G.R. No. 160347 ll Nov. 29, 2006 ll Chico-Nazario, J.
173 332 Cadorna
Persons and Family Relations
PETITIONERS: Arcadio and Luisa Carandang RESPONDENTS: Heirs of Quirino A. De Guzman MAIN DOCTRINE:
An obligation entered into by the husband and wife is chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership, which is primarily bound for its repayment. Thus, when the spouses are sued for the enforcement of the obligation entered into by them, they are being impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as independent debtors
FACTS:
Quirino de Guzman and the Spouses Carandang are stockholders as well as corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System. Spouses Carandang subscribed to increases made in MBS’s capital stock, which subscriptions, de Guzman claims to have been partially paid by him. Thus, de Guzman sent a demand letter to the spouses for the payment of said total amount. However, the latter refused to pay, contending that a pre- incorporation agreement was executed between Arcadio Carandang and de Guzman, whereby the latter promised to pay for the stock subscriptions of the former without cost, in consideration of Carandang’s technical expertise, newly purchased equipment, and skill
in repairing and upgrading
radio/communication equipment. This led de Guzman to file a complaint against the spouses, seeking recovery of the amount allegedly paid by him.
The trial court and the CA both ruled in de Guzman’s favour, prompting the spouses to file this petition. In particular, both courts declared
that the debt to de Guzman should be paid by the spouses jointly and severally (note: this is the same as a SOLIDARY obligation).
ISSUES:
WON the liability of the spouses Carandang is joint and solidary
RULING:
The Court affirmed the RTC and CA’s judgment but modified it by saying that the spouses should pay the amounts they owe de Guzman from their conjugal partnership properties
RATIO DECIDENDI:
NO. It is apparent from the facts of the case that the spouses Carandang were married way before the effectivity of the Family Code; hence, their property regime is conjugal partnership under the Civil Code. It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal partnership of gains, an obligation entered into by the husband and wife is chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership, which is primarily bound for its repayment. Thus, when the spouses are sued for the enforcement of the obligation entered into by them, they are being impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as independent debtors. Hence, either of them may be sued for the whole amount, similar to that of a solidary liability, although the amount is chargeable against their conjugal partnership property.
Ros v. PNB
G.R. No. 170166 ll Apr. 6, 2011
174 332 Cristobal
Persons and Family Relations
Husband obtained loan from PNB and mortgaged land by forging wife’s signature. Contract VALID because H cannot come to court with unclean hands and loan was automatically assumed to have benefited the family because it was obtained for family business.
FACTS
Ros obtained a loan of P115,000 from PNB Laoag on Oct. 14, 1974 and mortgaged a parcel of land as security. PNB foreclosed on the property and bought it in an auction. The land was then registered in the name of PNB in 1978. Aguete claimed that she had no knowledge of the loan obtained by her husband without her consent and filed to annul the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property, alleging that her signatures were forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.
ISSUES
1. WON the wife did not consent to the mortgage executed by the husband, thereby making the contract void.
2. WON the loan from PNB redounded to the conjugal partnership
HELD & RD:
1. NO. The Court held that the Civil Code was in effect at the time of the mortgage, thus the property is considered part of the CPG. Art. 173 of the CC (The wife may, during the
marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property…) does not guarantee that Courts will declare annulment of contract, but rather only upon a finding that the wife did not give consent. It was not sufficiently proven that the signature was forged. Also, the documents were notarized, therefore they are public documents that has in their favor presumption of regularity.
Ros admitted in the complaint that he had forged his wife’s signature. If he were alive at the time of the decision he would have been prosecuted for forgery. By this admission, he cannot bring the action against PNB because he needed to come to court with clean hands.
2. YES. The Court ruled that the benefit to the family was apparent at the signing of the contract, which application included “for additional working [capital] of buy & sell of garlic & Virginia tobacco.” Where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Tinitigan v. Tinitigan
Oct. 30, 1980
175 332 Dantes
Persons and Family Relations
FACTS:
Teofista Payumo Tinitigan leased a residential house in Pasay to copetitioner Pentel Co. without permission from her husband, Severino Tinitigan Sr., who filed a complaint before Rizal CFI Branch II. He later sought, and was given, court approval to sell the Pasay property to Quintin Lim, general manager of Pentel Co. The wife filed a petition for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership in another court, which appointed her administrator of the conjugal properties subject to conditions (one of them being that the disposition of the Pasay property is subject to the decision of CFI Branch II.
Meanwhile, the husband sold the Pasay property not to Lim, but to Chiu Chin Siong. The wife protested but was denied because he supposedly has the right under Art. 171 CC, further justified because it will relieve the conjugal properties from foreclosure due to mortgage obligations.
She brought the case to the CA but it affirmed the assailed decision, hence the petition.
