Speeches and articles on part of Turkey‘s FM, PM and president will be used.29 In order to create an unbiased selection of material, minimising the risks of skewnes and/or lack in repre- sentativity, I have chosen to select the ten last major speeches held by FM Davutoğlu. The time-span is roughly half a year, and the speeches are delivered in a wide range of contexts, addressing varying audiences. I hope that this method of choosing material provides for bene- ficial conditions for capturing the whole variety of the Turkish FSP. I have also chosen to
28
I. For accounts that Turkey was not as pro-Gaddafi or pro-status quo in Libya as has been suggested, see e.g. Aydintaşbas (Milliyet 19/03/2011) who argues that Turkey has attempted, in contrast to Western countries (which have taken sides against Gaddafi), to act equidistantly to the warring parties and seeking the role of a mediator; or Bozkurt (26/03/2011) who empha- sises that Turkey had almost succeeded in brokering a deal between the conflicting parties, in order to secure an ordered transition and attempted to prioritise the individuals as prime referents, intentions stymied by the UNSC resolution 1973 and its sanction to establish a no-fly zone with its ensuing military bombardments. II. I will though not dwell more on Turkey‘s role and action in the Arab spring, as this is still an event yet to unfold. Quick conclusions, made in the midst of the turmoil and based by all likelihood on incomplete information, is therefore problematic.
29 The government consists of individual actors. Öniş (2011) argues that leadership and ownership of FSP is a
natural starting point in dissecting the current Turkish foreign FSP (2011:53). President Gül has according to Öniş acted as a complementary de facto foreign secretary to Davutoğlu, and PM Erdoğan has pursued an almost as active stand himself.
include a couple of major lectures held by president Gül and PM Erdoğan, penning down the Turkish external outlook in a more comprehensible way. This kind of material-type is partly such which is sustained over time, but has also a communicative quality - in the present and in the context where it is held – of the signals the government wants to convey.
An objection may be that I rely on officially published documents. Is it not the actions and the crisis management which disclose the de facto FSP? However, Turkish actors negotiated and compromised on these texts – written/deliberated on/conveyed by an actor which is a rep- resentative of the official policy - and agreed that these texts in a public format and published form shall display the official FSP. Hence, the texts represent positions which the Turkish actors have to defend, and if later contradicting the texts, the responsibility lies with them to justify this discrepancy. When published, the logic of incentives kicks in. In order to reach respectability, influence and to be seen as a civilised actor, one has to behave. To retaining this leverage and perception, one cannot act no matter how. Visibility civilises, as Bjereld argues in his argumentation in favour of transparency in diplomacy (Bjereld 2010).
My argumentation is, ineluctably, partially normative. Were one rather to take Takiyye30 as a starting point, this choice and this limitation of the material would not suffice. Hence the importance of underscoring this study‘s normative assumption that publicity and participation has a civilising impact. The investigation is a textual one, and does not primarily look at how the ideas are enforced in practise, but as argued, in a civilised world the publicity and the offi- cial stances matter, in order to be accepted as a reliable partner in the international game of politics. For Turkey - in contrast to countries such as e.g. China, Iran or Russia –, striving for such an image and status, these considerations are believed to be decisive. Hence, it is more the image of the FSP than the exercised policy which constitutes the generaliseable scope.
Nonetheless, in order to take stock of the layers beyond the surface, the study will also con- sult primary qualitative interviews for the analysis. The interviews were conducted with aca- demics, journalists and think tank representatives, comprising a variety of political positions. The material was gathered during a five-week visit to Turkey enabled by a scholarship from the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul. In total eight interviews were conducted, all rough- ly one hour long. This material will, however, not be used in an exhaustive manner, but aims to support the analysis, hence not presented as primary empirics. It will thus feature, with parts of it corresponding to the purpose, in the analysis chapter.
30
Another possible point of criticism relates to the material chosen, or rather, the material not chosen. The most obvious document in this matter is, could be argued, the National Security Policy Document (MGSB), put to revision every five years. The most particular with the last preparation in the fall of 2010 was that it for the first time ever was civilian-led (this had ear- lier been a [quasi-] military prerogative). However, this document is strictly classified, and there is not even published an official summary. For certain, much of the contents have reached the public thanks to leaks to the press. However, studying press material is kittle as long as the reasons behind the leaks are not clear. The leaks may be sanctioned by the regime, or be part of political intrigues. Unless such issues are clear, using that kind of press material may create spurious reasoning. Not only such considerations play into my decision not to use the MGSB, though, since using press material would in essence constitute a different kind of study. Rather, I argue, the MGSB can be said to represent the internal base through which actions and positions are crystallised and manifested in the public. So, in fact, the material I have chosen can be seen as prolongations of this doctrine, and thus also the operationalised forms of it, and the more relevant to cast light on.31