Planteamiento del problema

The second theme, from Aristotle, poses the central problem of the first 8 chapters of the treatise and determines the course of the argument.6 _{Aristotle’s thought}

about contemplation, one could well argue, leads to a dilemma. On the one hand, he specifically states that contemplation is not productive; it “makes” nothing (EN X 8, 1178 b 20–21) Nor does it extend to brute animals (cf. Deck, 1967, 106–9). This seems to follow from the way Aristotle views the hierarchy of sciences: the theoretical or contemplative sciences (theology, metaphysics, physics) are clearly demarcated from the practical (politics, economics, ethics) and from the produc- tive (the crafts and arts). The productive sciences examine the human being as a

maker of objects outside of himself or herself (poiêsis). The practical sciences ex-

amineaction,orwhatapersondoes(praxis) where the object of the action is more unifiedwiththesubjectacting,asinallthecasesofmoral,economic,orpolitical

self-organization; inotherwords,thereisadeeperorinnerdimensiontoactionin- sofarasactioninvolvesthedevelopmentofcharacterandoftheself. Finally, the theoretical sciences see, or have insight into (theôria), the whole of reality, not just the human sphere of action or production, and no longer for the enquiring subjects’ own sake but for the sake of things themselves. Theôria, the word for contemplation, signifies the capacity to look or to gaze at a spectacle. So far so good. The demarcations among the sciences seem to make good sense.

But in III, 8, Plotinus takes up a hidden problem. Is contemplation for Aris- totle like looking at an object or spectacle? Because of one prevailing paradigm in modern science, we might agree that it is “objective” in the sense that it is a dis- passionate scrutiny of the facts. But as Hegel long ago observed in his Phenome-

nology of Spirit, it is possible to do science in this way without ever being self-

aware or having any minimal form of self-knowledge. One may be a brilliant “theoretical” technician, worthy of the Nobel prize, but at the same time a moral, intellectual, and spiritual child. Now, for Aristotle, theoretical science cannot be conceived in this way, for in contemplation, understanding of the world is raised into self-understanding so that self-understanding (i.e., the paradigm for all au- thentic understanding: God’s life is an understanding of understanding or a think- ing of thinking: noêseôs noêsis, Metaphysics XII 9, 1074 b 34) and understanding (noêsis) are one. This is conceived, of course, as an ideal to which a human being can only aspire at the limits of his or her being (EN X, 7). It is nonetheless essen- tial for Aristotle (as also for Plato) that scientific thought break out of its own nar- row individuality and, at its best, even out of its own specifically human focus, to see both the world and itself as permeated by a wisdom that is self-understanding. So, for contemplation, the world is not an object; rather, as Aristotle tends to say about even the smallest or apparently least divine things in the universe, the parts

6. On Aristotle see espec. H. H. Joachim, 1951; J. Lear, 1988; T. H. Irwin, 1988; R. A. Gauthier-H. Y. Jolif, 1970.

of animals (cf. PA I 6), “there are gods even here” (citing Heraclitus with ap- proval, see DK, Heraclitus A 9).

The juxtaposition of these two rather different perspectives—that is, contem- plation as the highest human activity and contemplation as a divine activity al- ready embracing and pervading everything—poses a major philosophical problem as well as a specific problem of interpretation in Plato and Aristotle. The Gnos- tics, on the good authority of the Bible as well as of Plato’s Timaeus, represent divinities as doing and saying and working out many things. Their higher beings are visibly and audibly creative, an attractive feature for any human being who naturally prefers “sound and light” or special effects in Dolby stereo, and they are even more attractive in the absence of any powerful philosophical alternative. So the question for Plotinus is how we can think of the world by means of both per- spectives simultaneously; that is, how can we see it as genuinely pervaded by con- templation and yet at the same time be able to trace back to an authentic paradigm the dim or more obscure sorts of contemplation we find embodied even in action and creative production in the physical universe. This is the question he attempts to answer in III, 8, 1–8.

However, this is not only a philosophical problem rooted in Plato and occa- sioned by the Gnostics. In this new conception of contemplation, Plotinus con- sciously develops a line of thought implicit and even important in Aristotle, but one that Aristotle did not develop himself. If the divine life of contemplation or self-understanding is what makes everything move (and “god moves,” Aristotle says, “as being loved”; that is, god moves as the goal of all natural organisms), then how this goal-directedness actually operates in all of nature becomes a prob- lem. If the divine life is the purest self-contemplation, then such goal-directness can operate only if contemplation has real creative effects in the world. Indeed, Aristotle appears to believe this—despite his claim at EN 1139 a 39 a 35–6 that “thinking [dianoia] moves nothing, but only thinking that is for the sake of some- thingandpractical”—since the productive intellect(nous)inDeAnimaIII,5, must be a contemplative power that makes actual the possibility and potentiality of the world. So too sophia, or wisdom, whose activity is essentially and comprehen- sively contemplative, is said to be not only the excellence (aretê) of art (technê) (EN VI 7, 1141 a 12; cf. V, 8 [31] 5, 4–5) but an internal productive power in its own way of happiness (EN VI 12, 1144 a 1–6) “as health makes health” (i.e., not as the doctor [efficient cause] but as the principle of health [formal cause] brings about a healthy condition). Sophia, or wisdom, then “makes” internally like a for- mal and final cause (just as any organism’s own nature in its proper environment actscausallytobringittomaturity,etc.),not like an efficient cause (as x external

to y moves y by pushing, kicking, etc.) (cf. Gauthier-Jolif II, 542–47). Although John Deck (1967, 107–9) proposes that Plotinus develops in III, 8 a curious kind of causality, not formal or final but a “real efficient causality,” Plotinus is more concerned to show how the principles of things in their natural environment work

from within (i.e., formally and teleologically), rather than from without by exter- nal agency.

