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According to Taniguchi (2011), the Japanese concept of citizenship is somewhat different from other countries owing to the country’s “unique historical

background” (p. 3), and, in particular, its Confucian heritage. During the Tokugawa era (1603-1868), Confucianism, with its emphasis on loyalty,

harmony, and deference to authority, provided the philosophical justification for the shi-nou-kou-shou system, which arranged samurai (shi), farmers (nou), artisans (kou) and merchants (shou) in a rigid social hierarchy under the emperor (Goto-Jones, 2009). While Confucianism has clearly influenced Japanese

conceptions of citizenship, O’Dwyer (2017) warns that, particularly in the field of education, it has too often formed the basis for “anachronistic, orientalist stereotypes” (p. 208) among Western scholars, which ignore cultural diversity within Japan and the social transformations brought about by modernization. Today, the differences in Japanese conceptions of citizenship that Taniguchi alludes to are essentially a matter of degree. Regarding citizenship in the wider Asian context, Davies (2010) comments that, “Many so-called ‘eastern’ ideas

and practices will be recognised in the ‘west’, and vice versa” (p.xiv), and this observation is certainly true of Japan.

2.5.1.1 The terminology of Japanese citizenship

The English word “citizen” has various equivalents in Japanese, each of which has different connotations. Karaki (2007) discusses four terms, shown in Figure 2.1, which he argues reflect the evolution of citizenship in Japan.

The first term (1), koumin (皇民), which is only used today in discussions of history, refers to the Japanese person as a subject of the emperor under the pre- war imperial system. The terms (2) kokumin (国民) and (4) shimin (市民) are in everyday use to refer to citizens, but have different connotations. Kokumin – literally, “person of the country/state” – refers to a Japanese citizen: that is, someone with the legal status of a Japanese national. When used in the context of schools, kokumin has associations with patriotic education and the inculcation of national identity. On the other hand, shimin – literally, “person of the city” – carries the sense of the individual citizen acting in civil society. The term shimin came to prominence in the 1950s through the shimin undou, or citizens’

movements, which campaigned, for instance, against the renewal of the US- Japan Security Treaty (Anpo). Owing to this early association of shimin with anti-establishment causes, the word still has negative connotations for some Japanese (Ogawa, 2009). Particularly with the expansion of Japan’s voluntary sector, however, shimin has become the usual way to refer to citizens in the municipal sphere, and as participants in NPOs.

The other term Karaki discusses is (3) koumin (公民) – literally, “public person” – which is the name of the civics component of the social studies subject taught in high schools. Explaining the placement of koumin between kokumin and shimin in the diagram, Karaki quotes guidelines issued by the Ministry of Education in 1967: “In essence, the ‘public person’ (公民的資質)… must be understood to combine two meanings – citizen (shimin) as a member of civil society, and citizen (kokumin) as a member of the nation” (as cited in Karaki, 2007, p. 45, my translation). This attempt to combine two very different concepts of citizenship in one notion of the “public person” (公民) was problematic, and the reference to kokumin in the Ministry’s guidelines was widely criticized at the time as inviting associations with pre-war nationalism.

There continues to be a tension between the two senses of citizenship denoted by kokumin (national) and shimin (civil). It is interesting how in recent years, perhaps to sidestep the kokumin/shimin controversy, the Japanese

discourse on citizenship education increasingly employs the English

“citizenship” as a loanword – shitizunshippu (シティズンシップ) – written in the katakana script reserved for words of foreign origin. (The fact that “citizen” and “citizenship” can be translated in various ways in Japanese has important methodological implications for my study. These are discussed in 3.6.3.2.)

This discussion of terminology has highlighted some of the main themes in the Japanese discourse on citizenship – in particular the tension between the “national” and “civil”. The sections that follow expand on these ideas in relation to Osler and Starkey’s (2005) three dimensions of citizenship – status, feeling and practice.

