Préstamos hipotecarios 2010 – 2016

Who killed innovation in the Cape wine industry?  27 the centre of the history of the Afrikaner volk (van Zyl 1993: 54-55). In 1952, the KWV also instigated wine festivals in each of the main towns in the winelands, borrowing from a successful Burgundian cultural template (Whalen 2009).

The second factor was the concentration of capital in the liquor indus- try. In the fijirst half of the century, the ups and downs of the wine trade drove many smaller companies to the wall, with the result being that there were only a few fijirms left in business by the 1960s. The largest were the Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery (SFW) and Distillers Corporation. These fijirms were able to assert tighter control over the production process. Dis- tillers established a special relationship with Manie Malan of Alto and A.W. Jordaan of Theuniskraal in 1949 (Venter 2009: 11). SFW records sug- gest that buyers felt that they were fijighting an uphill battle with farmers who often harvested their grapes before they were ripe, either pressed them insufffijiciently or too vigorously for good wine, and/or treated the fermenting must with insufffijicient SO2 with the result that the wines had high levels of volatile acidity. The occasional dead mouse or frog that entered the open tanks did not help! Contact with (hot) air during fer- mentation was understood to be one of the sources of the many faults. SFW buyers chided and cajoled, and when all else failed they refused to buy contaminated wine. Interestingly, the Boereboeke15 reveal that some of the farmers who went on to cover themselves in glory in the 1970s had been heavily criticized a decade earlier for a lack of attention to basic hygiene in their cellars.

Although it had long been known that excessive heat during fermen- tation is detrimental to the yeasts and leads to a proliferation of harm- ful bacteria,16 the discovery that the esters that impart fragrance to the wine are also lost led to far-reaching changes. There is an on-going debate about who fijirst pioneered cool fermentation in South Africa and the truth is probably that a number of farmers hit on the discovery at about the same time.17 In the early 1950s, the installation of refrigeration facilities

15 Ledgers that kept a record of the quality and condition of the wine in each farmer’s cellar and on the basis of which the SFW made its decisions on how much to buy. 16 A treatise from 1896 by an Edinburgh University professor made this very point and

even provided a diagram revealing how a cooling coil was passed through the fer- menting vat at Groot Constantia. See Wallace (1896: 140-141).

17 One claimant is the Nederburg Farm, where Johann Graue had been experimenting with cool fermentation in the 1940s. Another is N.C. Krone from Twee Jonge Gezel len in Tulbagh, while a third is what is now Oak Valley Farm in Elgin. Interview with Duimpie Bayly, Stellenbosch, 17 February 2011. The offfijicial KWV history accords Graue the credit

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and the adoption of steel tanks came to be seen as de rigeur for the mak- ing of aromatic white wines. N.C. Krone of Tulbagh, who was the fijirst to take the plunge, scooped the main prizes at the Cape Agricultural Show in 1959.18 His explanation of the science behind cool fermentation and his personal success in following it through, which won the plaudits of André Simon, encouraged other farmers to follow suit.

The transformation in the cellars was accompanied by some aggressive marketing by fijirms. The SFW and Distillers founded a number of new products, mostly consisting of semi-sweet and slightly sparkling white wines. The brand that broke the mould was Lieberstein. The advertising jingle that became seared into the consciousness of all South Africans went: ‘Get together with Lieberstein, any day any time’, which signalled that it was a wine for everyday sociability.19 Initially Lieberstein was sold at the same price as the other SFW brands and was made available in quart, gallon and half-gallon jars. Within a few years it was being targeted at middle-range consumers at a lower price and was sold in cooler units in bars to maximize sales. By 1964, Lieberstein had become the world’s largest single brand, which was no mean achievement in a country that had no previous tradition of wine drinking.

