A logical starting point would be a discussion of the two dominant research paradigms of positivism and constructivism. These philosophies have a fundamental influence on purpose and approach of business research (Adcroft & Willis, 2008). It should be stated from the outset that debates on social science paradigms have been on-going for hundreds of years and no categorical conclusions have yet been drawn. Positivism is perhaps the most mature of paradigms (Guba & Lincoln, 1994) but its position in the wider
epistemology debate remains in a formative phase. Positivism is the most widely used paradigm (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; Healy & Perry, 2000). The positivist researchers quantitatively measure real facts and investigate cause and effect. Philosophically
speaking, they detach themselves from the world of study so that they can measure objectively, without imposing themselves on their findings. In their objectivity there is a one direction perspective whereby the assumption is that data does not change because it is being observed. Guba & Lincoln, (1994, pp 110), called this “a one way mirror”. The assumed outcomes of the positivist approach are findings which are generalizable, true, and have a predictive function.
The ‘scientific’ approach that positivism espouses inevitably leads to an emphasis on reliability. In other words, statistical methods can show if the researchers are measuring phenomena consistently. However, when researching complex social sciences such as Competitive Intelligence, treating respondents as independent non-reflective beings is most likely a falsehood. This is corroborated by Healy & Perry, (2000, pp 119) who stated “a positivism view is inappropriate when approaching a social science phenomenon like marketing networks which involve humans and their real-life experiences”. Furthermore, the positivism paradigm does not necessarily cater to the discovery dimensions of inquiry (Deshpande, 1983; Guba & Lincoln, 1994) and therefore is weak on theory generation.
Sobh & Perry (2005) argue that positivism as a predominant paradigm in marketing and similar social sciences has had disappointing results.
Post-positivists have been trying to amend criticisms of positivism for some time. Popper (1959) postulated ‘falsification’ whereby while absolute truths cannot be found it is possible to reject false beliefs. In ontological terms, Popper identified a ‘third world’ that
82 was neither positivist (objective) nor critical theory and constructivism (subjective). This
‘third world’ is described by Healy & Perry, (2000, pp 120) as “related to realism and consists of abstract things that are born of people’s minds but exist independently of any one person”. Another influential post-positivist, Kuhn (1962), proposed entire ‘paradigm shifts’ to account for evidence and not only individual theories. That is to say, scientific revolutions are noncumulative. New paradigms emerge to replace or complement old ones and competing paradigms can exist simultaneously (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). More recent ‘paradigm wars’ have not exhausted the question of what should be the
epistemological and methodological foundation for marketing. Kavanagh (1994) identified Hunt and Anderson as two academic leaders in terms of output on this debate. Taking an ontological approach Kavanagh (1994) presented the debate in terms of territory, theology and technology, with the goal of refocusing debate rather than ending it. What can be stated unequivocally about research output in marketing is that it remains predominantly quantitative, and therefore positivist. Hanson & Grimmer (2007) concluded after an extensive study that quantitative research was dominant in major marketing journals. It is noteworthy that post-positivism is considered a better term for quantitative research than positivism for today’s practicing researchers (Phillips & Burbules, 2000).
Constructivists as opposed to positivist or indeed post-positivist researchers can claim to believe in multiple even contradictory realities (Creswell, 2007; Onwuegbuzie et al, 2009).
This paradigm emerged in the 1970s and 1980s (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). In this paradigm people ‘construct’ the world and therefore they should be the focus of
investigation (Sobh & Perry, 2005). A synonym of constructivism, interpretive research (Creswell, 2007), is so named as researchers interpret what they find knowing full well that their own background and experiences will shape their findings. Reality is linked to place and situation (Creswell & Miller, 2000). While this intimate sharing of multiple realities may explore individual views of the world, it is unlikely to contribute much to the wider phenomena of influence drivers on CI. A picture of many players making collective transactions in a market is needed. Moreover, constructivists do not believe in
distinguishing cause from effects (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). This study is investigating the roles (cause) of influence drivers on CI (effects).
A third research paradigm, pragmatism, has been proposed as the philosophical partner of mixed methods research (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). In other words, research
83 methods should be combined in ways to answer research questions effectively (workable solutions) as opposed to defending dogmas or taking positions on traditional dualisms. The roots of this philosophy go back at least a hundred years with Peirce (1878), James (1907) and Dewey (1920) all guided by the principle that dualistic disputes are interminable and the real questions should address consequences and what next issues. The following synthesis of pragmatist philosophy advantages and disadvantages can help researchers position their approach. Johnson & Onwuegbuzie (2004) cautioned researchers to avoid or at least mitigate the potential weaknesses of pragmatism. Denscombe (2008) also
cautioned researchers not to use pragmatism for expediency. Table 5.1 presents pragmatism as an alternative in a social science research.
Table 5.1 A Pragmatic Alternative to the Key Issues in Social Science Research (Morgan, 2007)
Key Issues Qualitative Approach
Quantitative Approach
Pragmatic Approach Connection of theory
and data
Induction Deduction Abduction
Relationship to research process
Subjectivity Objectivity Inter-subjectivity Inference from data Context Generality Transferability
In examining the implications of combining qualitative and quantitative methods Morgan (2007) stated that in practice researchers never operate in one direction when moving between data and theory. As Morgan (2007, pp 72) put it “abductive reasoning moves back and forth between induction and deduction first converting observations into theories and then assessing those theories through action”. The process of abduction in this study is fully documented in section 5.5.
The same logic applies to both subjectivity and objectivity: in practice researchers pass from one to the other which is named inter-subjectivity. Transferability refers to
investigating the factors which would permit or obstruct the findings being transferable to other settings. Deduction, which is making logical correct conclusions from an argument, does not necessarily have to involve empirical data (Downward & Mearman, 2006).
Nevertheless, this reasoning works best in closed systems, value free, which is seldom the
84 case in a CI context (Fleisher & Wright, 2008). Table 5.2 compares and contrasts
positivist, pragmatist, and constructivist paradigms. The weaknesses to consider when using pragmatism (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004) include:
Pragmatism may promote incremental change rather than more fundamental change, structural, or revolutionary change in society.
What is meant by usefulness or workable can be vague unless explicitly addressed by a researcher.
Pragmatic theories of truth have difficulty dealing with the cases of useful but not true beliefs or propositions and non-useful but true beliefs or propositions.
Table 5.2 The Characteristics of Positivism, Pragmatism and Constructivism (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004)
Characteristic Positivist Pragmatist Constructivist Endorses fallibilism (current beliefs
and conclusions are rarely if ever perfect, absolute)
No Yes Yes
Endorses eclecticism (different, even conflicting theories, can be useful)
No Yes Yes
Endorses reductionism (Reducing culture, thoughts and beliefs to nothing more than neurobiological processes)
No No Yes
Endorses dualisms (only one way is the right way)
Yes No Yes
Endorses a values oriented approach No Yes Yes
Endorses truth as provisional (meaning and knowledge change over time)
No Yes Yes
Endorses multiple realities No Yes Yes
Endorses inter-actionalism (research reflects social relationships which are inherently subjective,
Downward & Mearman, 2006)
No Yes Yes