In August 1933, Mao prepared his "Preliminary Conclusions of the Land Investigation Campaign" and reported a general success on the movement, in which a total of more than 2,000 landlords and rich peasants were identified and their properties confiscated. As a result of the campaign, Mao declared, the Soviet and party work had become more dynamic. The heightening of the spirit among the masses, he held, had led to other achievements such as the expansion of the Red Army, the raising of public funds, development of co operatives, increased production in agricultural campaigns, and the enlistment of a large number of worker—peasant activists in local Soviet organizations. All these successes, Mao stressed, were a "Bolshevik answer to the call of the Party and the Central
„19 Government.
Speaking at the Second National Soviel Congress In January 1934, Mao also reported favourably on the achievements of the Land Investigation Campaign. He disclosed that in the three months from July to September 1933, a total of 6,988 landlord families and
6,638 rich peasant families in possession of excessive amount of land were discovered and their confiscated properties amounted to no less
than six hundred thousand dollars. He then related in detail the work of the Soviet Government in the past two years, and claimed great achievement made in the various fields of Soviet work, such as solving the land and economic problems, consolidating the Red Army, and
achieving preliminary success in resisting the K M T ’s Encirclement 20
Campaign. Thus, contemporary documentary evidence show that Mao was positively in favour of the RRS's land policies during the Kiangsi Period.
Some historians argue that since Mao's position in the CCP suffered a serious decline during the Kiangsi Period at the hands of the R R S , he was speaking only under duress and his stated views should
O 1
not be taken as a true reflection of his real opinions. Such a view is rendered untenable by the fact that in the implementation
of these policies, Mao went beyond verbal concessions in giving positive endorsement and support for the policies of the RRS. It would be
difficult to imagine that Mao, purely for the sake of saving his own skin, would choose to put into effect what he considered to be the "erroneous" policies of the RRS, and disregard the prospect of the Communist revolution. Moreover, although M a o ’s authority in the Party and army apparatus had been severely curtailed, he was still the dominant figure in the Soviet Government. It would be more reasonable to assume that because of military exigencies Mao also • found it necessary to activate the masses to the fullest extent. This did not, of course, prevent Mao from disagreeing with the RRS over the problem of military strategy.
At this point, it is necessary to consider another aspect of the C C P ’s policy which was closely related to the problem of the land revolution. Ever since the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September 1931, the CCP had never been slow to indulge itself in anti-imperialist propaganda. Apart from a host of proclamations advocating resistance against Japan, including a declaration of war on Japan in April 1932,
the Party also attempted to mobilize the masses in both coastal cities 22
and Soviet areas by the formation of anti-imperialist leagues. However, the CCP was unable to make any significant headway in winning over
the support of the students and intellectuals because nationalistic fervour in the country was still not incited to an explosive point, because Communist influence in the cities were weak, and because the CCP was seen to be unpatriotic by insisting that the Nationalist Government
should be overthrown first before united resistance.
In 1933, however, a change occurred in the C C P ’s position. On January .17, 1933, the CCP issued a public statement announcing for the first time its willingness to come to an alliance with other armed forces on the basis of the following three conditions: 1. immediate cessation of offensive attacks on the Soviet areas; 2. immediate granting of civil liberties and democratic rights to the people; 3. immediate arming of the people for the defence of China'a territorial integrity. This declaration, while reaffirming the CCP's basic stand for the overthrow of the KMT as the prerequisite for national resistance against Japan, allowed the conclusion of military
23 alliance with other regional armies under certain specific conditions.