The white-wine revolution did, however, generate some downstream efffects, not all of which were conducive to innovation in the long term. The cost of steel tanks and refrigeration equipment were beyond the reach of many ordinary farmers who were therefore forced to join one of the cooperative cellars. In the early 1950s, the SFW began to look to the coop- eratives to replace some of its contracts with individual farmers. Over the years, a number of these cooperatives cemented their reputation as pro- ducers of palatable sweet white wines that won prizes at the annual Cape wine shows. On the positive side, they also encouraged smaller producers to move from producing distilling wine to delivering higher-quality grapes to the cooperative. However, the latter tended to settle into a predictable pattern rather than heading a relentless drive for improvement.

for having recognized the principles but notes that it was Krone who introduced the installation of dedicated cooling tanks and other equip ment. See van Zyl (1993: 60). 18 Santhagens ran an advertisement in 1959 congratulating Krone for having won eight

trophies, including the Burgoyne Trophy, twelve fijirst prizes and one second prize. It slipped in the claim that it was they who had discovered cool fermentation and had made their expertise available to Krone. See ‘Gelukwense aan N.C. Krone’, Die Wynboer, 4 September 1959.

19 Circular sales letter by R.D. Burmeister, 26 September 1961, Distell Archive, Sales Let- ters, 1951-1962.

Who killed innovation in the Cape wine industry?  29 The dual emphasis on sound cellar practices and the production of white wines meant that there was, however, much less innovation in the vineyards. From Table 2.2, it can be seen that the share of Semillon had declined considerably since the early twentieth century. The shift towards (white) Palomino grapes, which accounted for 21% of vines, was largely associated with the production of sherry. By contrast, the noble variet- ies remained conspicuous by their absence amongst the white wines. Chardonnay and Sauvignon Blanc were virtually non-existent, while the so-called Cape Riesling, which was thought to derive from the esteemed Rhine Riesling, later turned out to be the less illustrious Crouchen Blanc. The production of red wines was dominated by Cinsault, much of which continued to be destined for distillation. The limited advances in viticul- ture reflected an institutional conservatism that ironically derived from the legacy of Perold. The latter had been decidedly enthusiastic about Pinot Noir and even had some success with making wine from experi- mental farms. But after his retirement, the consensus was that Pinot Noir was unsuited to South African conditions.20 This assessment reflected the fact that it was trialled in districts that were far too hot for this notoriously ‘thin-skinned’ grape. Limited quantities of Cabernet Sauvignon, Merlot, Shiraz and Sauvignon Blanc were trialled and released but Chardonnay was considered as unsuitable as Pinot Noir. This largely accounts for the divergent trajectories between the Cape and California, where the adop- tion of Cabernet, Pinot Noir and Chardonnay, in the context of limited regulation, led to the breakthrough in quality. Most Cape farmers contin- ued to plant the same narrow range of heavy-bearing varieties as before, whereas Californians had access to the best planting material available forced by the narrow price diffferentials laid down by the KWV. In 1960, the producer of distilling wine received £ 11.1s per leaguer, while the pro- ducer of good wine received £ 16.3.6 (KWV 1961: 51). Although the lat- ter might receive a small bonus from the wine merchants, this did not add much to the price. In efffect, it still paid farmers to double or treble their output of distilling wine rather than banking on the premium for a smaller volume of drinking wine.

The constraints on further improvement were not immediately obvi- ous in the early 1960s, partly because of the optimism that surrounded

20 In 1958, a researcher from Elsenburg concluded that ‘Pinot, the well-known variety used for French Burgundy can not be freely recommended as a result of its poor adaptability to this country’. See De Waal (1958: 32).

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Table 2.2

 Grape varieties ranked by number of vines over a year old (1959)

Grape Paarl W’cester S’bosch R’btson M’mbury Montagu

Ceres & Tulbagh

Cape Caledon Total Hermitage 11,537,681 10,751,236 14,210,620 6,681,435 4,819,993 1,804,485 1,804,485 1,550,865 1,444,323 53,686,618 27.2%

French grape (Palomino)

5,145,656 6,134,655 1,432,068 11,999,192 8,099,881 6,159,324 1,754,263 459,290 301,730 41,486,059 21.0% Hanepoot 1,429440 11,353,290 1,018,874 2,635,561 4,000,814 2,374,993 1,045,051 1,054,642 984,752 26,347,417 13.4% Stein 3,393,264 4,788,147 9,366,796 1,917,645 1,912,591 167,605 843,113 1,488,868 340,108 24,218,137 12.3%

Green grape (Semillon)

