Con respecto a las pretensiones accesorias

G.R No. 102007. September 2, 1994

FACTS:

Appellant Bayotas was charged with rape and was convicted for the said crime in 1991. while his appeal was pending, he died at the New Bilibid Hospital due to respiratory attack. Thus, when the Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect, the Solicitor- General expressed that the civil liability of the accused was not also extinguish upon the death of the appellant.

ISSUE:

Whether the civil liability of the accused was extinguished upon his death.

RULING:

No, the civil liability in general of the accused was not extinguished upon the death of the accused. However, necessarily, the civil liability in the rape case was extinguished since it was included in the act complained of but the remedy of the victim is to proceed to the estate of the accused through the filing of a separate independent action for collection of damages.

Barredo vs. Garcia 73 Phil 607

FACTS:

The taxicab owned by petitioner Barredo collided to a carratela. Thus, the carratela fall down and overturned causing the death of the son of respondent Garcia.

The trial court convicted the driver of the taxicab. However, the respondent has reserved his right to file independent civil action for collection of damages for the death of his son.

ISSUE:

Whether Barredo can held primary liable for the death of the son of the respondent.

RULING:

Yes. Barredo can also be held primary and directly liable in the civil case because it was found out that being the owner and operator of the taxicab, his negligence to supervise and exert extraordinary diligence in the performance of his employees made him liable together with his convicted employee. Thus, the failure to prove that there was no negligence on the part of the owner of the taxicab made no way for the petitioner to escape his civil liability. Therefore, the acts of the employee reflects the act of the employer causing the latter liable in case of negligence in supervision.

DY TEBAN VS. LIBERTY FOREST G.R No. 161803. February 4, 2008

FACTS:

A Prime Mover Trailer suffered a tire blow out during the night of its travel at a national highway. The trailer was owned by the respondent Liberty Forest. The driver allegedly put earl warning devices but the only evidence being witnessed was a banana trunks and candles. Since the car was placed at the right wing of the road, thus it cause the swerving of a Nissan van owned by the petitioner when a passenger bus was coming in between the trailer. The Nissan van owner claimed for damages against the respondent. The trial court found that the proximate cause of the three –way accident is the negligence and carelessness of driver of the respondent . However reversed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether there was negligence on the part of the respondent.

RULING:

Yes. There was negligence on the part of the respondent when the latter failed to put and used an early warning device because it was found out that there was no early warning device being prescribed by law that was used by the driver in order to warn incoming vehicle. Furthermore, the proximate cause of the accident was due to the position of the trailer where it covered a cemented part of the road, thus confused and made trick way for other vehicles to pass by. Thus the respondent is declared liable due to violation of road rules and regulations.

SAFEGUARD SECURITY VS. TANGCO G.R No. 165732. December 14, 2006

FACTS:

The victim Evangeline Tangco was depositor of Ecology Bank. She was also a licensed-fire arm holder, thus during the incident, she was entering the bank to renew her time deposit and along with her was her firearm. Suddenly, the security guard of the bank, upon knowing that the victim carries a firearm, the security guard shot the victim causing the latter’s instant death. The heirs of the victim filed a criminal case against security guard and an action against Safeguard Security for failure to observe diligence of a goof father implied upon the act of its agent.

ISSUE:

Whether Safeguard Security can be held liable for the acts of its agent.

RULING:

Yes. The law presumes that any injury committed either by fault or omission of an employee reflects the negligence of the employer. In quasi-delicts cases, in order to overcome this presumption, the employer must prove that there was no negligence on his part in the supervision of his employees.

It was declared that in the selection of employees and agents, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records.

Thus, due diligence on the supervision and operation of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his employees. Thus, in this case, Safeguard Security committed negligence in identifying the qualifications and ability of its agents.

VILLANUEVA VS. DOMINGO G.R No. 144274. September 20, 2004

FACTS:

In 1991, a collision was made by a green Mitsubishi lancer owned by Ocfemia against a silver Mitsubishi lancer driven by Leandro Domingo and owned by petitioner Priscilla Domingo. The incident caused the car of Domingo bumped another two parked vehicles. A charged was filed against Ocfemia and the owner Villanueva. Villanueva claimed that he must not be held liable for the incident because he is no longer the owner of the car, that it was already swapped to another car . however, the trial court ordered the petitioner to pay the damages incurred by the silver Mitsubishi lancer car.