2.5.1.2 The status of Japanese citizenship

Japanese nationality is based on parentage, on the principle of jus sanguinis. The law allows for the naturalization of foreign nationals as Japanese citizens, but, since Japan does not recognize dual citizenship, this requires renunciation of any prior nationalities and comes with the expectation that naturalized citizens will assimilate fully as Japanese. Crucially, the government does not publish statistics on the ethnic origin of Japanese nationals, including those who have naturalized,

thus maintaining a clear dichotomy between Japanese – who are assumed to be ethnically homogeneous – and foreigners (Kashiwazaki, 2013).

Japan’s constitution – drafted under the US Occupation and enacted in 1947 – enshrines three fundamental principles in Japanese law: democracy, respect for human rights, and the preservation of peace. It provides an extensive list of rights for Japanese citizens which encompass civil liberties (jinshin no

jiyuu 人身の自由), political rights (sanseiken 参政権) and social rights

(shakaiken 社会権). Only three major duties (sandai gimu 三大義務)are

specified for citizens: the duty to educate one’s children, support oneself through work, and pay taxes. While aspects of the constitution remain controversial – in particular, Article 9, whereby Japan renounces its right to wage war and maintain an army – it has provided a durable legal framework for democratic citizenship in Japan, and in this respect Beer and Maki (2002) judge it to be “one of the world’s most successful documents” (p. 95). With its emphasis on human rights and democracy, the constitution has been a key rallying point for progressive educators in Japan, including the left-leaning Japan Teacher’s Union, Nikkoyoso (Motani, 2005).

2.5.1.3 The feeling of Japanese citizenship

Osler and Starkey (2005) argue that individuals experience citizenship most directly as a “feeling of belonging” (p. 9). Data from a survey conducted in 2013 by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) reveal high levels of national identification in Japan, with 96% of respondents expressing emotional attachment to the country, and 61% believing patriotic feelings are essential for national unity (Murata, 2014).

The literature emphasizes the centrality of cultural factors in the construction of national identity in Japan. In an often-cited survey of national attitudes, Karasawa (2002) identified a commitment to national heritage as the main component of Japanese identity. He suggests that the strong attachment to

cultural distinctiveness reflects the fact that, unlike the US, Japan has never been

More than a simple attachment to traditional culture, however, it is the widespread belief in the cultural unity of Japan that appears to have been key to national identity. This unity is a central tenet of nihonjinron (日本人論 – literally, “theories of the Japanese people”), a popular discourse in post-war Japan that purports to explain the unique characteristics of the Japanese. The historical roots of nihonjinron can be traced to the Tokugawa and Meiji periods. Dower (1999) sees similarities with wartime nationalist propaganda which invoked the

Japanese people’s “unique and indomitable ‘Yamato spirit’” (p. 104). What Burgess (2010) refers to as the “post-war reconstruction of Nihonjinron”, however, was part of a concerted effort to erase the image of the wartime

imperialist state (Karasawa, 2002) and construct a new national identity based on a sense of ethnic distinctiveness. Fundamental to the nihonjinron discourse is the notion that the Japanese are a racially homogeneous people (tanitsu minzoku 単 一民族) who also share a common ethnicity and language.

Most nihonjinron writing was published during the 1970s and 80s, and, in the ensuing decades, scholars have waged something of a crusade against the discourse for its failure to acknowledge the realty of ethnic diversity in Japan (Okano & Tsuneyoshi, 2011). The clear consensus among academics now is that Japan is multicultural. Burgess (2010), however, criticizes the readiness of many scholars – especially Western academics – to dismiss the nihonjinron notion of homogeneity as a nationalist myth. He points to evidence from public surveys that suggests “homogeneous Japan” is indeed the prevailing discourse among most Japanese. Similarly, Siddle (2013) argues that increasing cultural diversity appears to have had little impact on most ordinary people’s sense of what it means to be Japanese:

the widespread acceptance of Nihonjinron myths as ‘common sense’ effectively denies such diversity and ensures that to be a Japanese citizen and enjoy constitutional rights requires both the practice of ‘unique’ Japanese culture and the possession of Japanese ‘blood’. (p. 152)