8,954,848 2,437,216 1,074,088 152,408 4,623,603 30,300 1,036,011 64,878 546,130 18,919,482 9.6% Pedro 3,836,935 915,139 1,108,837 51,966 2,765,783 5,400 408,997 109,780 48,082 9,250,919 4.7% Muscadel 53,740 476,383 22,231 2,864,383 370,929 1,762,802 27,860 62,709 2,100 5,643,137 2.9% Clairette Blanche 1,608,181 163,956 1,914,755 143,740 295,155 3,500 242,875 79,250 11,120 4,462,532 2.3% Sultana 7,720 908,660 7 659,291 694,765 295,717 569,288 10,000 - 3,109,448 1.5% Belies of Kanaan 275,400 751,397 296,609 876,126 354,923 241,796 33,320 49,132 12,706 2,882,409 1.4%

Cape Riesling Crouchen

1,453,051 97,009 677,025 12,200 168,116 2,500 190,037 69,437 3,000 2,672,375 1.4% Cabernet Sauvignon 340,746 20,051 434,902 17,850 13,500 500 8,000 48,089 2,000 885,638 0.4% Source: KWV Statistics, Die Wynboer , February 1961, p. 12.

Who killed innovation in the Cape wine industry?  31 the de-racialization of the liquor laws in 1961/1962. While the KWV sought to promote wine as the drink of choice of a supposedly incipient Black middle class, the wine fijirms sponsored jazz festivals and carried out imaginative promotions in the townships. Although there was an over- all increase in wine consumption, African consumers flocked to bottled beer that was vigorously marketed through an association with virility and male conviviality (Mager 2010). The contrasting trajectories between wine and beer were all too apparent to South African Breweries (SAB), which owned the SFW and could easily compare sales of its competing products. The White consumer base for wine remained rather narrow and fijirms survived largely on the sale of cheap wine to Coloured consumers at the bottom end of the market. More ominously, the wine surplus that was declared by the KWV began to rise again at the end of the 1960s. By this point, consumer boycotts of South African products had led to a serious contraction of the external market.

Despite these underlying problems, it is possible to identify a third period of innovation in the 1970s. This was not driven by the KWV or by fijirms but instead by individual farmers who saw the important Wine of Origin legislation of 1972 (see below) as an opportunity to target a niche market interested in something other than generic wine. These budding innovators aspired to bottle and market their own products, in which the place of origin, vintage and grape variety would be clearly specifijied on attractive labels. The farmers who spurred each other on were an unlikely group of friends in Stellenbosch and Paarl: Frans Malan (Simonsig) and Niel Joubert (Spier) were Afrikaners; Spatz Sperling (Delheim) was a German immigrant who had arrived penniless after World War ll; and Sydney and Cyril Back (Backsberg and Fairview) belonged to a small group of Jewish farmers in the Paarl area.21 What they shared was a desire to plant the noble varietals, especially red grapes, and to improve their wine-making techniques. An especially important innovation was the cre- ation of the wine route in 1971, an idea that Malan had conjured up on a holiday in Burgundy with his wife and the Jouberts two years earlier.22 Although there were strict regulations as to what could be sold at the farm gate, the wine route enabled participating farmers to make them- selves known to ordinary White consumers. As particular wines acquired

21 There are some fascinating memoirs and biographies surrounding these pioneers. See Back (1996), Sperling (2005) and van Zyl (2002).

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an almost cult following, other farmers followed suit and new wine routes were delineated.

The merchant-manufacturers initially felt threatened by these devel- opments and applied pressure on farmers to deter them from bottling their own wines. But such was the farmers’ desire to be in control of their own products that fijirms were forced to relent and enable the iden- tity of particular wine farms to be actively promoted. The compromise offfered by Distillers was to market wines from specifijied farms, with the varietal and the producer clearly designated on the label, but as part of their Bergkelder range. This allowed farmers to build up a loyal constitu- ency for their own wines across South Africa, while enabling companies to advance their market share. Over time, Bergkelder acquired a direct stake in some of these farms and took greater control of the maturation process. Dr Julius Laszlo, a Hungarian immigrant, was employed as the cellar master and is credited with pioneering the deployment of French oak barrels. This enabled a breakthrough in quality for red wines that was of equivalent importance to the discovery of cool fermentation for whites in the 1950s. Fridjhon (1992: 48) moreover observed that it was Laszlo who encouraged farmers to draw inspiration from France as the land of red wine, rather than taking Germany as the benchmark. The Bergkelder extended its reach by offfering cellaring facilities at their Vinoteque in Stel- lenbosch. While Bergkelder wines became highly sought after, including the red wines from Alto, the flip side was that producers forfeited some of their independence (Ibid.: 19-29).

