PORTAFOLIO DE TRÁMITES Y OTROS PROCEDIMIENTOS

787

Figure 2-5. Disaster Relief/Foreign Humanitarian Assistance 788

2-21. The theater army’s CCP is well-suited to provide C2 for Army and/or joint forces engaged in 789

Humanitarian Assistance or Disaster Relief (HA/DR). Department of Defense (DOD) normally has a 790

supporting role in HA/DR operations, with the US ambassadors/Chiefs of Mission posted to the affected 791

host nations and US Department of State (DOS) as the US government agency lead. However, exceptions 792

do exist. Two exceptions are the U.S. Mission is not functional because of damage or the host nation 793

government collapses and the country descends into anarchy. In such extreme cases, the operation often 794

changes from HA/DR to other forms of international intervention. This was not the case in the fall of 1998 795

when Hurricane Georges and Hurricane Mitch devastated several countries and the US Territory of Puerto 796

Rico within weeks of each other. See Figures 2-5. Disaster Relief/Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Figure 797

2-6. Hurricane Georges 15 SEP 1998, and Figure 2-7. Hurricane Mitch 22 OCT 1998. These scenarios are 798

useful for exploring the options available to the GCC for CCP employment. These scenarios provide useful 799

examples of how very small JTFs deal with specific country situations, with a higher JTF providing 800

centralized planning and coordination of DOD support to inter-agency efforts and Unified Action plans. 801

All this conducted under environmental, diplomatic and political circumstances that vary widely between 802

affected host nations (compare the diplomatic challenges of deploying U.S. military forces into Nicaragua 803

for disaster relief to the relatively benign diplomatic environment in Honduras). See Figure 2-5. Disaster 804

Relief/Foreign Humanitarian Assistance for paths of Hurricanes. 805

Figure 2-6. Hurricane Georges 15 Sep.98 806

2-22. In the fall of 1998, two devastating hurricanes (Hurricanes Georges and Hurricane Mitch) hit within 807

a four-week span in the Caribbean and Central America areas affecting both foreign territories and U.S. 808

territory (especially Puerto Rico). These two hurricanes yielded a substantial number of deaths and injuries 809

with widespread property damage. U.S. military forces, specifically within the USSOUTHCOM AOR, 810

Theater Army Contingency Command Post Employment

15 July 2010 (Final Draft) FM 3-93 2-7

mounted large-scale responses to these disasters, in conjunction with the affected countries, civilian relief 811

agencies of the United States government (USG), foreign governments, the UN, non-governmental 812

organizations (NGOs), private businesses, and individuals. The SOUTHCOM Commander created two 813

joint task forces (JTFs) for disaster response, reoriented the mission of a third JTF toward relief efforts, and 814

employed more than 7,000 U.S. military personnel deployed to the region to assist with the response to the 815

damage caused by these events. 816

2-23. For Hurricane Georges, U.S. military assistance focused on civil support operations in Puerto Rico, 817

in support of Federal Emergency Management Authority (FEMA) and HA/DR in the Dominican Republic, 818

in support of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). U.S. military personnel, stationed in Haiti 819

as part of Support Group Haiti, provided limited assistance in that nation. In the eastern Caribbean islands, 820

the U.S. military provided limited but important support. 821

2-24. The DoD asset in greatest demand following Hurricane Georges was air transport; both strategic lift 822

into the area of operations (AO) and theater lift to distribute relief supplies. Another major asset employed 823

was a Disaster Response Joint Task Force (DRJTF), designated JTF Full Provider deployed aboard the 824

USS Bataan with 900 U.S. Marines from the second Force Service Support Group (FSSG). JTF Full 825

Provider coordinated U.S. military support of both Puerto Rico civil support operations and foreign disaster 826

relief in such places as the Dominican Republic. In Puerto Rico, Naval Station Roosevelt Roads (NSRR) 827

became the logistics hub for FEMA relief operations. In the Dominican Republic, the Military Assistance 828

