Praxis como saber fundamental en la Terapia Ocupacional y su relevancia en las

The protection against disaster discourse was contested in many ways. First, there were actors that questioned the underlying analysis of the problem. Among them were the most outspoken opponents to the protection against disaster discourse, i.e. those actors with stakes in the cash crop production, who were mainly interested in their short-term profit, and their advocates in the colonial administration and parliament. They argued that cash crops were

10 Boomgaard 1994, p. 128-129. 11 Aubert 1967.

12 De Haan 1936a, p. 75-76.

13 Circulaire No. 28 published in Bijblad No. 3156, 8 April 1879. Before that, efforts in these regions were aimed merely at the economically valuable trees (e.g. gum and camphortrees). See, for example, circulaire No. 1830 published in Bijblad No. 3452, 7 November 1878. 14 Art. 3 (2) Indisch Staatsblad 1897: 61 (Boschreglement); 9-2-1897; came into force 1-7-1897.

80 Protection against disaster discourse

of more value than the wildwood forests. Even as late as 1934, when arguments in favour of forest reservation for the protection against disaster had gained more support in the Dutch Indies, members of the Volksraad protested on the planters’ behalf that reserving forests created an obstacle for the trans- migration of labour to places in the vicinity of their plantations.15_{The govern-}

ment replied that research had shown that there were other suitably sufficient areas left for this purpose.16_{Among the actors who questioned the urgency}

of the problem were also swidden farmers and their advocates. A resident of Palembang, for instance, argued that his observations could not confirm that shifting cultivation destroyed the forest.17_{Surprisingly, there were also}

some forestry scientists who, after a while, began to question the ideas that formed the basis of the forest reservation policy. One prominent example is forester B.W.P. Roessel who in 1927 and 1928 published articles in the forestry journal Tectona in which he argued that it was not the forest cover of a moun- tain that was determinant for the water supply of a region but rather its geological formation.18_{He backed his argument with quantitative data argu-}

ing that forestry science needed scientific argumentation instead of ‘confessions of faith’ (Du. geloofsbelijdenis).19 _{This rebellious argument was not readily}

accepted by other foresters.20_{De Haan wrote in 1936 in retrospect that ‘what}

Roessel wrote was not liked in our circles’. After all, there was a strong ‘feel- ing’ backed by subjective observations and through frequent repetition a ‘communis opinio’ that forests were indispensable for a region’s water supply.21_{Still, critics agreed with him that methods needed to be improved}

to back up the hydrological hypotheses. Zwart, for instance, wrote that ‘the article by Roessel will not change our protection forest policy in the short run. In this regard it is wise to be conservative since one usually only starts to appreciate forests when they are gone and one needs to be careful with scientific theories. What seems rationally plausible often appears to be wrong in practice. However, that does not take away from us the obligation to collect data considering that the economic interests at stake are very big.’22

Although agreeing with the methodological point made by Roessel, Zwart called for collecting further evidence before changing policies. As Galudra and Sirait have shown there were scholars who after some time accepted

15 Volksraad 1934, p. 649. 16 Volksraad 1934, p. 651.

17 Galudra & Sirait 2006 citing Van Setten 1922. 18 For instance, Roessel 1927.

19 De Haan 1936b, p. 79.

20 De Haan 1936b, p. 79; Galudra & Sirait 2006. 21 De Haan 1936b, p. 80.

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Roessel’s thesis and others who kept rejecting it.23_{I will return to this point}

and Galudra and Sirait’s argument that foresters deliberately refused to accept Roessel’s argument for political reasons at a later stage.

Second, next to those who contested the foresters’ analysis of the problem, there were actors that had doubts about the solution that the foresters had formulated. Members of the Volksraad, for instance, argued that forest reserves formed a threat for indigenous communities living in the forests on the Outer Islands since a shortage of agricultural land was to be expected.24_{The govern-}

ment replied that it could not agree with this alleged crisis for the indigenous people and ‘that reserving the forests which need to be protected was con- sidered too important – in the first instance for the indigenous population itself – that we could tolerate the destruction of the forests that need to be protected’.25_{The government thus denied that its protection policy was caus-}

ing problems for the population. It argued that, on the contrary, it was re- serving the forests in the population’s interest. The above-mentioned argument against forest reservation at the expense of land for transmigration offers another example of protest against the foresters’ plea and in favour of pro- tection forests. Likewise, regarding the best instrument for protection against disaster there was some debate going on between experts of forestry and agriculture. The latter argued that agricultural land use was as good a pro- tection for soil as forest cover. Apparently, the foresters won this battle since protection against disaster remained under their jurisdiction. Last, but not least, there was an argument being made about who should be granted the authority to protect forests. Basically, there were three opinions about this matter. On the one hand, foresters were convinced that ‘good’ (Du. deugdelijk) forest management required forestry knowledge26 _{and therefore liked to portray}