Now for Aristotle it is no small statement to say that sophia makes well-being or happiness,7 _{for this happiness is not just human (although eudaimonia appears}

as a specifically human goal in EN I) but coextensive with the well-being of all reality: “for if the state of mind concerned with a human being’s own interests is to be called sophia, there will be many sophiae; there will not be one concerned with the good of all animals” (EN VI 7, 1141 a 29–32). Sophia is not limited to

specific interests, but is “knowledge [epistêmê] and intellect (nous) of the things

that are most held in honour by nature” (1141 b 2–3). Sophia, or contemplative wisdom, as opposed to practical wisdom, must therefore be internally productive of the well-being of all species and things if it is a contemplative activity rooted in the divine intellect and if that intellect not only moves the instincts, desires, and loves of all natural things by being loved but also makes, together with the imma- nent principles of organisms (i.e., their souls), the essential “health” of their be- ing.

Aristotle, of course, never explicitly develops such a theory, but the theory Plotinus sketches of creative contemplation at work on all levels and in every thought, act, or making process in the physical universe is an innovative and highly accurate development of these genuine possibilities latent in Aristotle’s teleology and theory of intellect. Contemplation does not do away with action or production but puts them in a new perspective: we make in order to be able to “see” what we cannot get at directly by any other means; we act or do things in order to unfold natural powers that are perfectly intelligible in themselves but re- main too unified for us to approach directly through experience, perception, or reasoning. Actions and productions, therefore, unpack the unified content of con- templative reality into more discursive modes of apprehension (reasoning, imagi- nation, etc.) so that we can “run through them” and come to see them for what they are.

In III, 8, 1–8 Plotinus implicitly brings together two powerfully different, but related ways of looking at things; the playful attempt of Plato’s dialectic to see things whole in terms of their ultimate (serious) Good and, on the other hand, the contrasting attempt of Aristotle’s contemplative wisdom to see things whole in

7. The word eudaimonia is difficult to translate. The general sense is brought out by

“living well,” “doing well” (to eu zein, to eu prattein) (EN 1095 a 18). The English happi-

nessistoonarrowandsuggestspleasure or the satisfaction of our sensual nature. The Greek conception involved the satisfaction of our active natures as well as the notion of prosperity (euêmeria) and even good luck (eutuchia) (cf. H. H. Joachim, repr. 1962, 28). Armstrong rightly translates “well-being.” Some Aristotelian scholars insist on “human flourishing” (e.g., John M. Cooper, Indianapolis, 1986, 89–90). I prefer “happiness” here simply to avoid confusion. For the question of eudaimonia in Plotinus, see Enneads I, 4 (46) and I, 5 (36).

light of the entire universe’s desire for the divine life, a wisdom reflected for Aris- totle even in frog’s legs or the baser parts of animals. For Plotinus, these two ways of looking at things, while different, are plainly not incompatible, and the at- tempt to think through the puzzles they present will have far-reaching conse- quences. The result is a new theory of nondeliberative but purposeful creation that will have immense influence in Christian, Arabic, and Jewish philosophical theol- ogy. God and creation do not operate in time, for there is no time before the be- ginning of time in which creation could occur. Instead, the physical world is time- lessly unfolded from within the divine intellect. Thus, one can explain why things are like this (in many different ways, for example, by science or art), but one should not suppose that things are like this because of the reasons one gives. In- tellect as a naturally creative force for Plotinus is like the conclusion before the syllogism (cf. V, 8 [31] 7, 36–41), before purposive thought (41–43). Our reasons for things, however accurate or not, are always after the fact since the fact and the cause are already one before we begin to think about them separately. The life of the divine intellect, therefore, is for Plotinus creatively immediate: directly and dynamically present now, neither distantly echoing some divine craftsmanship ir- retrievably past nor indefinitely postponed to some glorious, unattainable “fu- ture.” This theory is also Plotinus’ answer to the Gnostics: we do not need anthro- pomorphic audio-video revelations from other realms that we cannot test by philosophical thought or indeed even by more stable experience since we get swept away immediately by the apocalyptic glitz. Creative contemplation, by con- trast, is silent and so intimately present everywhere for anybody and anything that we do not even notice it (cf. V, 5 [32] 12, 13–14: “but people do not see it be- cause it is present to them as they sleep”).

Presumably, the usual objections to Aristotle’s teleology also will apply to Plotinus’ theory of creative contemplation, namely (1) that it makes everything for the sake of the “whole” (universal teleology); or (2) that it is mere anthropomor- phic mind-projection upon nature; or (3) that it involves vague spiritual “striv- ings” in nature.8 _{Plotinus may well be open to these sort of objections, but in III, 8}

and V, 8 (as well as later in VI, 7 [38] and VI, 8 [39]), he obviously does not

mean such things. So it is important to give him the benefit of the doubt and to see

if he can make a case for a contemplative teleology in ways in which other think- ers (from Aristotle to Leibniz and Kant) might not.