Determinación de la CMI

When the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal reached its final Award on December 12th 1979, the Government of Gujarat had already begun the planning of the use of their share. They had decided on the main features of the Sardar Sarovar Project, the height of the dam and the length of the main canal, and the main principles of water conveyance and allocation. The main features of the command area of the project were fixed by the Tribunal based on the plans already developed by Gujarat for the Narmada water (Narmada Planning Group 1989). The Government of Gujarat had approached several donors, including the World Bank, for funding of the project, and was told to improve the planning of the project. In 1980, Yoginder K. Alagh was approached by the new Chief Minister of Gujarat, Madhavsinh Solanki of the

162 Congress Party (who had come to power in early June 1980) and was asked to lead the planning group of the SSP, the Narmada Planning Group. Alagh had just returned to his position as an economics professor at the Sardar Patel Institute of Economic and Social Research in Ahmedabad after a five-year position as advisor to the Indian Planning Commission in New Dehli. He agreed to meet with the leader of the World Bank Mission visiting Gujarat at the time, the Swede Mr Per Ljung, who told him that they could see no proper plan for the project, “nothing more than lines on a map” (Alagh, interview, 1.12.2004). Alagh agreed to lead the Narmada Planning Group on certain conditions: He demanded the right to handpick his planning-committee members and executing staff, and the right to raise policy issues directly with the highest levels of government (Alagh interview, 1.12.2004). In addition to the NPG, the Government established a Coordination Committee for the Narmada Project headed by the Chief Minister. Members were the Finance Minister Sanat Mehta and the Irrigation Minister Amarsinh Chaudhuri and Alagh was convenor. The Government of Gujarat decided that the leader of the opposition should be involved in the process because it would involve financial allocations and would come under legislative scrutiny. Alagh points out that the “planning process would have been impossible if every Rupee had been contested in the State Assembly” (Alagh, interview, 1.12.2004). He met with the then leader of opposition, Keshubhai Patel of the BJP, in 1981 and 1982 to discuss the planning progress (personal communication, Y.K.Alagh, email 4.9.2009). Keshubhai Patel had earlier been deeply involved in the Narmada issue as he was Irrigation Minister in the Janata Government from 1977 to 1979. The work of the Narmada Planning Group itself was financed by the UNDP and the World Bank (World Bank 1994).

In Gujarat, all major political parties (the Congress, the BJP, and the Janata Dal) have strongly supported the Sardar Sarovar Project through all the years of project planning, implementation and conflict, and the main line of conflict between the parties have been when the opposition accuses the sitting government for not completing the project fast enough, or for claiming undue political credits for bringing Narmada water to Gujarat97.

97 _{As in 2004, when Congress claimed to have a “lion‟s share in the progress of the dam”, and that “most of the}

hurdles in expediting the project, were cleared by the then Congress governments.” (“Cong claims lion‟s share in progress of Narmada dam”, Times of India, Ahmedabad edition, March 21, 2004).

163 The Narmada Planning Group (NPG) was a multi-disciplinary group of experts working part time or full time. Their task was to make a detailed and feasible plan for the use of the Narmada water in Phase 1 of the command area, and a reconnaissance plan for Phase 2 of the command area. They were also responsible for analyzing the financial and economic benefits of the project, in close collaboration with World Bank staff (World Bank 1994). The NPG was a rather small group, but it made use of the expertise of numerous research institutes within and outside Gujarat and India, and commissioned a range of studies investigating the physical and social aspects of the command area, as well as environmental and resettlement concerns (World Bank 1994). Eleven preparatory studies were done in the years 1981 to 1983 (SSNNL 1999) and formed the basis on which the master plan for the SSP was developed98. This plan was ready in early 1983 and sent to the World Bank for approval. The project appraisal was carried out by the World Bank during 17 months between March 1983 and August 1984, and the project was approved by the World Bank board in March 1985. The Narmada Planning Group worked as an independent expert group under the Government of Gujarat in collaboration with the Narmada Development Department (NDD). In May 1988, the responsibilities of the NDD were transferred to a new government-owned institution, the Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd (SSNNL) (World Bank 1994). The Narmada Planning Group continued its work into the mid-1990s, until its functions were gradually taken over by the Command Area Development Wing of the SSNNL, and the NPG “died a natural death” (Alagh interview 1.12.2004)99.