anyone lacking such knowledge as a ‘layman’ (Du.leek).27_{On the other hand,}

a commission that had been formed to advise the colonial government on the question of whether it was desirable to let go of the so-calleddomein-principle – that all land that was not claimed otherwise was to be regarded as state land – argued that indigenous communities should be given the authority over most forests according to the indigenousbeschikkingsrecht, which had been ignored by the introduction of theDomeinverklaringin 1870.28_{The commission}

concluded ‘that maintaining the domein principle will permanently threaten (Du.bedreigen) the Indonesian land law and that abandoning it is therefore desirable’.29_{Logemann, a member of the commission, argued in an article}

in the Dutch Indies’ foresters’ journalTectonathat ignoring thebeschikkingsrecht

23 Galudra & Sirait 2006. 24 Volksraad 1934, p. 649. 25 Volksraad 1934, p. 652.

26 For instance, Gonggrijp 1932, p. 268. 27 For instance, Bruinier 1924, p. 13. 28 Advies Agrarische Commissie 1930, p. 10. 29 Advies Agrarische Commissie 1930, p. 84.

82 Protection against disaster discourse

would mean continuing to deny the existence of law ‘at both sides’ and en- danger the ‘livelihood’ (Du.levenszekerheid) of indigenous peoples.30_{A modest}

middle position was formulated by, among others, forester Japing. He argued that acknowledging the population’s rights on land would oblige the govern- ment to let the indigenous legal communities participate in all debates on ‘all agrarian issues, including those that were for the time being above their ability to understand (Du.bevattingsvermogen).’31_{He therefore pleaded for a ‘limited}

margaforest management’ (Du.beperkt margaboschbeheer), meaning that indi- genous communities should be given the right to manage forests that served local interests such as timber supply and that played a role as agricultural land reserve, but the Forest Service should be granted the authority over all forests serving a more public interest, thus including the protection forest reserves. After all, only the government would want to invest in their mainten- ance and improvement.32_{‘Limited’, he emphasised, was thus neither related}

to the size of the area nor the financial gain that was to be expected from the area. Instead, we may conclude, ‘limited’ was related to the question of what interest a forest served. Furthermore, he argued that knowledge played a role but acknowledged the possibility of giving indigenous communities this knowledge. Transfer of authority for forest management therefore needed to be ‘prepared’: the government needed to formulate ‘general guidelines for management’ and needed to monitor (Du. behoorlijk toezicht) management performance.33

In addition to criticism of the definition of problem and solution, there was finally the criticism that focused on the implementation of the protection against disaster policy. The main argument in this context was about discrim- ination. On the one hand, critics argued, the government kept listening to planters and their interests. It determined which forests needed to be protected while keeping in mind the maximum altitude for coffee plantations. Only forests above that altitude were to be protected.34_{In addition, the government}

did not stop leasing land in the mountains to cash crop producers and still portrayed Dutch entrepreneurs clearing wildwood as ‘pioneers’.35 _{On the}

other hand, it portrayed the swidden farmers as ‘robber farmers’36 _and

30 Logemann 1932, p. 509-510. It is important to note that he, in the long term, wished an

end to the existence ofbeschikkingsrechtbut considered ignoring it at that moment not ‘wise’

(Du.verantwoord). He also argued for limiting the beschikkingsrecht where the public interest demanded it, after deliberation and reaching an agreement with the local population about a compensation (Logemann 1932, p. 511-512).

31 Japing 1932a, p. 542. 32 Japing 1932b, p. 1585. 33 Japing 1932a, p. 545-546.

34 Fokkinga 1934, p. 151 citing Brascamp. 35 Potter 2003, p. 32.

36 A more nuanced perception was that only swidden farmers who opened new ‘original’ (Du.oorspronkelijk) forest areas in an unlimited way rather than returning to their old ladangs after a while were to be seen as robber farmers (Kools 1935, p. 26).

