Facts: Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., is an 82 year old retired schoolteacher (now deceased) who was hit by a Pinoy jeep while he was walking along Roxas Ave., Roxas City, at 6:30 p.m. The jeep was owned by Filamer Christian Institute (FCI), and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha. Funtecha was a student at the school who was assigned work in exchange for free education. He was accompanied by Allan Masa; they both fled the scene. Kapunan was brought by a tricycle driver to the hospital, where he stayed for 20 days.
Evidence establishes that only one headlight was functioning at the time. Funtecha only had a student permit, but he convinced Allan Masa – the authorized driver – to allow him to drive.
Kapunan filed a criminal case against Funtecha alone for physical injuries through reckless imprudence; he reserved the right to file an independent civil action. Funtecha was found guilty.
Kapunan also filed a civil action for damages before the RTC against FCI, Funtecha, and Masa – Allan was not included. Agustin Masa – the president and director - was being sued in his personal capacity for allegedly allowing Funtecha – his houseboy - to drive despite not having a license. The RTC found Filamer, Funtecha, and Allan Masa (a non-party) solidarily liable. Zenith Insurance Corp. was likewise ordered to pay FCI.
FCI and Zenith appealed, but the latter‘s appeal was dismissed for non-payment of docket fees. Issue: Whether or not employer in Art. 2180 applies to FCI as regards Funtecha.
Held: NO. In disclaiming liability, Filamer has invoked the provisions of the Labor Code, 7 specifically Section 14, Rule X of Book III which reads:
Sec. 14. Working scholars. — There is no employer-employee relationship between students on the one hand, and schools, colleges or universities on the other, where students work for the latter in exchange for the privilege to study free of charge; provided the students are given real opportunity, including such facilities as may be reasonable, necessary to finish their chosen court under such arrangement.
It is manifest that under the just-quoted provision of law, Filamer cannot be considered as Funtecha's employer. Funtecha belongs to that special category of students who render service to the school in exchange for free tuition. Funtecha worked for FCI for 2 hours daily for 5 days a week. He was assigned to clean the school passageways from 4:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. with sufficient time to prepare for his 7:30 a.m. classes. As admitted by Agustin Masa in open court, Funtecha was not included in the company payroll.
The wording of Section 14 is clear and explicit and leaves no room for equivocation. To dismiss the implementing rule as one which governs only the "personal relationship" between the school and its students and not where there is already a third person involved, as espoused by private respondents, is to read into the law something that was not legislated there in the first place. The provision of Section 14 is obviously intended to eliminate an erstwhile gray area in labor relations and seeks to define in categorical terms the precise status of working scholars in relation to the learning institutions in which they work for the privilege of a free education.
But even if we were to concede the status of an employee on Funtecha, still the primary responsibility for his wrongdoing cannot be imputed to FCI for the plain reason that at the time of the accident, it has been satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was not acting within the scope of his supposed employment.
His duty was to sweep the school passages for 2 hours every morning before his regular classes. Taking the wheels of the Pinoy jeep from the authorized driver at 6:30 in the evening and then driving the vehicle in a reckless manner resulting in multiple injuries to a third person were certainly not within the ambit of his assigned tasks. In other words, at the time of the injury, Funtecha was not engaged in the execution of the janitorial services for which he was employed, but for some purpose of his own. It is but fair therefore that Funtecha should bear the full brunt of his tortious negligence. Filamer cannot be made liable for the damages he had caused.
Private respondents' attempt to hold petitioner Filamer directly and primarily answerable to the injured party under Article 2180 of the Civil Code would have prospered had they proceeded against Allan Masa, the authorized driver of the Pinoy jeep and undisputably an employee of petitioner. It was Allan's irresponsible act of entrusting the wheels of the vehicle to the inexperienced Funtecha which set into motion the chain of events leading to the accident resulting in injuries to Kapunan, Sr. But under the present set of circumstances, even if the trial court did find Allan guilty of negligence, such conclusion would not be binding on Allan. It must be recalled that Allan was never impleaded in the complaint for damages and should be considered as a stranger as far as the trial court's judgment is concerned. It is axiomatic that no man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger.