MODIFICACIONES QUE DEBEN INCLUIRSE EN LAS SECIONES CORRESPONDIENTES DE LA FICHA TÉCNICA O RESUMEN DE LAS CARACTERÍSTICAS DEL PRODUCTO
10. FECHA DE LA REVISIÓN DEL TEXTO
4.2 Posología y forma de administración (Para completar a nivel nacional)
This section summarises some key policy insights from the country studies collected in this publication, and suggests policy options for increasing the income security of on-call workers or those on flexible hours contracts.
1.8.1. Social security contributions should be harmonised across forms of
employment as much as possible
Including workers that sit on the border between dependent and independent forms of work in the standard social protection scheme closes coverage gaps and helps ensure that social protection systems cover those who are most at risk.
It can also curb the extent of non-standard employment, and thus limit the erosion of the contribution base of social protection systems, as shown by the policy reform experiences in Italy and Austria. Raising non-wage labour costs, of course, comes at the risk of decreasing employment, in the same way as this can be the case for standard workers. If certain forms of employment are subject to lower non-wage labour costs, this should be a deliberate policy choice.
1.8.2. Voluntary schemes do not seem to work well for non-standard workers
Any insurance depends on risk sharing among members. With a voluntary insurance scheme, those who have the highest risk have the greatest incentive to join. Unless a voluntary scheme achieves a very high coverage rate, this adverse selection either leads to a downward spiral of rising premia and falling coverage, or to additional costs in the system. High coverage rates, in turn, may require public subsidies, as the willingness to pay voluntarily for social protection appears to be low in some cases, as seen, for example, in Sweden where voluntary unemployment insurance coverage fell after a moderate rise in contribution rates in 2007/08.
Adverse selection in voluntary schemes is not limited to unemployment insurance but can be observed for sickness benefits (voluntary sickness benefits for self-employed workers in Austria) and even maternity and carers’ benefits (evidenced by the Canadian Special Benefits for Self-employed Workers scheme).
1.8.3. Making entitlements portable supports mobility across jobs and forms of
employment
Untying entitlements from specific relationships with employers, and tying them to individual contributions instead, not only makes it easier for workers to switch jobs, but it also makes it easier for them to switch between self- and dependent employment. Furthermore, it facilitates the harmonisation of entitlements across contractual arrangements. Individualised forms of social protection, however, can only offer protection if sufficient contributions are paid by or on behalf of the beneficiary.
Austria offers an interesting policy lesson in this respect when, in 2003, its severance pay scheme was replaced by company-based pension accounts. While the old severance pay entitlements benefitted only laid-off employees, all dependent employees now have a company-based pension account, which is portable across jobs. This measure increased
job mobility for workers in distressed firms (where a plant closure or mass layoff will take place in the near future, Kettemann et al. (2016[42])). As the pension accounts are tied
to the individual, and employers contribute a fixed rate of individual earnings, it was easy to extend the programme to independent contractors in 2008.
1.8.4. Increasing income security for those working flexible hours
Independent contractors – whether they do work mediated by online platforms or not – as well as workers on on-call or flexible hours contracts lack the income security provided by regular employment relationships while enabling firms to cheaply adjust to demand fluctuations. One way to redress this imbalance is to introduce a wage premium for flexible work as a compensation for assuming part of the entrepreneurial risk. The idea of requiring employers to pay higher rates to those who assume part of the entrepreneurial risk has been gaining traction both in the context of platform work (Chapter 8) as well as flexible hours work contracts (Taylor, 2017[43]).
In Australia, casual workers, who may be terminated on short notice and do not receive some benefits like paid holidays or paid sick leave that are provided to permanent employees, are already entitled to a casual loading of 25% for each hour worked compared to a worker doing the same job on an ongoing basis (Chapter 2).6
On-call or other flexible workers would also benefit from minimum hours guarantees: in Australia and the Netherlands, for example, employers already have to pay on-call workers at least three hours of work each time they call on the employee (Chapter 7). Minimum earnings floors may also be applied to independent contractors: the New York Taxi and Limousine Commission is currently considering introducing a minimum driver
pay standard for drivers for ride-hailing apps. The proposal would set an earnings floor at
roughly 115% of the minimum wage and increase driver earnings after expenses by 22.5% on average (Parrott and Reich, 2018[44]). The Netherlands plans to introduce a
payment floor of EUR 15-18 per hour for independent contractors who are paid below 125% of the statutory minimum wage or the lowest wage in the relevant collective agreement (Government of the Netherlands (2017[45]) and Chapter 7).
Notes
1 Those who were already self-employed upon the introduction of the programme in 2009 had one year to decide whether to opt-into the programme.