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farmers who made their cattle graze in forests as equally harmful. Both groups were to be blamed for their allegedly detrimental effects on the ecology of the country.37 _{This discrimination undermined the belief in the good in-}

tentions that the government claimed to possess. The Resident of Palembang, for instance, argued that if the forest reservation was in the people’s interest the government should be consistent and not grant the same forests to Euro- peans involved in cash crop plantations or timber extraction.38_{The reason}

for this discrimination may have been either that the colonial government was not entirely convinced of the future crisis described in the protection against disaster discourse (see above)39_{or that the government considered European}

planters to be ‘rational’ whereas the indigenous farmers were seen as ‘care- less’40_{(Du.zorgeloos) and thus ‘irrational’ or ‘not yet able to understand’ (see}

above). Even most of those participating in the debate on forest protection who were more positive about indigenous land use thought thatladangfarmers lacked the appropriate knowledge for forest and forest soil protection and feared that it was not possible to convince them to take good care of mountain slopes. Since they at the same time did not think that enforcing possible regulations to keep the land covered with plants was possible even they pleaded for establishing wildwood forest reserves at the expense of agricultural land for swidden farmers.41

In addition to making arguments against the implementation of the pro- tection against disaster policy there were also communities that stood up against being forced to leave what they claimed to be the land of their an- cestors.42_{Peluso has described this for a Dayak community: When the Dutch}

in the early 1920s began to establish a watershed reserve at the upper slopes of the Raya Pasi Mountain in Bagak, West Kalimantan,43 _{they forced the}

people to move and prohibited them from entering the area any longer. This meant that the Dayak living in the area had to abandon their fruit trees and give up their rights to cultivate the land they claimed had belonged to their ancestors. This, however, they would not do voluntarily. It was twenty years before the colonial authorities succeeded in convincing them of the necessity to move, and even then it was only the threat of imprisonment that made the last families give up their resistance.44_{Not surprisingly, after the Dutch had}

37 Potter 2003, p. 38; Galudra & Sirait 2006 citing Van Eck. 38 Galudra & Sirait 2006 citing Van Setten 1922.

39 Cf. Boomgaard 1994, p. 128.

40 Fokkinga 1934, p. 177 describing a situation in the Cilutung river area, West Java. 41 Fokkinga 1934, p. 155 citing de Haan. Fokkinga was an exception in this respect. He pleaded

for obliging indigenous and European landusers alike to plant bamboo and other perennials ‘which come close to fulfilling the functions of forest’ in regions which were not suitable for reforestation (Fokkinga 1934, p. 159).

42 Peluso 1993b, p. 30.

43 Officially established in 1932.

44 After negotiations with the Dutch the Dayak succeeded eventually to move the boundaries up the mountain, closer to the actual water catchment area (Peluso 1993b, p. 31).

84 Protection against disaster discourse

left the area during the Second World War, the local people made new swiddens within the reserve.45_{But the effective threat or use of state violence}

made it in this case necessary for the Dayak community to obey the new rules. In the words of a former Dutch forestry official, by the way, a comparable story sounds very different:

‘For the benefit of a protection forest the Dutch had established reserves for the Dayak with the idea that these would protect the Dayak against the advancing flood [oprukkende vloed] of Malay people. That was a beautiful idea but the Dayak were smart guys [slimme jongens], too. They sold timber from the reserves to the Malay people. They themselves therefore increasingly moved upwards the slopes of the mountain. There they saw that things they had just planted were washed away by the first rainfall. So, in principle they were motivated to do something about it but then the Dutch had to leave…’46

In this story, the Dutch thought to have found a solution that was beneficial for both the Forestry Service and the Dayak community. However, they conceptualised the Dayak and their needs in a way too static and ‘traditional’ without taking into account that the arrival of the Malay people could create new behaviour in the Dayak. Furthermore, this story indicates that the Dutch, at least in some cases, did indeed try to transfer knowledge and that the Dayak were not opposed to protection arguments once they experienced erosion.

Also in other cases the local population readily accepted the discourse. Japing mentions, for instance, the Eastern coast of Sumatra where ‘margas

established many reserves (In.rimba larangan, hutan larangan) after the govern- ment had explained their importance to them’.47_{According to Japing, accept-}

ance depended very much on how seriously the government took the people.48_{In this respect he criticised the Forestry Service for too much arguing}

in terms of ‘you guys make a mess of forest management, so stay away from

our[original emphasis,JA] forests.’49_{In his eyes, it was the arrogance of the}

foresters rather than the unwillingness of the indigenous people that deter- mined whether the latter would accept forestry arguments or not.

On the whole, when we consider which arguments were successfully made in favour of forest protection outside forestry circles, it seems that sustaining economic production and profit formed the major motivation for the institu- tionalisation of the protection against disaster discourse as it had in the case of the rational forestry discourse.

A new challenge for these economic arguments emerged when the last discourse that was going to result in new regulations on the treatment of

45 Peluso 1993b, p. 31.

46 Personal communication, W.M. Otto, 3 July 2003. 47 Japing 1932a, p. 545.

48 Japing 1932a, p. 545. 49 Japing 1932a, p. 545.

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nature in the Dutch East Indies brought two new values into the debate: pure science and romanticism.