While kills per contact gave one measure of a battalion's operational efficiency, a second can also be seen in the number of eliminations per battalion:
7(^ Interviews with Templer, Henniker and Brooke.
71 As the commander of the brigade in which the Fijian Battalion served put it, 'A Fijian with a Bren Gun can run faster than a Chinaman for his life.' Henniker, Interview.
72 Moreover, in the same period the Malay Regiment had to find a proportion of N.C.O.s for a battalion of the Federation Regiment, an Armoured Car Squadron, a Signal Squadron, and an expanded depot a n d ,training
FIGURE 18
The Average of Battalion Eliminatioiis (1953-1954) by Racial Groups 7 3
1953 1954
Fiji and East African Battalions 60.5 42.0
Gurkha Battalions 32.7 28.1
Malay Battalions 15.7 14.5
British Battalions 22.8 16.0
(Average for all Battalions) 28.4 21.8
Since the daily elimination of insurgents over the whole
Federation seldom amounted to more than a dozen, there was a constant search at every level for better methods. Yet amidst all the experiments, it is surprising how few technical advances had a significant effect on tactical operations. An Infra-Red Alarm System, which was intended to give warning of movement along a track was found to be cumbersome and unreliable.74 A Sniperscope attached to the American Ml and M2 Carbines used by many of the troops to provide a means of observation and sighting at night was too heavy for prolonged use and insufficiently robust and reliable. However, a simple bracket which allowed a torch to be fitted to the barrel of a Bren Gun or a carbine, to focus a beam of light along the line of fire, improved accuracy against both static and moving targets and brought some success in night ambushes.75
The insurgents, like the Mau Mau in Kenya, became so timid in their attempts to avoid contact with the °ecurity Forces, that it became
73 Ibid.
74 Similarly, a Forward Listening Area Device which could pick up the ndse of men approaching an ambush position by means of small microphones placed out in four different directions and pass the resultant signal through an audio-amplifier to a listener wearing headphones who could then trigger an ambush, had limited success. Again, a Small Arms Detector which gave warning of the approach of anyone carrying a weapon, and a Patrol Sender Unit which provided one way radio communications between different patrols in different parts of the country, were found to be too specialised to be of real practical value. Ops Research Memo No. 1/57, pp 23-29.
increasingly difficult to find them.'76 One of the most effective means of doing so was by employing Iban (Sea Dyak) trackers from Borneo, many of whom had been practising head-hunters. These were introduced early in the
insurgency and had been used with great success but their numbers were
limited. This presented a problem. Malay villagers do not normally frequent the jungle, and the Aborigines until relatively late in the campaign were inaccessible and difficult to handle. A Tracker Training Wing was therefore opened at the FARELF Training Centre, and after trials it was found possible to train British soldiers to be trackers. Instructional courses lasting two months were begun in 1954 and, provided they practised daily thereafter, the best soldiers trained in this way could become competent trackers.
Specially trained tracker dogs, employed with a specialist handler were also used and had mixed success. Much depended on the
confidence which patrol commanders had in them, but in comparison with the Mau Mau uprising, where they were used with great success and patrols seldom went out without a dog, tracker dogs were never enthusiastically adopted in Malaya. The higher temperature and humidity of Malaya and the prevalence of pests such as leeches made them less dependable and accounts for much of the difference.77
The basic small arms and light automatic weapons used by troops and police, changed only slightly during the course of the Emergency and, with minor exceptions, a clear pattern had been established by 1954. On patrols the most successful weapon was the United States Ml Carbine, while the Bren Light Machine Gun was universally rated as the best weapon in an ambush. Initially, the rifle most frequently carried in Malaya, the Number 5 75 Troops in Malaya searched for the following sign: (1) Change in the colour
of the vegetation; (2) Unnatural formations in the vegetation; (3) Bruises, breaks and cuts in the vegetation; (4) Water on certain areas whereas the remainder is dry; (5) Mud or soil on grass or bushes; (6) Scars (or foot prints) in bare or muddy ground; (7) Latex exuded from a bruised rubber root; (8) Disturbances in insect life. A T O M , p xxi-2. Operations Research also assisted in identifying the characteristics of insurgent camps. Ninety-eight per cent of them (over five years) were within two miles of habitations or gardens. They were likely to be within 50 to 100 yards of a stream large enough to show on a map scaled 1 inch to 1 mile. Almost all were located between 150 and 250 feet above sea level; the favourite location was on the spur of a mountain, which offered escape routes. The camps were clustered, with up to four or five in two or three adjoining grid squares, although they had all been built at different times. Individual camps were often under outstandingly tall and bushy topped trees. About 70% of the camps were placed so as to catch the morning sun. Ops Research Memo 3/53, pp 1-8.
Rifle, was handicapped because of the time spent in manual reloading, and was rapidly supplanted by the FN Self Loading R.ifle when it became available
in quantity in 1956. The Browning Automatic Shotgun (maximum range 75 yards), proved very effective in ambushes where hitting power and spread of shot were more important than range. But in this connection neither the Sten, Patchett, nor Owen group of sub-machine carbines were popular with the troops and were seldom carried. One reason was the unreliability of ammunition, which was mostly of 1945 vintage combined with the knowledge that if the weapon did not kill first time, the firer was unlikely to get a second chance.78 Both types of grenade in general use throughout the British Army at the time, the
Number 36 (Fragmentation) Grenade, and the Number 80 (White Phosphorus)