Precipitación, temperatura y la relación T/P

Dasein is I. Mine belongs of itself to Dasein (Heidegger, 1992: §12). In George Steiner’s view, Dasein is ‘being,’ which questions being, by first questioning its own Sein. Man is man because he is a being–there (Steiner, 1987: 80). It is not a being, given once and for all, and possessing qualities. It is simple. It should be remembered that there is no pure consciousness detached from the world because Dasein is to be there (da-sein), and there is the world: the concrete, literal, actual, daily world (Steiner, 1987: 81). According to Heidegger, Being-in-the-world is an essential state of the Dasein’s ‘being’ […]. Dasein is a ‘being-in-the–world with other’s’. Therefore, Dasein is being-with and Dasein-with (Mitsein und Mitdasein) (Heidegger, 1980: 80/149). This is a new fact of primary importance. Indeed, the world is not only populated with utensils, it includes beings who, like me, are Dasein, who like me are each a ‘being-in- the-world’. These "others" accompany me, and contrariwise the utensils serve me. The others are mitsein. The "others" are not what remains of humanity apart from myself. They do not oppose my I-hood (Heidegger, 1980:152), they are therefore those whom, at first sight, one does not distinguish, but those among whom I am also (Heidegger, 1992: 160). To be more precise, Heidegger affirms that the others already are there with us in being- in-the-world (Heidegger, 1980: 152).

They are existential, insofar as they are constituents of the being of my existence. My being itself is an existence in common with the other. The world I live in, I share with others. That is to say, the world of Dasein is a shared world. This world is a Mitwelt (Heidegger, 1992: 160). To exist is for mankind to exist with other human beings. Heidegger insists on this and states that:

Being-in-the-world is the basic state of Dasein by which every mode of its Being gets co-determined… And the Dasein of Others is encountered

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within-the-world. By others we do not mean everyone else but me - those over against whom the I stands out (Heidegger, 1980: 153-154).

In any case, we do not conclude the existence of the other; the other accompanies us in a world from which he is inseparable. Others, in fact, participate closely in my existence because Dasein is fundamentally and ultimately to be-in-common.

On the other hand, misanthropy, or the absence of the neighbour, as an absence is only meaningful in a Mitsein. We speak of absence only where the presence of others is right. There is solitude only relative to the possible presence of others. As an illustration, I can be alone in the middle of a crowd; this is a peremptory proof that the true presence of the other is not reducible to the de facto fact of a material neighbourhood, but that it is based on being-in-common. It is in this order of ideas that it is logical to say that the solitary exists according to a deficient mode of Mitsein (Heidegger, 1992: 163).

The Dasein who is fundamentally in the world, must necessarily be concerned about this world. The world in the work of Heidegger is:

Always the one that I have with others. In this sense, the world of Dasein is a with-world (Mitwelt) and Being-in is being-with others. That is to say, their Being-in-themselves-within-the-world is Dasein-with (Mit-dasein). The world is where concernfully Dasein dwells essentially (Heidegger, 1980: 155).

The world is a system of modifiable relationships. The world co-implies a priori and necessarily the possibility of the game, which is precisely the space of the world. The worldhood (mundanity) of the world is to be seen as referential totality, which constitutes significance (Heidegger, 1980: 160). In other words as Suvak states:

Dasein is not simply self-consciousness, but mainly and fundamentally is conscious of itself or conscious of itself as being (-in-the-world). Being-in-

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the-world is a fundamental characteristic of Dasein and co-original with this openness to its own being is an openness to other beings as well as the being of other beings (Suvak, 2000: 4).

From this, it becomes clear that Dasein, which is fundamentally being-in-common, can care about others because Dasein in itself is essentially being-with and even Dasein’s Being-alone is Being-with-in-the-world (Heidegger, 1980: 156-157). The attitude of Dasein towards others is defined by concern towards others. In this sense, the attitude of Dasein towards itself is solicitude (Heidegger, 1980: 158).

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has emphasized the notion of ‘being’ as one of the key concepts of Martin Heidegger. The question of ‘being’ has been overshadowed in the history of Western metaphysics because all philosophy after Parmenides has lost sight of the ontological difference and hence the confusion of ‘being’ and beings. To put it simply, all Western philosophy has thought of ‘being’ only in terms of beings by forgetting nothingness, since being itself is unveiling and veiling at the same time.

Drawing parallels between ‘being and truth’, we have said that the latter, contains in itself untruth. It is therefore in the very essence of truth that it also implies non- truth. The forgetting of ‘being’ having reached its climax, we have therefore justified the surpassing of metaphysics by a new question, which would take into account the problem of nothingness. Given that there are several beings, we have pointed out the primacy of one of these beings, who is Dasein and who alone has the capacity to question his being, to understand. But then how do we understand? This is the task of our last chapter.

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CHAPTER FOUR

ONTOLOGY OF UNDERSTANDING

4.1 Introduction

The question of epistemological understanding discussed in the previous chapter allows us to approach understanding in its ontological sense. More explicitly, our cogitations here gather around the interrogation, which bears on the mode of being of this being which exists in understanding. This is the turning point Heidegger made in hermeneutics. To better highlight, the ontological understanding, our remarks will have four points. We will start from the analysis of the world. Then we will try to clarify

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what Heidegger means by the anticipation structures of understanding, to lay bare his notion of understanding that extends to interpretation (the third point). Finally, we will end with language, which is nothing other than the articulation of explicitation (explicitness).