In the case of the SFW, competition from the independent producers forced the company to up its own game. The SFW had recruited a German winemaker, Günter Brözel, to take over production at the Nederburg Farm in the 1960s. Ten years later, he became responsible for creating some of the leading sweet white and dry red wines that were marketed under the Nederburg label, using grapes drawn from further afijield. These various ini- tiatives were assisted by three other developments. The fijirst was the Wine of Origin system, which permitted the designation of ‘estates’ in the case of quality producers. It was flexible enough to cover distinct farms treated as a unit but sharing a single cellar, as well as wards, districts and regional appellations in which grapes from across a wider area could be used. A tussle between the wine fijirms and the Estate Wine Producers eventually led to a compromise in which a distinction was drawn between ‘estate wine’ (such as Kanonkop) and wine that derived in part from an estate (such as Nederburg), each with their own distinct label (van Zyl 2002: 48-49). The second was the proliferation of wine-appreciation societies,

Who killed innovation in the Cape wine industry?  33 including local chapters of the Chevaliers de Tastevins from Burgundy, which tasted and scored wines and prepared the way for local arbiters of taste to emerge across the country. Thirdly, an additional borrowing from Europe was the Nederburg auction, modelled on the annual auctions at the Hospice de Beaune and Kloster Eberbach, which had commenced operations in 1975 (van de Merwe 2000: 11-12). This enabled the SFW and individual estates to showcase and, of course, market their premier wines. While the price bands for quality Cape wines had hitherto been narrow, the auctions now created a price premium for the very best wines that, in turn, provided a spur to further innovation.

The underlying problems were, however, all too apparent. After the Soweto uprising, it was unrealistic to imagine exporting quality wines on any scale, while a highly segmented liquor market meant that there were limits on local demand. In the mid-1970s, when SAB and Distillers fought a bitter liquor war, it is telling that the battleground was beer and not wine. In the peace deal that came into efffect in 1979, SAB divested itself of the SFW and was only too happy to assume a monopoly on the sale of beer and later went on to become one of the world’s dominant brewing companies.

Contesting regulation (1980-1986)

The fourth period of creative innovation came in the 1990s and saw the fijirst genuine breakthrough based largely on the recovery of an export mar- ket. This lies outside the chronological limits of this chapter and would require more extensive treatment than is possible here. I confijine myself instead to a brief discussion of the challenges that wine farmers mounted to the KWV system, which is what eventually enabled the industry to reconstruct itself.

For parts of its history, the KWV had led or at least facilitated some innovation. As already seen, it invested in scientifijic research and after 1940 made a conscious efffort to steer farmers and consumers alike in the direction of ‘good wine’. But by the late 1970s, many farmers felt that the KWV system was excessively bureaucratic and an impediment to prog- ress. A particular source of grievance was the quota system that was intro- duced to deal with the problem of overproduction. The quotas, which were not, based on the attributes of the land but on historical produc- tion levels, limited how much wine individual farms were permitted to produce. Whereas some farms were allocated relatively generous quotas, others received miserly ones and were only viable if producers resorted to

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mixed farming. Before 1986, it was not possible to sell quotas separately from farms. In addition, stringent quarantine restrictions prevented farm- ers from experimenting with diffferent kinds of grapes. Vines that were imported had to pass through a lengthy quarantine procedure and then had to be tested for viruses and general suitability for South African con- ditions before being certifijied and released to farmers.

As early as 1973, certain producers began to import vines illegally, a practice that accelerated at the end of the decade as the shift to qual- ity wine intensifijied. The cultivar that everybody wanted was Chardonnay but many other French and German varietals were also imported illegally. Grafted vines were flown to Swaziland and smuggled overland and, in one case, cuttings were even posted to a recipient at KWV headquarters. As it became public knowledge that the law was being flouted, the government was forced to intervene by creating a one-man Commission of Enquiry,