Another integral aspect of Japan’s national identity is the national language (kokugo). The idea that this embodies a unique Japanese spirit (kotodama) was a

central theme of nihonjinron (Gottlieb, 2012), and recent surveys suggest that for many Japanese, being a native speaker of the language is a more important marker of citizenship than even parentage (Burgess, 2012). This is reflected in the idea, apparently held by many Japanese, that their language is too difficult to be properly learned by foreigners. Gottlieb (2005) draws attention to the fact that there are two ways to refer to the language: kokugo (国語) is the “national

language”, spoken by natives and taught in schools, whereas nihongo (日本語) is the Japanese taught to foreigners. Thus, “the … native-speaker word for the language is different, although the language itself is of course the same, clearly designating the insider-outsider tenets of the Nihonjinron stance on language” (p. 15). A corollary of this insider-outsider view of language is the common

assumption among Japanese that as a nation they are not naturally gifted in foreign languages. Indeed, Befu (as cited in Seargeant, 2009, p. 55) went as far as to argue that the difficulty of reforming foreign language education in Japan may result from policy makers’ unconscious desire to preserve low levels of foreign language proficiency as a way of maintaining Japanese people’s sense of their own “separateness”.

2.5.1.4 The practice of Japanese citizenship

For most Japanese, the practice of citizenship is arguably characterized less by political participation than by involvement in their local community. In recent decades, concerns have been raised about dwindling electoral turnout and the apparent disengagement of Japanese citizens from formal political processes. Turnout in the 2016 parliamentary elections was just 52.6 percent (International IDEA, 2017). A recent survey by national broadcaster, NHK, found that in the previous decade there had been a significant increase in the number of Japanese saying they “had never and would never” engage in political activities such as signing petitions or contacting public officials. Part of the reason for this trend, it suggested, is a pervading sense that “even if I participate in politics, nothing will change” (Kobayashi, 2015, para. 3, my translation).

Tsukada (2015) cautions against attributing low rates of political

Japanese are interested in politics and do want to play an active role in bettering the country. Although ordinary Japanese are often characterized as being averse to political involvement, the post-war period has seen periods of intense political activism, most obviously in the mass demonstrations of the 1960s and 70s against the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty, and Japan’s involvement with the Vietnam War (Avenell, 2010). There have been ongoing social

movements throughout the post-war period – campaigns for the rights of Korean residents, for example, or protests against US military bases in Okinawa – but large public demonstrations have been comparatively rare. Recent events, however, including the perceived mismanagement of the nuclear crisis at Fukushima and the passing of the State Secrecy Law under the Abe

administration, have triggered the largest mass protests seen in decades. Ogawa (2016) argues that these may herald a new activism in Japanese politics.

Notwithstanding these recent developments, overtly political activism is relatively unusual in Japan, and for most citizens civic participation is focused on the local community (J. Tsukada, 2015). Involvement in local neighbourhood associations – to which an estimated 90% of households belong – is part of everyday life for most Japanese, and involves them in such activities as environmental preservation, fire and crime prevention, traffic control, and organizing cultural events. Participation is voluntary but typically viewed as a civic duty (Haddad, 2012).

Though not as pervasive as neighbourhood associations, participation in other civil groups is also increasingly common in Japan. The past two decades have witnessed important developments in Japan’s civil society (shimin shakai 市民社会), in particular a massive expansion of non-profit organizations following the passing of the NPO law in 1998. The new legislation was itself a response to pressure from citizens’ groups who, following the Great Hanshin Earthquake of 1995, proved more effective than government bodies in organizing relief efforts (Leheny, 2013), inspiring a “volunteer boom” in Japan. As of 2015, more than 50,000 NPOs had been incorporated, involved in such areas as