PRÁCTICA DEPORTIVA CONCRETA Y RECONOCIMIENTO DE SU DESARROLLO EN

The experiment consists of two parts, where subjects receive instructions for the second part only after the first part is over and hence do not know what follows in the later part. 1. In the first part of Experiment 1, subjects’ contribution types are elicited in groups of four along the protocol from Fischbacher et al. (2001). Subjects are endowed with 20 experimental tokens that they can allocate to either a public or a private account with the parameter specification from above, i.e., a marginal per capita return of 0.5.4 Everybody in the group is asked to submit an unconditional contribution and

thereafter a contribution table where entries have to be made conditional on the av- erage rounded contribution of all three other group members.5 _{Both contributions}

are made incentive compatible in the following way: one randomly selected subject in every group is given the role of a conditional contributor, the three other sub- jects in the group are allocated the role of unconditional contributors. The average contribution of the three latter subjects is used to determine the payoff relevant con- tribution of the one conditional contributor per group from her contribution tables. Subjects earn the payoff of the public goods game in part one, but do not learn the result from this part until the end of the experiment. As is standard in the literature, see Fischbacher et al. (2001), subjects are classified into four categories according to their pattern of conditional contribution:

• Freeriders: These subjects never contribute anything to the public good, regardless of the contributions of other group members.

4_{One experimental token is converted at an exchange rate of 0.10 €.}

5_{Since contributions are made from an endowment of 20 experimental tokens, 21 choices have to be} made.

• Conditional Cooperators: These subjects display a positive correlation be- tween their own contribution levels and the average contribution of others in their group.6

• Hump-shaped (or Triangle) Contributors: Subjects in this category (weakly) increase their contribution up to a certain level of average contri- butions from which on they decrease it.7

• Others: The residual category

The conditional cooperation exercise is particularly useful in eliciting underlying preferences from subjects in the absence of strategic uncertainty. Even in a one- shot interaction, an unconditional contribution of a subject is affected by both the preferences and the beliefs of a subject about other group member’s contributions, see Fischbacher and Gächter (2010). The conditional contribution, however, com- pletely abstracts from beliefs about behavior of others since the contribution is entered taking the others’ action as given. As a consequence, the conditional con- tribution table gives a close picture of a subject’s underlying preferences over final outcome distributions.

2. In the second part of the experiment, the same groups of four subjects repeatedly interact in a partner design for 10 rounds. In every round, subjects enter their unconditional contribution to the public good. Full feedback is given after every round, i.e., subjects learn about the contributions of the other group members, albeit in a way that precludes identification of subjects across rounds.

We conduct 2 treatments, (COMP) and (BASE). In the competition treatment (COMP) the final wealth of subjects after 10 rounds decides about the allocation of the prize. More precisely, every subject is randomly matched with a subject from a different group such that no rivalry between two distinct groups emerges. 6_{We take the Spearman rank correlation coefficient as a criterion to classify a subject to be a condi-} tional cooperator, i.e., positive andp <0.01. For a robustness check, we also take the somewhat more restrictive ”weak monotonicity rule“ rule as a criterion according to which a subject is classified as a con- ditional cooperator if her contributions are weakly increasing (and never decreasing) in the contributions of all other team members. This yields identical results.

7_{Note that in the classification method through the Spearman rank correlation, it can happen that} subjects get classified as conditional cooperators and hump-shaped contributors at the same time. In that case, we classify them in the former category, but this applied to only 4 out of 192 subjects.

After 10 rounds, the final wealths of the two subjects are compared with each other and the subject who has earned more in accumulated earnings is awarded a prize of 70 experimental tokens (equivalent to 7 €).8 _{Subjects do not get any feedback}

about contributions or earnings of their competitor from the other group during the course of the experiment. In the baseline treatment (BASE), everything is identical to COMP except that the prize is awarded randomly through the public roll of a dice between two subjects from two different groups.

In addition to the contribution decision, we elicit subjects’ expectations about their position in the competition against their competitor every round. To do so, subjects have to answer the following question every round by entering a percentage number on the screen: ”How likely is it that you have higher accumulated earnings than your competitor up to the current round?“. There is no feedback given about the performance of the competitor in the other group within rounds. Payoffs to subjects are made as follows:

πt=       

(probability entered)·40EP if cumulated earnings until t are higher (100−probability entered)·40EP if cumulated earnings until t are lower One period is drawn at random for payoff and within that period, either the contri- bution decision or the expectation elicitation is paid out with a 50 % chance. If the contribution decision is selected, subjects earn the proceedings from the public good game in that round; if the expectation elicitation is selected in roundt, correctness

of expectations is rewarded according to the above mechanism. Hence, subjects can at most earn 40 experimental tokens if they enter 100 % (or 0 %) and they indeed have higher (lower) cumulated earnings than their competitor in that specific round. The way payments are implemented for part two is done to discourage subjects from hedging between the contribution decision and the elicitation of expectations. To keep everything identical between treatments, subjects are asked to indicate their expecations about the comparison to their matched subject also in BASE, even if the prize is allocated randomly at the end of the 10 periods. At the end of the ex- 8_{This is done to keep marginal incentives from competition high over all ten periods thus prohibiting} a ”dilution“ effect of the bonus incentive if a smaller prize is attributed every period.

periment, subjects are told their earnings and whether they are awarded the bonus or not. In the BASE treatment, a dice is publicly rolled to determine the winner of the prize whereas in COMP cumulated payoffs of their competitor are shown to subjects on the computer screen.

It is important to note that the elicitation of types in part one is identical across the two treatments, since subjects learn only afterwards about part two. At the end of the experiment, subjects have to answer a socio-demographic questionnaire. Overall, 192 subjects participated in the experiments, i.e., 24 groups of four subjects in every treatment. The experiments were run between September and November 2010 in the MELESSA laboratory of the University of Munich and were computerized via z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The sessions lasted roughly 45 minutes and subjects received 12.7 € on average including a show-up

fee of 4 €.