Rhodes’s people. It was the nature of the religious interpretation that precipitated the First Chimurenga in 1896 (Loney, 1975).