Although this document was issued by Mao and Chu Teh (N.B., all external statements were issued in the name of the Soviet Govern ment and the Red Army Command), available evidence point to Moscow as
the initiator. According to Otto Braun, the Comintern’s military adviser to the CCP, the declaration was drafted by Chang Wen-t'ien in response to a directive from the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI), pointing out the need to adjust the Party’s
24 policy in the face of the intensifying Japanese threat to the country. This is partly corroborated by the fact that Moscow was also making approaches in the same period to the Second International (composed mainly of Social-Democratic parties, i.e., bourgeois-reformist groups) in Europe for tactical alliances against the newly emerged
25
fascist government in Germany; and b y .the fact .that-Ch'en Shao-yü 26
and the Comintern leaders immediately sanctioned the policy. .Furthermore, in an article published in January 1933, Ch'en gave the first
indication that the CCP branch in Manchuria should form a united front from above with all anti-imperialist forces in Manchuria, including the "wavering" elements such as the national bourgeoisie, on condition that a solid united front from below had first been
established to ensure the Communist or proletarian leadership in the movement. This message was contained in a letter from the Central Committeee to the Party units and members in Manchuria, dated January 26, 1933; but according to a contemporary Japanese source, the
Manchurian Party units had already received instructions from Ch'en Shao- y(J prior to the arrival of the Central Committee letter. ^
Nevertheless, the CCP was apparently unable to adopt a more flexible approach to the united front owing to its dilemma of having to either relax its struggle against rich peasants and small landlords or continue its struggle against the national bourgeoisie. This is because a change in the attitude towards an urban class, in Communist parlance, always involves a corresponding change in the attitude towards its rural counterpart , so that an alliance with the national bourgeoisie must entail a relaxation in the struggle against small landlords and
30
rich peasants. This qualification must be understood in our evaluation of the CCP s reaction towards the Fukien Rebellion of the Nineteenth Roupe Army in November 1933, as well as in our subsequent evaluation of the Anti-Japanese United Front policy.
When the Fukien Rebellion occurred, the CCP was in the midst of a frantic struggle to intensify the land revolution against both landlords and rich peasants to mobilize the masses in the counter offensive against the KM T ’s Fifth Encirclement Campaign. An agreement with the Fukien rebels who were the representative of the national
bourgeoisie at this juncture would have undesirable repercussions within the Kiangsi Soviet as it would amount to a betrayal of the interests of the worker-peasants masses. Moreover, as the CCP’s current stand was that a united front from above could only be established on the basis of a solid united front from below, the CCP had to insist that the Fukien leaders grant complete freedom to mass movements in their province.
Unable to meet the CCP s demands, the Fukien leaders procrastinated and finally abandoned the movement, enabling Chiang Kai-shek to quickly re-establish control over Fukien and re-direct his forces against the
31
Communists. As it turned out, the CCP’s failure to procure the
Wlu'ii I h e C o m m u n i s t s w e r e finally f o r c e d Lo e v a c u a t e Lhe K i a n g o i Soviet, one of the most urgent problems was to find out the reasons for the defeat, not only for the sake of future policy-making, but also to maintain the morale and confidence of the troops during the Long March. As C h ’en Shao-yd was in Moscow, he was the earliest CCP leader able to reflect upon the Communist experience. Writing in November 1934, C h ’en attributed the difficulties confronted by the Red Army to the new
strategy adopted by Chiang Kai-shek in the Fifth Campaign (i.e., ,the strategy'of constructing "blockhouses") and to the superior military equipment of the Nationalist troops (including fighter planes and bombers). This did not mean that the Communists were foredoomed to failure: had rebellions or other forms of "gigantic" struggle in a major city or within the ranks of the Nationalist troops occurred, and a better coordination between the Red Army and guerrilla units inside and outside the Soviet been achieved, the Red Army might ha.ve won the war. Nevertheless, the partial evacuation of Communist territories, C h ’en
asserted, should by no means be taken as a sign that the Red Army had been defeated; on the contrary, the Red Army after breaking through the KMT s encirclement and preserving intact its main fighting force, was on its way to creating new and extensive Soviet areas. In particular, Ch en condemned the view that the temporary setback of the Red Army was an indication that the Soviet movement had failed.
In analysing the strength of Chiang Kai-shek’s counterrevolu tionary camp, C h ’en listed the following five factors: 1. the support of the imperialist powers; 2. the support of the landlord-capitalist classes (emphasis added), especially the financial cliques in Chekiang, who were the most powerful capitalist group in the nation; 3. the
KMT s ruthless exploitation of the people; 4. the support of the warlords; and 5. the deceitful propaganda of the KMT, which had hoodwinked even certain section of the petty bourgeoisie (emphasis added). fo overcome these difficulties, C h ’en asserted that the Party must exploit every conflict among the warlords and recognize only Chiang Kai-shek as the principal enemy of the people, and come to an alliance with all forces or factions which were opposed to Chiang Kai- shek. The failure to aid the Fukien rebels, he declared, was a grave military and political blunder; it stemmed from an underestimation of the possibility of other political and military forces, confronted with a national crisis, to participate in the anti-Japanese struggle. As
the imperialist powers backing Chiang Kai-shek's regime were not likely to be weakened as a result of the insufficient workers' movement in those countries, the CCP must pay the utmost attention to the problem of creating a united front composing of workers, peasants, soldiers, students and merchants for the anti-imperialist and anti-Chiang Kai-
32