POBLACIÓN Y MUESTRA

For all Beust's vacillation on the subject, a number of documents from early 1869 show that Austro-Hungarian policy regarding Bosnia was still guided by traditional considerations. Memoranda produced in January 1869 by Colonel Beck, chief o f the Emperor's military chancellery, and his subordinate Captain Thoemmel, represent a significant counter-weight to Andrâssy's and Kâllay's Bosnian project, since Francis Joseph was bound to take seriously the opinion of his military experts.^

For Thoemmel the bottom line for the Monarchy was clear:

Oesterreich mu6 um jeden Preis verhindem, dafi Serbien Herr von Bosnien werde, weil damit, der Besiz Dalmatiens sehr gefahrdet und der schon jetzt beachtenswerthe moralische BinfluB Serbiens auf die griechisch-orthodoxe

Bevolkerung der Militar-Grenze, bedenklich werden konnte.

This did not rule out a partition between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, Just as important was to secure for the Monarchy the most mineral-rich valleys, which were also the easiest trade routes. Failing to do so, and above all letting Serbia take over the Hercegovina, meant giving it control of these trade routes and permitting it access to the Adriatic.^^

Beck roundly described a forcible entry by Serbia and Montenegro into Bosnia- Hercegovina as "mit der Lebensfrage der osterreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie in enger Verbindung." It could have disastrous consequences for the latter's internal stability. Any indication that Bosnia was about to slip from the Porte's control

demanded an end to the Monarchy's conservative policy, and an active push to secure "einen strategisch und kommerziell zweckmaGig begrenzten Lander-Antheil." Serbia would probably have to be bought off, but the military were under no illusions as to who the enemy was. "Was es [Austria] bei der ersten Theilung Bosniens nicht erhalt,

ist für immer verloren, und kommt nur den Feinden zu Gute."^

There is no documentation of Francis Joseph's reaction to these memoranda, but the thinking which informs both of them might explain the Emperor's otherwise surprising assent to the Andrassy scheme. The Hungarian plan clearly involved a disturbance of the status quo in the Balkans, and for radical reasons in diplomatic terms. Andrâssy and Kâllay aimed to win the Serbs over with concessions, on condition that Serbia bound itself unequivocally to the Monarchy, or at least its Hungarian half. The military advanced more conventional arguments of strategic and commercial advantage, as a justification for ending the status quo, and stressed the imperative need to assure the Monarchy a share in the spoils. Although the Emperor was in no way committed to a partition of the Ottoman Empire, territorial gains of the sort entertained by Beck and Thoemmel may well have been his own condition for letting Andrâssy go ahead. More than one authority, with only a sketchy knowledge of the Hungarian scheme, has pointed to the psychological appeal, for Francis Joseph, of gaining territory rather than losing it as a motive inclining him to occupy Bosnia.^^ The compromise partition envisaged in the late 1860's, therefore, can be seen as a staging-post on the way to sole occupation by Austria-Hungary in the late 1870's.

Beust's position is better documented. The chancellor saw the question in terms of its possible effect on the broader scene, and shrank from violent change. In a

memorandum of 3 February, Beust started from the truism, ignored by Andrâssy, that since "le maintien de la paix nous est encore essentiel", the Monarchy had perforce to reserve "tous nos moyens pour paralyser une action éventuelle de la Russie."98 War was simply not an option. Alluding to his proposals of 1867, Beust insisted that the Monarchy's policy remained the same: to contain Greece, Roumania and Serbia, while at the same time striving to better the position of the Balkan Christians generally.

Beust conceded that Serbia was still least overtly hostile to the Turks. Hence, Si, au prix de quelques concessions, la Porte se délivrait de

toute inquiétude du côté de la frontière serbe, elle n'aurait pas à regretter ce sacrifice.^

The intriguing question here is the nature of the concessions Beust had in mind. Was he resigned to letting the Hungarian initiative run its course, aware that he could do

little to obstruct it? Was he hoping that, against all his expectations, something would come of it, that the Porte would see reason in the Hungarian plan and acquiesce? What seems certain is that Beust did not, like the military, favour annexation of Bosnia for its own sake; nor did he really believe in the Hungarian policy of winning Serbia over by concessions.