ISSUE:

Whether the owner Villanueva be held liable for the mishap.

RULING:

Under the Motor Vehicle law, it was declared that the registered owner of any vehicle is primary land directly liable for any injury it incurs while it is being operated.

Thus, even the petitioner claimed that he was no longer the present owner of the car, still the registry was under his name, thus it is presumed that he still possesses the car and that the damages caused by the car be charge against him being the registered owner. The primary function of Motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle, responsibility therefore can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.

CALALAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R No. 122039. May 31, 2000

FACTS:

Eliza Sunga was a passenger of a jeepney owned and operated by the petitioner Calalas. Private respondent Sunga sat in the rear protion of the jeepney where the conductor gave Sunga an extension seat. When the jeep stopped, Sunga gave way to a passenger going outside the jeep. However, an Isuzu Truck driven by Verene and owned by Salva, accidentally hit Sunga causing the latter to suffer physical injuries where the attending physician ordered a three months of rest. Sunga filed an action for damages against the petitioner for breach of contract of common carriage by the petitioner.

On the other hand, the petitioner Calalas filed an action against Salva, being the owner of the truck. The lower court ruled in favor of ther petitioner, thus the truck owner is liable for the damage to the jeep of the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitionerr is liable.

RULING:

Yes. The petitioner is liable for the injury suffered by Sunga. Under Article 1756 of the New Civil Code, it provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.

In this case, the law presumes that any injury suffered by a passenger of the jeep is deemed to be due to the negligence of the driver. This is a case on Culpa Contractual where there was pre-existing obligations and that the fault is incidental to the performance of the obligation. Thus, it was clearly observed that the petitioner has negligence in the conduct of his duty when he allowed Sunga to seat in the rear portion of the jeep which is prone to accident.

LUDO AND LUYM CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 125483. FEBRUARY 1, 2001

FACTS:

Ludo & Luym Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in copra processing. Private Respondent Gabisan Shipping Lines was the registered owner and operator of the motor vessel MV Miguela, while the other private respondent, Anselmo Olasiman, was its captain. On May 21, 1990, while MV Miguela was docking at petitioner’s wharf, it rammed and destroyed a fender pile cluster. Ireneo Naval, petitioner’s employee, guided the vessel to its docking place. After the small rope was thrown from the vessel and while the petitioner’s security guard was pulling the big rope to be tied to the bolar, MV Miguela did not slow down. The crew did not release the vessel’s anchor. Naval shouted “Reverse” to the vessel’s crew, but it was too late when the latter responded, for the vessel already rammed the pile cluster. Petitioner demanded for damages but private respondents denied the incident and the damage.

Their witnesses claimed that the damage, if any, must have occurred prior to their arrival and caused by another vessel or by ordinary wear and tear.

ISSUE:

Is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable to this case?

RULING:

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor provides that where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. In this case, all the requisites for this doctrine exist. First, MV Miguela was under the exclusive control of its officers and crew. Second, aside from the testimony that MV Miguela rammed the cluster pile, private respondent did not show persuasively other possible causes of the damage.

There exists a presumption of negligence against private respondents which they failed to overcome. Additionally, petitioner presented proof that demonstrated private respondents’ negligence. As testified by Capt. Olasiman, from command of “slow ahead”

to “stop engine”, the vessel will still travel 100 meters before it finally stops. However, he ordered “stop engine” when the vessel was only 50 meters from the pier. Further, he testified that before the vessel is put to slow astern, the engine has to be restarted.

However, Olasiman can not estimate how long it takes before the engine goes to slow astern after the engine is restarted. From these declarations, the conclusion is that it was already too late when the captain ordered reverse. By then, the vessel was only 4 meters from the pier, and thus rammed it.

Respondent company’s negligence consists in allowing incompetent crew to man its vessel. As shown also by petitioner, both Captain Olasiman and Chief Mate Gabisan did not have a formal training in marine navigation. The former was a mere elementary graduate while the latter is a high school graduate. Their experience in navigationwas only as a watchman and a quartermaster, respectively.