The studies done by the NPG were not intended to explore whether the Sardar Sarovar dam and canal irrigation project was a good idea, or whether other alternatives could solve the problems in question at lesser cost. The Government of Gujarat had fought for a large share of the Narmada water for almost 35 years and was convinced that the Narmada water was the only option for securing the water needs of the state. The main features of the project had already been decided. The purpose of the NPG was to develop a plan for the best possible utilization of the Narmada water allocated to Gujarat in the Tribunal Award, while at the same time complying with the standards and conditions for World Bank funding.

98

The planning studies continued through the 1980s and 1990s, 21 studies were completed in the 1980s and 21 during the 1990s (SSNNL 1999).

99 _{The last publication I have from the Narmada Planning Group is a paper presented at the Silver Jubilee}

164 According to Y.K. Alagh, the planners went to the task with enthusiasm, often working into the early hours of the morning (Alagh 1991b):

“There was only one ambition. Sardar Sarovar was western India‟s and Gujarat‟s last great real physical resource. It must be used in the most socially productive manner.” (Alagh 1991b:56)

V.M. Patel, former Director of Perspective Planning in the Government of Gujarat and advisor to the NPG, says that the benefits of the project were understood to be so obvious that a benefit-cost analysis was not considered necessary at first:

“[t]he benefits, especially the irrigation benefits to the drought-prone areas and domestic water supply to the water-scarce areas were so attractive and large that the project was considered as economically viable at its face value even without a detailed economic analysis.” (Patel 1991c:101)

However, the World Bank required a benefit-cost analysis and the consultancy TECS was commissioned to do one in December 1981. Their results were ready by April 1983, and a favourable view of the project is evident also in their report; they write that the Sardar Sarovar Project is a “mighty” project (TECS 1983:80) and concludes happily that “[i]t is heartening

to note that the project turns out to be quite beneficial even if all calculations are based on

market prices” (preface, TECS 1983, emphasis added). In the early 1980s, diverting Narmada river water for the drought-prone areas of Gujarat seemed a common-sensical development project, and stood in a long line of earlier water projects in India. As we shall see later, the Government of Gujarat and the SSP planners were not prepared for the scale of the opposition to the project later to come.

Gujarat had struggled for many years for a share of the Narmada River‟s water. Many of the persons who were part of the planning of the Sardar Sarovar Project in the 1980s and 1990s had been involved since the beginning of the interstate disputes over the water. Sanat Mehta, for example, who was Finance Minister of Gujarat in the Congress Government from1980 to 1985, and the first Chairman of the SSNNL from 1988 to 1990 and later from 1992 to 1994, had actively campaigned for development of the Narmada water since the 1950s, and described the project in 2006 as “the mission of his life right from the young age” (interview 2006). On becoming a member of the Upper House of the Legislative Assembly of Bombay

165 State in 1958100, the first question he raised in the Assembly was when the Narmada Project would be sanctioned (interview 2006). When Mr Khosla, who headed the Khosla committee101 came to Baroda in 1965, Mehta asked him the same question:

“I said, you are presiding over the meeting, can you tell me when the project will become reality? And what was his remark, you know? He said: you are a young man, why are you so frustrated? Then I replied: I am young in age, but old for Narmada.” (interview, Sanat Mehta 2006)

Another “old-timer” for the Narmada was C.C.Patel, the Chairman of the Nigam from April 1990 to November 1992. He had been an expert advisor during the surveying of the Narmada Valley for suitable dam sites in the early 1960s102 (Dalal 1991). The hegemonic development perspectives of the 1950s and 1960s had influential carriers in the planning and later defense of the SSP in the 1980s and 1990s, and these development visions were not limited to the small circle of SSP planners. For example, one of the nestors of water management in Gujarat and the leader of the large NGO the Development Support Centre, Anil Shah, told me that he saw the SSP as “part of the larger process of development in India which started after Independence and is slowly transforming the country” and that he expected the project to have great impacts on the economy and poverty if managed properly (interview 3.3.2006).

Main aims of the Sardar Sarovar Project

Agriculture in most parts of Gujarat was (and still is, given the delays and limited coverage of the SSP), as described in Chapter 3, a gamble on the monsoon, and productivity fluctuated greatly and had negative impacts on the economy at large. At the same time, the Narmada River was “flowing waste” to the Arabian Sea, only six percent of its water being utilised (Narmada Planning Group 1989). Alagh et al. (1995) show the destabilising effects of drought on agricultural production in a table comparing agricultural production in index numbers

100 _{Gujarat and Maharashtra became separate states in 1960, and both were Bombay State before that.} 101

The Khosla committee was established in 1964 to solve the interstate dispute over the Narmada river water (see Chapter 4).