2 They have to contribute to pension, health and accident insurance since the late 1990s; in 2008 they were incorporated into the unemployment insurance system, the insolvency remuneration fund, the chamber of labour and the severance pay scheme Abfertigung neu (a form of portable employer-funded pension account).
3 The URSSAF (Unions de recouvrement des cotisations de sécurité sociale et d’allocations
familiales) are private bodies collecting employees’ and employers’ contributions to the general
social security system, see Chapter 4.
4 In a 2015 survey, around 30% of gig-workers performing work exclusively online on the Amazon Mechanical Turk and Crowdflower platforms named a preference to work from home, or only being able to work from home as the main reason for choosing this type of work (Berg, 2016[15]).
5 Indeed, most social protection systems do not seem to make such a difference: a survey conducted by the European Social Insurance Platform, an association of European statutory social insurance organisations (ESIP, 2017[46]) found that in all twelve participating European Union and EEA member countries, workers providing “virtual tasks” (graphic design, translation etc.) would be considered as self-employed. While there are differences in statutory coverage by the pension insurance across the surveyed countries, they are the same as for other self-employed persons. 6 Empirical evidence suggests, however, that casual workers do not in fact receive higher wages and might even suffer a wage penalty compared to similar permanent workers (see Chapter 2 for an overview of recent evidence). Thus, monitoring is crucial (as in the case of minimum wages).
References
Abraham, K. et al. (2017), Measuring the Gig Economy: Current Knowledge and Open Issues, U.S Census Bureau, http://aysps.gsu.edu/files/2016/09/Measuring-the-Gig-Economy-Current- Knowledge-and-Open-Issues.pdf (accessed on 10 December 2017).
[11]
Arbejdsgruppen om selvstændige i dagpengesystemet (2017), Et nyt dagpengesystem for
fremtidens arbejdsmarked. Report from the working group on self-employed persons in the unemployment benefit system, http://www.bm.dk.
[20]
Avlijas, S. (2018), “The dynamism of the new economy: Non-standard employment and access to social security”, Research note.
[19]
Berg, J. (2016), “Income security in the on-demand economy: Findings and policy lessons from a survey of crowdworkers”, Conditions of Work and Employment Series, No. 74, ILO, Geneva,
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---
travail/documents/publication/wcms_479693.pdf (accessed on 12 December 2017).
[15]
BLS (2018), Contigent and alternative employment arrangements - May 2017,
http://www.bls.gov/cps (accessed on 11 June 2018).
[10]
BLS (2005), Contingent and alternative employment arrangements, February 2005,
http://www.bls.gov/cps/ (accessed on 11 June 2018).
[9]
BMAS (2017), White paper work 4.0, German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs,
http://www.arbeitenviernull.de.
[16]
ILO (ed.) (2018), The architecture of digital labour platforms: Policy recommendations on
platform design for worker well-being, http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/future-of- work/publications/research-papers/.
[37]
Cour des Comptes (2012), Le régime des intermittents du spectacle: la persistance d'une dérive
massive, Cour des comptes.
[33]
Datta, N., G. Giupponi and S. Machin (forthcoming), “Zero Hours Contracts and Labour Market Policy”, mimeo.
[6]
Delsen, L. and J. Smits (2014), “The Rise and Fall of the Dutch Savings Schemes”, SSRN
Electronic Journal, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2414546.
[23]
Employment and Social Development Canada (2016), Evaluation of the Employment Insurance
Special Benefits for Self-employed Workers, http://canada.ca/publicentre-ESDC.
[29]
ESIP (2017), Statutory Pension Insurance of Digital Platform Workers - a comparative
perspective, ESIP, https://www.esip.eu/images/pdf_docs/Mapping---Statutory-pension- coverage-of-platform-workers.pdf.
[46]
Etsy (2016), Economic Security for the Gig Economy,
https://extfiles.etsy.com/advocacy/Etsy_EconomicSecurity_2016.pdf.
European Comission (2018), Behavioural study on the effects of an extension of access to social
protection for people in all forms of employment, European Commission,
http://dx.doi.org/10.2767/180611.
[30]
European Commission (2018), Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment
accompanying the Proposal for a Council Recommendation and Access to social protection for workers and the self-employed, SWD(2018)71, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52018SC0070.
[8]
European Commission (2018), Proposal for a Council Recommendation and Access to social
protection for workers and the self-employed, COM(2018)132.
[7]
Government of the Netherlands (2017), Confidence in the Future - 2017-2021 coalition
agreement, https://www.government.nl/.
