Predicción de la relación del comportamiento del flujo de entrada

Similar to life course theorists (Laub & Sampson, 2001) and proponents of human agency (e.g., Maruna, 2001), developmentalists assert that desistance is best described as a process, with offending termination being the outcome of desistance (Bushway et al., 2001). Life course theorists and developmentalists also agree that turning points and within-individual change are important factors to consider regarding the desistance process. Where these two perspectives begin to diverge is with respect to (a) how offending unfolds over time, (b) the importance of childhood and adolescent experiences on adult offending outcomes, and (c) the validity of mono-causal theories of desistance (Blokland et al., 2005). Beginning with the specification of the unfolding of offending, developmentalists (e.g., Le Blanc & Loeber, 1998; Loeber & Le Blanc, 1990) are much more descriptive in terms of specifying the dynamic nature of offending over time. Le Blanc and Loeber (1998) specified three stages of offending across the life course, and at each stage, the nature of offending involvement changes. At the first stage, activation, offending becomes more frequent, more versatile, and more stable. At the second stage, aggravation, the types of offenses committed are more severe, and this escalation is typically characterized by involvement in qualitatively similar offense types (e.g., overt or covert; see Loeber & Hay, 1994). Finally, at the third stage, desistance, offending becomes less frequent, more specialized, and less serious. The timing (e.g., when the stage happens) and duration (e.g., how long an individual spends in a stage) of these stages is thought to be influenced by different risk factors.

Developmentalists also argue that childhood and adolescent experiences and risk factors affect (a) the likelihood of experiencing quality turning points in adulthood, or (b) the capacity to benefit from turning points that do occur (Moffitt, 1993), which is very much

in contrast with life course theories of desistance (Laub & Sampson, 2001; Sampson & Laub, 2003). Although the search for specific risk factors affecting the occurrence of turning points has been rather unsuccessful (e.g., Sampson & Laub, 2003; van der Geest et al., 2009), there is evidence that the occurrence or beneficial effect of key turning points varies across different offending trajectories. In their analysis of offenders from the Netherlands, Blokland and Nieuwbeerta (2005) found that turning points had only a modest effect on desistance for the most frequent offenders. Similarly, using a sample of Dutch adolescent offenders followed into their thirties, van der Geest, Bijleveld, and Blokland (2011) found that (a) higher-rate offenders were less likely to be employed and (b) these higher-rate offenders had fewer employable qualities. In other words, due to selection effects, certain offenders were less likely to experience or benefit from employment. This is very much in contrast with Laub and Sampson’s (2001) perspective that selection effects were inconsistent with the randomness of life events and notions of human agency. Symptoms of psychopathy may be a potential source of selection effects.

Finally, developmentalists and life course researchers disagree with respect to concepts of asymmetrical causation and mono-causality (Blokland et al., 2005). For developmentalists, factors influencing onset, persistence, and desistance may all be different. For life course theorists, these elements of the criminal career can be explain by the presence or absence of the same factors (e.g., sources of informal social control). Relatedly, life course theorists oppose the notion that type of factor influencing desistance for one type of offender may be different from the type of factor influencing desistance for another type of offender (Blokland et al., 2005)17_{. For developmentalists like Moffitt (1993),}

in contrast to mono-causal theories, risk factors for adolescence-limited (AL) offenders were different from the risk factors for life course persistent (LCP) offenders. As well, for AL offenders, social learning processes were implied in the onset of offending but acquisition of informal social controls were implied in the lead-up to desistance. Also unlike the life course perspective and other desistance theories, the developmental perspective is less a specific theory of desistance and more a framework for incorporating the appropriate desistance theory. Different desistance theories may be more or less

17 _{This is not to say that life course theorists reject the notion of age-graded informal social}

controls. The nature of the informal social control influencing desistance may vary over time, but the source of desistance is always the same (i.e., informal social control).

appropriate depending on the offender and their associated developmental pathway. Examining symptoms of psychopathy may be helpful for identifying the likelihood that an offender will follow a specific developmental pathway, and therefore the appropriate approach to the promotion of desistance for this type of offender.