Gabisan Shipping Lines and the ship captain are held jointly and severally liable for damages caused to the petitioner.

THERMOCHEM INCORPORATED vs. LEONORA NAVAL G.R. No. 131541. OCTOBER 20, 2000

FACTS:

"On May 10, 1992, at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, Eduardo Edem was driving a "Luring Taxi" along Ortigas Avenue, near Rosario, Pasig, going towards Cainta.

Thereafter, the driver executed a U-turn to traverse the same road, going to the direction of EDSA. At this point, the Nissan Pathfinder traveling along the same road going to the direction of Cainta collided with the taxicab. The point of impact was so great that the taxicab was hit in the middle portion and was pushed sideward, causing the driver to lose control of the vehicle. The taxicab was then dragged into the nearby Question Tailoring Shop, thus, causing damage to the said tailoring shop, and its driver, Eduardo Eden, sustained injuries as a result of the incident."

Private respondent, as owner of the taxi, filed a damage suit against petitioner, Thermochem Incorporated, as the owner of the Nissan Pathfinder, and its driver, petitioner Jerome Castro. After trial, the lower court adjudged petitioner Castro negligent and ordered petitioners, jointly and severally, to pay private respondent actual, compensatory and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees and costs of suit.

ISSUE:

What are the liabilities of both parties?

RULING:

The driver of the oncoming Nissan Pathfinder vehicle was liable and the driver of the U-turning taxicab was contributorily liable. It is established that Castro was driving at a speed faster than 50 kilometers per hour because it was a downhill slope. But as he allegedly stepped on the brake, it locked causing his Nissan Pathfinder to skid to the left and consequently hit the taxicab. Malfunction or loss of brake is not a fortuitous event.

Between the owner and his driver, on the one hand, and third parties such as commuters, drivers and pedestrians, on the other, the former is presumed to know about the conditions of his vehicle and is duty bound to take care thereof with the diligence of a good father of the family. A mechanically defective vehicle should avoid the streets. As petitioner's vehicle was moving downhill, the driver should have slowed down since a downhill drive would naturally cause the vehicle to accelerate. Moreover, the record shows that the Nissan Pathfinder was on the wrong lane when the collision occurred.

The taxi driver is contributorily liable since he took a U-turn where it is not generally advisable. The taxi was hit on its side which means that it had not yet fully made a turn to the other lane. The driver of the taxi ought to have known that vehicles coming from the Rosario bridge are on a downhill slope. Obviously, there was lack of foresight on his part, making him contributorily liable. Considering the contributory negligence of the driver of private respondent's taxi, the award of P47,850.00, for the repair of the taxi, should be reduced in half. All other awards for damages are deleted for lack of merit.

AMADO PICART vs. FRANK SMITH, JR.

G.R. No. L-12219. MARCH 15, 1918 FACTS:

The plaintiff, riding on his pony was half way across the Carlatan bridge when the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, thinking that he has no sufficient time to go to the other side of the road, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. The defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant is guilty of negligence.

RULING:

As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge he clearly saw that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse.

The plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But it was the defendant who had the last clear chance to avoid the impending harm and when he failed to do so, he is deemed negligent, thus liable to pay damages in favor of the plaintiff.

JOSE V. LAGON vs. HOOVEN COMALCO INDUSTRIES, INC G.R. No. 135657. JANUARY 17, 2001

FACTS:

Sometime in April 1981 Lagon, a businessman and HOOVEN entered into two (2) contracts, denominated Proposal, whereby for a total consideration of P104,870.00 HOOVEN agreed to sell and install various aluminum materials in Lagon’s commercial building in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. HOOVEN filed an action against Lagon claiming that the latter failed to pay his due despite HOOVEN’s performance of its obligation.

Lagon, in his answer, denied liability and averred that HOOVEN was the party guilty of breach of contract by failing to deliver and install some of the materials specified in the proposals; that as a consequence he was compelled to procure the undelivered materials from other sources; that as regards the materials duly delivered and installed by HOOVEN, they were fully paid.

ISSUE:

Who among the parties is entitled to damages?

RULING:

HOOVEN's bad faith lies not so much on its breach of contract - as there was no

HOOVEN's bad faith lies not so much on its breach of contract - as there was no