ISSUES:
- WON the husband was the administrator of the conjugal partnership
- WON the sale was valid. HELD:
Yes. As a general rule, Art. 165 NCC makes the husband the administrator of the conjugal partnership. Exceptions are in Art. 168, where the wife may administer only by the husband’s express authority in a public instrument. Other provisions may make the wife administrator by judicial decree. This does not apply since the decree giving her administration was issued after the CFI already authorized the sale, and because the decree was subject to certain conditions, particularly the sale of the Pasay property.
Yes. Art. 166 NCC states that, while the husband as administrator cannot alienate or encumber property w/o wife’s consent (unless she is declared non compos mentis, a spendthrift, or under civil interdiction), the court may compel her if she unreasonably refuses to give consent, hence the husband’s seeking of judicial approval in the sale.
Even so, Art. 171 NCC allows the husband to dispose of the conjugal partnership to fulfill the obligations in Art. 1612 pertaining to debts and obligations contracted by either spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. This does not require the wife’s consent and it is implied that judicial intervention is not necessary.
The wife didn’t deny these great conjugal liabilities the danger of foreclosure of many of their conjugal properties.
Guiang v. CA
G.R. No. 125172 ll Panganiban, J.
176 332 De Castro
Persons and Family Relations
DOCTRINE:
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect.
FACTS:
The wife went to Manila.
The husband sold half of the conjugal property without her consent.
When she came back, she found her children living in separate households, so she gathered them and they lived in the house the husband sold.
The buyers sued her for trespassing.
They later made an ‘amicable settlement’, which is still pending in the RTC.
The wife sought for the declaration of the dead of sale as null and void because it was sold without her consent.
The buyers contend that the contract was merely voidable, and that it was ratified by the
wife when she entered into an amicable settlement.
ISSUES:
WON the deed of sale is void or voidable given that the Conjugal Property was sold without the wife’s consent
WON the amicable settlement ratified the contract.
HOLDING & RATIO:
Deed of sale is VOID. Void contracts cannot be ratified.
Art 124 FC was correctly applied by the lower court because wife’s consent was absent.
Art 1390 CC does not apply because there was no “mistake, violence, intimidation or undue influence” that vitiated the wife’s consent; the consent was completely absent.
The amicable settlement cannot ratify a void contract. Citing Art 1422 CC, “A contract which is the direct result of a previous illegal contract is also void and inexistent.”
Relucio v. Lopez
G.R. No. 138497 ll Jan. 16, 2001 ll Pardo, J.
177 332 Dilag
Persons and Family Relations
PETITIONER: Imelda Relucio RESPONDENT: Angelina Mejia Lopez DOCTRINE:
3rd Parties or Strangers to the marriage do not have cause of action when one spouse petitions for appointment as the sole administrator of the properties.
FACTS:
In 1968, Husband left Wife and 4 legitimate children
He arrogated unto himself full and exclusive control and administration of the conjugal properties
Spent and used for sole gain and benefit and excluded the wife and children
VALID during that time, as husband was sole admin
In 1976, Husband got into an illicit relationship and cohabited with the Petitioner/Paramour
Started to build up a fortune consisting of stockholdings in Lopez- owned or controlled corporations, and other properties (buildings, vehicles, lots, jewelry, etc.) o Came from actual contribution of
properties and money (which were conjugal) of Husband
o Concealed these from the original family, entered into using his name or his paramour’s name or both
o In 1993, Petition of Wife to be sole administratix of properties, forfeiture, etc. against husband and petitioner o A motion to dismiss the petition filed by
Petitioner on the ground that wife has no action against her
DENIED: as she was impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party because some of the properties were registered in her name. ISSUES:
1. WON wife’s petition for appointment as sole administratix establish a cause of action against petitioner
2. WON petitioner’s inclusion as party is essential to the proceedings
HELD: 1. NO
o A cause of action is an act or omission of one party (defendant) in violation of the legal right of the other (plaintiff). o Elements:
A right in favour of the plaintiff An obligation on the part of the
defendant
An act/omission on the part of defendant that violated the rights of the plaintiff / breach of obligation that gives rise to an action for recovery of damages o The complaint is by an aggrieved wife
against the husband
Cause of action arises only between the husband and the wife who have rights and obligations to each other. o Petitioner is a complete stranger to the
marriage and to the cause of action Administration is between the
married couple only
o Wife’s petition for forfeiture is on the share of the husband’s share of the properties co-owned by him and petitioner
It does not involve the issue of validity of the co- ownership
o Seeking of support by wife is from the husband, also not from the stranger
2. NO
o An indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final determination of an action
o A real party in interest is an indispensable party, who stands to be benefited/injured by the judgement of the suit
Since petitioner would not be affected in any way, she is not a real party in interest, and is not an indispensable party to the suit.