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Scholastic Thought

Throughout Frank’s writing on the formal elements of his thought, some of which has been discussed above, there is a lingering worry about the influence of scholastic

worldviews. Indeed scholasticism provides one influence by which scientific theories might be problematically misinterpreted, as discussed in section 3.3. And one of the problematic features of scholastic truth (involving claims that are deemed universally true because they can be derived from first principles), which Frank calls “philosophical truth,” is mentioned by Uebel 2011 as a motivation for Frank’s supposed dismissal of verificationism. But, now that we know that Frank did not fully reject verificationism, we should try to understand how his concern with scholastic thought figured into his philosophy of science.

In this section, I argue that Frank’s concern with scholastic thought motivated his development an account whereby (what I call) “social factors” can figure into a traditional logical empiricist account of meaning. There are two kinds of social factors that play a role in Frank’s mature account of meaning. The first is negative and allows him to identify and eliminate ideological biases. The second kind of social factor is positive, and allows Frank to explain how metaphysical claims are meaningful because it accounts for how political and social beliefs affect our actions. By associating actions and beliefs, Frank argues that we can empirically understand the effects of metaphysical beliefs.

Frank’s form of analysis stands in contrast to a scholastic, or Thomistic, understanding of science and philosophy. Scholastic philosophy sought to develop a stable conceptual framework that did not simply ensure that a particular description of facts might hold true given a particular interpretation, but that this description was necessarily true. Frank appeals to the Thomistic distinction between two criteria for believing that a statement is true:

One reason for believing a statement is that we can derive results from it which can be checked by observation; in other words, we believe in a statement because of its consequences. For example, we believe in Newton’s laws because we can calculate from them the motions of the celestial bodies. The second reason for belief – and medieval philosophy considered this to be the highest one – is that we can believe a statement because it can be derived logically from intelligible principles (Frank 1957, p. 16).

The first criterion of scholastic thought, which Frank calls “the scientific criterion” (ibid.), requires only that the theory should account for physical phenomena. This criterion alone is far too permissive, for it only requires “that these principles may be right, but it does not follow that they must be right” (Frank 1957, p. 16).

In a 1944 essay89, Frank addressed the dual notion of “philosophical” or scholastic truth that is characteristic of Thomistic philosophy. In both essays, the first notion of truth is developed from Osiander's account of empirical adequacy. When Copernicus published his account of the heliocentric solar system, Osiander added a preface explaining that the reader need not believe in the truth of Copernicus’ system. Instead, Osiander argued that the reader need only believe that the system is empirically adequate, or that it explains the phenomena.

The hypotheses of this book are not necessarily true or even probable. Only one thing matters. They must lead by computation to results that are in agreement with the observed phenomena (Osiander [1543], ‘Ad lectorem de hypothesibus huius operis,’ Osiander’s unsigned preface to The Revolutions of the Celestial Bodies, quoted in Frank 1944/1949, p. 223)

Hence the issue of truth was separated from issues having to do with empirical adequacy, scientific fecundity or the explanatory power of the heliocentric system. If the models are regarded as scientific principles only, then Frank is right to conclude, “our observations

89_{This earlier essay of Frank’s was used because it is consistent with the arguments given by Frank in} 1957 and because I believe that his discussions in 1944 add depth to his later discussions, helping us to better understand Frank’s argument.

cannot decide between two principles” (Frank 1957, p. 16). This intellectual permissiveness would allow the Catholic Church to continue to endorse the truth of the geocentric system while also allowing for the technical application of Copernicus’ system. However, that same permissiveness will not help us to uniquely confirm90 the theory. As we can see from the description above, the scientific criterion does not select only one theory. Frank (1957, p. 16) explains that this is so because the scientific criterion does not give us any guidance with regard to what hypothesis we ought to prefer. Many different hypotheses may be confirmed by the same set of observations.

The second aspect of a Thomistic conception of truth requires appeal to first principles, which are regarded by its adherents as the unshakeable foundations of belief. By appeal to these principles, one theory can be uniquely selected for acceptance as true. Necessary truth can be ensured by deduction from these first principles, which are immediately understandable (i.e., “intelligible”) and are taken to be self-evident. On Frank’s analysis, this requires that the principles be expressible in ordinary, uncomplicated language. However, why a particular principle is regarded as intelligible will vary. For example, it may fit within a religious view that is already held, or it may seem to explain a large body of empirical evidence. In any case, the essential element of these kinds of principles is that they are stated in ordinary and simple language. On Frank’s analysis, such principles are rooted in school philosophy (discussed in Chapter 1). In the context of Thomistic thought, these intelligible principles are part of an “organismic” view, one that pictures everything acting as an organism would – i.e.,

90_{In this section (from the 1957 book), Frank uses both “truth” and “confirmation,” but says that the} “correct way of speaking is to say that experiment ‘confirms’ a certain hypothesis” (Frank 1957, p. 16).

intelligibly.

It was believed that everything had a certain nature, and acted according to this nature, which was meant for a certain purpose – the nature of a bird was to fly, of a frog to jump, of a doctor to cure (optimistically speaking), of a stone to fall down, of smoke to go up, of celestial bodies to move in permanent circular motion. Everything acted according to its nature. In a general way, without details, one could derive from this statement how a stone would behave, etc. (Frank 1957, p. 23).

Frank (1957) goes on to ask why it is that people persist with outdated descriptions of the world. He eventually suggests that scholastic philosophers thought these (outdated) principles were more intelligible and possessed greater dignity. These principles originate from “vague analogies with everyday experience,” analogies that seem plausible (Frank 1957, p. 41). In other words, these analogies satisfy our common- sense assumptions. So, when a scientific theory contradicts our common-sense assumptions, we are inclined to reject it.

But, what is the nature of this rejection? Scientific systems may be rejected because of a desire to preserve consistency within our set of philosophical beliefs. This desire to preserve consistency is pragmatic, for it figures into what we do with our beliefs (e.g., whether we accept theory x or not) and not how we form those beliefs. For this reason, it is important to understand the pragmatic effect of intelligible principles.

In a way, these “intelligible” principles are more practical in their effects than the physical principles. The technical effects of science are more indirect than a blunt command to someone as to what he must do. Thus the most general principles are also practical but on a different level – in a way, they are more practical. Bluntly speaking, science proper provides us with the technical means by which we can produce weapons to defeat the enemy, but the philosophic interpretation of science can direct man in such a way that he makes actual use of the weapons (Frank 1957, p. 19).

The introduction of social factors is Frank’s attempt to address the pragmatic problems introduced by metaphysical systems of thought (in this case, those that reference

intelligible principles). While Frank does not think that the philosophical system (Thomism) on which the principles he is considering are based is tenable, he seems to be primarily concerned with the social effects of these systems of thought. Thus Frank seeks to analyze Thomism and other troubling variants of school philosophy by understanding them through the application of logical empiricist thought. Frank achieves this goal by empirically understanding how these systems of belief seek to direct human conduct. So, in addition to explaining why he thinks Thomistic philosophy persisted, Frank also seeks to understand its social role and effects. He asks: “On what grounds is such a statement accepted? What is its practical function? Such statements have just as practical results as the scientific ones; they have a direct effect on human behavior” (Frank 1957, p. 37). In the next section we will examine why Frank regards “effects on human behavior” as a practical result.