[45]
Hofer, H., R. Hyee and G. Titelbach (2018), Where did all the independent contractors go?. [32]
Huws, U., N. Spencer and K. Holts (2017), Work in the European Gig Economy, FEPS,
http://www.feps-europe.eu/.
[38]
ILO and OECD (2018), Promoting adequate social protection and social security coverage for
all workers, including those in non-standard forms of employment, Paper prepared for the G20
(Argentinian presidency).
[39]
ISSA (2012), Handbook on the extention of social security coverage to the self-employed,
http://www.issa.int.
[18]
Kassam, A. (2018), “Ontario's new Conservative government to end basic income experiment”,
The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/01/ontarios-new-conservative- government-to-end-basic-income-experiment.
[27]
Katz, L. and A. Krueger (2016), “he Rise and Nature of Alternative Work Arrangements in the United States, 1995-2015”, NBER Working Papers, p. No. 22667.
[2]
Kettemann, A., F. Kramarz and J. Zweimüller (2016), “Beyond Severance Pay: Labor market responses to the introduction of occupational pensions in Austria”, Mimeo, University of
Zurich, http://www.econ.uzh.ch.
[42]
Kvist, J. (2017), “Denmark: a new unemployment insurance scheme for the future labour market”, ESPN Flash Report 2017/45,
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1135&langId=en..
[21]
Commission, E. (ed.) (2016), e-stonian look at: collaborative economy,
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetailDoc&id=26 192&no=8 (accessed on 1 July 2018).
[40]
Ministry of Finance (2015), IBO Zelfstandigen zonder personeel, Ministry of Finance, Netherlands.
Moral-Arce, I., J. Martí-Román and Á. Martí-Román (2018), “Cessation of activity benefit of Spanish self-employed workers: a heterogeneous impact evaluation”, MPRA Paper No. 85111,
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/85111/.
[28]
OECD (2018), “Policy brief on the future of work”, in Online work in OECD countries,
http://www.oecd.org/employment/future-of-work/.
[36]
OECD (2018), Social Expenditure Database (SOCX), https://doi.org/10.1787/socx-data-en. [34]
OECD (2018), Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation – Interim Report 2018: Inclusive
Framework on BEPS, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD, Paris,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264293083-en.
[17]
OECD (2017), “Basic income as a policy option: Can it add up?”, Policy brief on the future of
work , https://www.oecd.org/els/emp/Basic-Income-Policy-Option-2017.pdf (accessed on 14 September 2017).
[24]
OECD (2016), “New Forms of Work in the Digital Economy”, OECD Digital Economy Papers, No. 260, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jlwnklt820x-en.
[4]
OECD (forthcoming), The tax treatment of non-standard work, OECD Publishing, Paris. [13]
Oxford Internet Institute (2018), The Online Labour Index, http://ilabour.oii.ox.ac.uk/online- labour-index/.
[35]
Parrott, J. and M. Reich (2018), An Earnings Standard for New York City's App-based drivers:
Economic Analysis and Policy Assessment. Report for the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission, The New School, Center for New York City Affairs, http://irle.berkeley.edu/an- earnings-standard-for-new-york-citys-app-based-drivers/.
[44]
Parsons, D. (1986), “The employment relationship: Job attachment, work effort, and the nature of contracts”, in Ashenfelter, O. and R. Layard (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier, North-Holland, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1573-4463(86)02004-7.
[5]
Pesole, A. et al. (2018), Platform workers in Europe, Publications Office of the European Union. [3]
Peter, L. (2018), No plans to expand Finland basic income trial,
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-43866700.
[26]
Piachaud, D. (2016), “Citizen's Income: Rights and Wrongs”, Case, No. 200, Centre for the Analysis of Social Exclusion (CASE), London,
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/case/cp/casepaper200.pdf.
[25]
Prassl, J. (2018), Humans as a service - The Promise and Perils of work in the gig economy, Oxford University Press, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198797012.001.0001.
[12]
Spasova, S. et al. (2017), Access to social protection for people working on non-standard
contracts and as self-employed in Europe, European Commission, Brussels,
http://dx.doi.org/10.2767/700791.
SSA and ISSA (2018), United States of America, Social Security Administration,
https://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy.
[14]
Tax and Customs Board, Republic of Estonia (2017), “Income declared trough Uber and Taxify has overwhelmingly increased”, Press release, https://www.emta.ee/eng/income-declared- through-uber-and-taxify-has-overwhelmingly-increased (accessed on 1 July 2018).
[41]
Taylor, M. (2017), Good work: the Taylor review of modern working practices, Her Majesty's
Government, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/good-work-the-taylor-review-of-
modern-working-practices.