The real priority for the imperial government was to open up Turkey-in-Europe to economic development, and thus stabilise the situation in the Near East. This could only be done by hurrying ahead with the railway between Vienna and

Constantinople. As far as Beust was concerned, it was essential that construction of such a strategic link should be concerted solely between the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary. Any other power dominant in this area

disposerait pour ainsi dire des clefs de notre Empire et aurait le pouvoir de nous fermer à son gré les débouchés naturels de l'activité industrielle et commercial de nos peuples.

So important did Beust consider this that he raised it at the common ministerial council on 9 February 1869, discussing railways in Dalmatia. In a clear reference to both the Andrâssy plan and the Beck and Thoemmel memoranda, Beust mentioned "den

immerhin im Bereiche der Moglichkeit liegenden Fall der Erwerbung weiterer Strecken

des H i n t e r l a n d e s . " i ® 2 Bosnia was an obvious means of safeguarding the Vienna-

Constantinople route, and it was vital, whether there was a partition or not, that the province not fall into the wrong hands.

As for the Balkan states themselves, Serbia included, Beust was determined to keep them small, divided and dependent, So, despite Beust's seeming acquiescence in the Andrâssy plan, and despite the justice of the remark by one historian that the

chancellor's stance on the Bosnian question remained unclear, certain conclusions are in order.

Beust's preference was for the status quo, but he was not above contemplating at least partial occupation of Bosnia by the Monarchy. This, if it had to happen at all, would in his eyes be for purely defensive, strategic reasons. Beust cannot have

regarded as desirable even the partial expansion of Serbia as envisaged by the Andrâssy plan, although he may have resigned himself to accepting it, if the Emperor persisted in

giving Andrassy his support in the matter. What is most likely is that Beust was resolved to resist the plan as far as he practically could without distancing himself too much from the Emperor. Kâllay was right in anticipating further delaying tactics from Vienna.

There was a natural tendency, however, among foreign diplomats to assume that the Bosnian plan was a truly Austro-Hungarian initiative. No one could realise just how fractured was the process whereby the plan was eventually 'agreed' upon. That it was primarily Hungarian in origin was generally appreciated; that Beust was a reluctant spectator, rather than a determined advocate, was at first missed.

Meanwhile Beust's reservations had received reinforcement from Prokesch-Osten. There was a sting in Prokesch's remark that,

je lui [Kâllay] suppose, à cause de son origine hongroise, trop de perspicacité pour le croire capable d'appuyer un projet dont la réussite menacerait l'Hongrie de sérieux embarras dans ses provinces méridionales slaves.

By late March, however, Prokesch could no longer deny that the policy he represented in Constantinople was not that pursued by Kâllay. To the British ambassador, he expressed "in the strongest manner" his disapproval of Kâllay's "short-sightedness" in encouraging the Serbs. Confronted by the Grand Vizier with clear evidence of Kâllay's support for ceding Bosnia to Serbia, and reminded how incompatible this was with traditional Austrian policy, Prokesch sought refuge in equivocation. To attribute to Hungary's leaders such a "Verlaugnung der Reichspolitik" would be to believe them capable o f a course which, "man moge ihn verkleiden wie man wolle, Handlanger- Arbeit fur Rufiland ware."^®® Everything in the tone of Prokesch's reports to Beust indicates that he expected the chancellor to back him and not Kâllay.

As of the end o f March 1869, moreover, Beust still seemed to be in agreement with Prokesch, endorsing his view that "no encouragement" should be given the Serbs. To the British ambassador, Beust admitted that Kâllay

had been under the influence of the Hungarian Government, who were in the habit of communicating directly with him upon various local affairs. The ideas which formed the subject o f our Conversation had issued from Pesth and not from

Vienna, but we should hear no more about them and Mr.

Kell ay [sic] would abstain from giving encouragement to the ambitions of the Servians to look to any annexation of the Sclave Districts of Turkey.

In the light of what Beust was about to concede, this was a particularly vain assertion. 48: Beust Gives Way

At the beginning of April 1869 Kâllay travelled up to Pest for leave, in the course of which he finally had the Bosnian matter out with B e u s t . Andrâssy informed Kâllay on 4 April that he had broached the subject "several times" with both Francis Joseph and Beust; m but the latter

is still preoccupied solely with South Germany, and in the eastern question, it seems, he is only inclined to give way when Andrassy, for his part, gives way with

regard to German policy. Andrâssy therefore had apian,

by which we offer the Turks effective help in the event of a war with Russia, but on condition that they agree to carry out the Bosnian plan. Beust to begin with was

scared even by this, saying that before the Crimean War Austria concluded a secret alliance with Russia to the effect that in the event of Turkey's disintegration the two of them would divide up the remains, this treaty would now be more suitable for Austria than an alliance with T u r k e y .