Psychopathy and the Developmental Perspective

Of the desistance theories reviewed, only the developmental perspective specifically incorporates the psychopathy construct. Although not specifically referred to by Moffitt (1993) in her discussion of the role of neuropsychological deficits for life course persistent offending, psychopathy appears to be in line with her description of risk factors that mortgage an offender’s future. Unlike other risk factors that influence offending during adolescence but become only distally related to offending over time (e.g., abuse, residential instability, poor parental attachment; Chung, Hill, Hawkins, Gilchrist, & Nagin, 2002; Day et al., 2012; Losel & Bender, 2003), symptoms of psychopathy are relatively stable (Lynam et al., 2007). Due to this stability psychopathy should (a) have more proximal effects on offending behavior across the life course and (b) continue to represent a barrier to desistance during age-periods where offenders are expected to bridge the maturity gap. Although Moffitt (1993) did not specifically refer to psychopathy, others influenced by Moffitt (e.g., Lalumière, Quinsey, Harris, & Rice, 2005) have contrasted the stable nature of psychopathy with the transitory nature of young male syndrome (YMS). The latter construct was specified by Moffitt (1993) to be responsible for adolescence- limited (AL) offending. Thus, the two constructs are expected to differentially impact criminal careers, but at the same time, manifestations of YMS can look very similar to manifestations of psychopathy. Differentiating between the two constructs is necessary to better understand which offenders will desist as a result of typical desistance theories (YMS) and which offenders are at risk of ‘selecting’ into an offending trajectory where turning points are less likely to occur (e.g., van der Geest et al., 2011).

Wilson and Daly (1985) initially characterized individuals with YMS as aggressive, impulsive, and risk taking. Expanding on this notion, Seto and Barbaree (1997) described how the impulsivity of individuals with YMS allowed this type of offender to be opportunistic. Although specifically talking about sexual offenses, Seto and Barbaree (1997) described how the aggressiveness of the YMS offender facilitated the use of

coercive tactics to accomplish goals. Lalumière et al. (2005) described these individuals as domineering, fearless, and willing to use coercion to capitalize on opportunities. This impulsive, aggressive, and dominating nature is similar to prototypical symptoms of the psychopathy construct (Kreis et al., 2012). However, whereas psychopathy is believed to be a stable personality disorder, qualities associated with YMS are expected to dissipate over time (Wilson & Daly, 1985) and thus offending is confined to the period of adulthood. Once exiting the stage of adolescence, YMS offenders are expected to, as Moffitt (1993) put it, bridge the maturity gap. The traits characterizing YMS are socially-induced via expectations of male daringness and willingness to compete for resources (Wilson & Daly, 1985), which is very much in contrast with perspectives on the development of psychopathy (Ogloff, 2006).

Lalumière et al. (2005) expanded on Seto and Barbaree’s (1997) model by explicitly clarifying the distinction between YMS and psychopathy. Unlike the hypothesized origins of psychopathy, where symptoms can be observed at the beginning of childhood (Barry et al., 2008; Hawes & Dadds, 2007; Obradovic, Pardini, Long, & Loeber, 2007), Lalumière et al. (2005) specified that YMS characteristics emerged during adolescence only. For these offenders, classic turning points such as marriage and job opportunities were expected to increase the costs of coercive tactics, resulting in desistance. Similarly, Moffitt (1993) argued that these offenders would desist once they were able to bridge the maturity gap between adolescence and adulthood. For individuals with symptoms of psychopathy, however, Lalumière et al. (2005) speculated that coercive tactics would be part of a life-long strategy used for obtaining gratification (sexual or otherwise). In addition to coercive tactics, methods such as manipulation, insincerity, and deceit were expected to be part of this life-long strategy. Due to the expectation that this strategy would continue across the life course, Lalumière et al. (2005) did not expect individuals with symptoms of psychopathy to desist from offending unless the individual identified ways to manipulate others in a non-criminal way. In sum, the YMS-type offender is not necessarily a poorer judge of risk and consequences compared to adults; rather, it is at this stage that risk- taking is socially validated (Reyna & Farley, 2006; Steinberg, 2008). However, for offenders with strong symptoms of psychopathy, the driving force behind their behavior is not normative development combined with social expectation; rather, the symptoms themselves drive involvement in criminal activity. Although it is unclear whether this is an

evolutionary adaptation on the part of the individual with symptoms of psychopathy (Lalumière, Mishra, Harris, & Duntley, 2008), the expected antisocial behavior manifestations of the individual with symptoms of psychopathy are expected to continue across the life course and be resistant to normative developmental processes initiating change.

Due to similarities between symptoms of psychopathy and symptoms of YMS, it is important to be measuring the full range of symptoms of psychopathy, something that criminologists have rarely done (Corrado et al., 2015). As well, because of similarities in symptom profiles, it is also possible that the two groups will show similar offending patterns during the period of adolescence. In line with Cullen’s (2011) recommendations for the future of criminology, it is necessary to move beyond measures of offending in adolescence in order to distinguish barriers to desistance between those characterized by YMS and those characterized by symptoms of psychopathy. The first study in this dissertation (Chapter Five) begins to address this concern. The specific aims of this study are described below.