102 _{He had suggested in 1962, that with a slight shift of the dam upstream from the site first proposed, the dam‟s}

166 relative to the average agricultural production in 1967-70103. The fluctuations are displayed in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3. Fluctuations in agricultural production, Gujarat, 1970-1990

The main aim of the SSP development plan was to stabilize the economy of the state through assured irrigation (Narmada Planning Group 1989). The SSP will “put the Gujarat economy on a new equilibrium,” said D.T.Lakdawala, former Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, an equilibrium where the prerequisites for a high agricultural and industrial growth will be assured” (Lakdawala 1995:8). However, economic growth was not the only goal, but to maximise the social returns to water. The chosen irrigation strategy was therefore one of extensive irrigation with a limited amount of water over as many acres as possible, “less than would be needed to get the maximum yield from that acre” (Narmada Planning Group 1989:99). The World Bank never questioned this principle, and writes in the project completion report that: “Because the appraisal team took for granted the concept of water

103 _{Figure derived from table in Annex 3.1 “Index number of Agricultural Production in Gujarat Base: Triennium}

Ending 1969-70=100” (Alagh, Pathak et al. 1995). 0 50 100 150 200 250 Index v a lues Agricultural year Index 100=Triennium ending 1969-70

167 spreading which prevailed at that time for social reasons, it did not consider the more intensive irrigation options which were known to yield higher rates of return” (World Bank 1994:6). The chosen strategy “gave higher priority to the project‟s equity and social aspects than to economic considerations”, and “was accepted by the Bank as consistent with the goal of reducing poverty” (World Bank 1994:6).

The expectations to the project, as expressed in Planning for prosperity, are high: “The pace of low growth and intense fluctuations in the agrarian economy will be over after the completion of the Narmada Project,” announced the NPG (Narmada Planning Group 1989:10). “Virtual elimination of poverty” would result from the rise in agricultural wage levels following irrigation development, and the increased production would “absorb a large number of the 1.5 million unemployed and under-employed” in Gujarat (Narmada Planning Group 1989:10-11). With assured irrigation, the planners expected a Green Revolution to take place in Gujarat, the creation of “a vibrant forward looking agriculture through irrigation- HYV-fertilizer based new technology” (Pathak 1995a:91) which the Gujarati farmers were prepared for given their many demonstrations of an “entrepreneurial mindset” (Narmada Planning Group 1989)104. The NPG estimates that in the decade from 1981 to 2001 the annual growth in gross output of agriculture would be 7.5% in the Narmada command area, as compared to 2.2% in Gujarat state in the decade from 1970 to 1980 (Narmada Planning Group 1989:7).

There is also a nation-building element to the management of natural resources and transfer of resources from areas of plenty to areas of scarcity. In several papers, C.C. Patel105 argues that a hydraulic reconfiguration of the Indian landscape through the linking of rivers and transfer of water from surplus to deficit watersheds is important for national unity (Patel 1991b; 1995b). The larger River Linking programme which has become a matter of controversy in India in the 21st century was already part of the vision of the early SSP planners106, the Master

104 _{For example: “The history of agricultural development in Gujarat underscores outstanding examples of the}

enterprising attitude of cultivators in the State in the past” (Narmada Planning Group 1989:82).

105_{Engineer by profession, Chairman of the SSNNL 1990-92, and involved in the Narmada projects from the}

1960s.

106 _{“If we have to come out from droughts, we must build all the dams, big and small, and connect the river}

systems within the country by a common grid which will integrate even the international rivers. This alone could be a guarantee for food and water for all and such a grid alone can provide unbreakable bonds of unity of all the

168 Plan of 1983 explicitly sees the SSP as part of a national water grid (Narmada Planning Group 1983)107. External political considerations were also important for the design of the SSP. The decision to extend the canal network to Kutch was done after a suggestion by former Chief Secretary of Gujarat, Lalit Dalal, in 1965. At this time, there was growing tension and even a brief war between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue, and Dalal saw the potential of irrigation in Kutch for sustaining a larger agricultural population which would be the “most practical and economical way of guarding our border with Pakistan”, a model based on the Israeli strategy of establishing agricultural kibbutz as reserve soldiers108 (Dalal 1991:1).