Beust was clearly making yet another plea for a policy o f cautious cooperation with Russia in the Balkans. Andrâssy, however, "energetically and efficaciously explained to him the danger of friendship with Russia."

Faced with Andrâssy’s persistence, Beust appears again to have concluded that direct opposition was futile. When Kâllay saw him in Buda on 6 April, the chancellor made a remarkable admission. As expected, he stressed that "the matter is not an easy one, indeed is surrounded by great d i f f i c u l t i e s . H o w e v e r ,

although the idea did not originate with him, nevertheless he is not against it, he even authorised me in this connection to announce to the Serbian government that we wiU not hinder its aspirations.

In response to Kâllay's enquiry as to what he should do if the Serbs took further measures, Beust simply told him to report it to those above him.

so Convinced that he had a free hand, he told Kâllay that the Serbian Regents could once again be urged to submit their memorandum, "which we will then

s u p p o r t . " Y e t Beust, when Kâllay saw him again on 7 April, was adamant that the strictest secrecy must be preserved. Kâllay could confide only in the French consul at Belgrade, Beust said, since France was already apprised o f the plan and, it was hoped, this time would act in concert with the Monarchy.

Beust's concern for secrecy is explicable on two counts. For one, he was undoubtedly anxious to allay the disquiet that rumours of the Bosnian scheme had already aroused abroad. For another, by keeping everything as far as possible under wraps he may have sought to conceal from the Hungarians the extent to which he had been trying to dissociate himself from the plan and discredit it.

It is hard not to conclude that Beust had no clear alternative to Andrâssy’s Bosnian project, or rather, had not the stomach to defend the only obvious alternative. This was the policy outlined by Beust himself on several occasions, namely, defence of the territorial status quo in the Ottoman Empire, but linked to reforms designed to defuse the potentially explosive situation in the Balkans.

The charge of supine acquiescence, moreover, makes more sense of Beust's policy than previous interpretations. Those historians, primarily Yugoslav, who have seen, in every Bosnian initiative from 1867 on, a cleverly thought out dual strategy by Beust and Andrâssy, ignore the very real antagonism between the two men.^^o g y June 1869, a propos o f the conflict between eastern and western priorities, Beust was

complaining that "Kein Minister mehr behindert sein kann als ich durch A n d r â ssy ." In view o f Beust's known views on the Eastern Question, the conspiracy theory simply does not add up. Far more likely is that Beust, seeing that he could not control Andrâssy, decided to let him field his ideas, which Beust could then disavow, and see how far they went. If they worked, which Beust cannot have believed they would, fine; if not, Beust could shrug his shoulders and claim, as he was to complain about

Andrâssy in 1870, that he "was obliged to bear much from him." 1^2 jt was a peculiar way to conduct foreign policy; but then, the Dual Monarchy was a peculiar institution.

Kâllay was quick to perceive the lack of enthusiasm for the project in Vienna. At

the beginning of May he and counsellor De Pont, of the foreign ministry, discussed the plan. De Pont, undoubtedly echoing Beust, was "afraid that Serbia, if it acquires Bosnia will want still more, and sooner or later will attract to itself both Dalmatia and C r o a t i a . " 1 2 3 Kâllay replied that the antagonism between Serbs and Croats over Bosnia was so strong that

if we were to strengthen both (Croatia by the annexation of Dalmatia and the Border and Serbia by the cession o f Bosnia), we can only increase this antagonism, so we could even in the given circumstances by means of Croatia, acquire B o s n i a . 124

Kâllay had to conclude that "We weren't able, however, to convince one another o f our points o f view." 125

Even before Kâllay returned to Belgrade, he received the clear impression that Beust was in no hurry to see the plan implemented. On 18 May the chancellor "expressed himself very vaguely, said that it is necessary to act reassuringly." 12^ Back in Belgrade, all Kâllay heard, from both Vienna and Constantinople, was of the need "to proceed with the Bosnian question with caution. "12? The Porte, according to Prokesch, was seriously alarmed at Kâllay's activities. 12* Beust and Prokesch can hardly have wanted the Turks to believe that Vienna supported the plan as wholeheartedly as Pest.