Advisory Group (MAAG) provided essential coordination with the Country Team and host nation military 829

and support at Santo Domingo airport for the relief effort. 830

Figure 2-7. Hurricane Mitch 22 OCT 98 831

2-25. The DoD response to Hurricane Mitch far surpassed the response to Hurricane Georges in scope, 832

complexity, cost, and duration, as well as in the range of policy issues it generated. U.S. military personnel 833

conducted significant relief operations in the four Central American countries primarily affected by 834

Hurricane Mitch: Honduras and Nicaragua, the two most seriously affected nations, and Guatemala and El 835

Salvador, which suffered moderate damage. In each of the affected countries, U.S. military units 836

concentrated their activities in specified geographic regions, assigned through discussions with host 837

governments to complement ongoing host nation and other responses, rather than operating countrywide. 838

U.S. based air and sea military transport assets moved large quantities of personnel and materiel to the AO. 839

2-26. With the deployment of over 5,000 military personnel and 63 aircraft to Central America region, 840

U.S. forces provided services including search and rescue, damage assessments, airfield management, food 841

15 July 2010 (Final Draft) FM 3-93 2-8 delivery, immunizations against epidemic diseases, veterinary care, bridge and road reconstruction, water 842

purification, liaison, and planning. During these efforts, DoD personnel interfaced with government 843

officials, international and local NGOs, local and third country military forces, UN agencies, banana 844

plantation owners, local religious and community leaders, and traumatized villagers. Command and 845

control of military forces for the Hurricane Mitch operation initially fell to JTF BRAVO located on Soto 846

Cano Air Base in Honduras. However, the massive devastation in Honduras required JTF BRAVO’s full 847

attention, and a second JTF stood up on the Comalapa Air Base, El Salvador (JTF AGUILA) with 848

subordinate reporting JTFs set up in the counties of Guatemala and Nicaragua. The overall operations 849

consisted of three phases: 850

 Emergency Relief Phase – commencing when the Hurricane struck Central America and 851

continuing through mid-December 1998 852

 Rehabilitation Phase – commencing in mid-December 1998 and continuing until approximately 853

26 February 1999 854

 Reconstruction Phase (not addressed in this report) – commencing at the end of the 855

Rehabilitation Phase and continuing into September 1999. 856

Figure 2-8. Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance Funded DoD Air Assets 857

2-27. The U.S. Government funded assessment teams, and deployed Disaster Assistance Response Teams 858

(DARTs) from the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) to the region. See above Figure 2- 859

8. Funded DoD Air Assets. These teams provided airlift and sealift to Central America, funded U.S. 860

military helicopter transport within affected areas, and financially supported many local relief efforts of 861

host governments, regional organizations such as the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO), and 862

NGOs. 863

2-28. The Hurricane Georges and Hurricane Mitch humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations 864

provide multiple examples for the CCPs effective employment. Deliberately organized to provide the 865

capabilities to monitor and control current operations, the CCP can form the nucleus or core element of a 866

small JTF headquarters. The CCP based JTF receives augmentation from the theater army MCP, the GCC 867

staff and other service component commands to provide the needed capabilities. The CCP is available to 868

command and control the immediate response to crisis to include coordination. Coordination consist of 869

working with U.S. military assistance groups to assess requirements of the U.S. country team, host nation, 870

Theater Army Contingency Command Post Employment

15 July 2010 (Final Draft) FM 3-93 2-9

and facilitate the deployment of disaster assistance response teams (DARTs). Additional coordination is 871

required for the delivery of relief supplies and follow-on disaster relief forces such as U.S. Army engineers, 872

aviation elements, medical treatment teams, and airfield control parties. Given DOD will likely have a 873

supporting role in most HA/DR operations, a CCP-based JTF can manage the coordination of DOD support 874

to multiple countries (through resident U.S. MILGPs and country teams) as well as civil support operations 875

such as the Hurricane Georges effort in Puerto Rico. The CCP design facilitates its use as the nucleus of a 876

smaller subordinate JTF like JTF Aguila in El Salvador. The theater army, with its CCP, provides the GCC 877

with an additional tool to meet the command and control requirements for effective crisis response for 878

HA/DR and other types of limited operations. 879

15 July 2010 (Final Draft) FM 3-93 3-1

Chapter 3

880

Theater Army Main Command Post Organization