the process of capitalization, but by the logically necessary steps of the creation and accumulation of capital.
Now, Althusser's theory of history takes as its methodological prototype precisely the same pattern of reflection with which Marx, in the course of his material social research, infers the 'concrete totality' of capitalism from the relation of capital which is fundamental to society. As with Marx's critique of political economy, Althusser's theory of history is methodolo· gicaHy grounded in material historical investigation and concerned with historiography. The structural theory of history elaborates the historically fundamental modes of production from the material under investigation � modes of production which can be conceptually reproduced according to the 'logic' operative in the articulation of their instances. From this 'logi· cal' plane of analysis the theory rises to the level of historical reality, by gradually encapsulating the historical context of events in the increasingly comprehensive categorial network of social-structural totalities. In this
process, however, historical peribds can never be completely grasped in theory by reference to the structural totality of -a mode of production, Rather, they must be brought into the framework of mutually overlapping modes of production (or social formations). Historical events are only adequately explained when, as Kar.sz succinctly puts it, their 'social histor ical functional mechanism' is established. �9
- Over and above the methodological vagueness in which this concept of historical explanation is shrouded, it also reveals a singuLar consequence of Althusser's argument. If sections of historical reality - in Althusser's terms, 'concrete situations' - can only be grasped in the structuralist theory of history when integrated into the logical context of a social-structural totality, then only the already systemically organized parts of these 'cart
crete situations' can be grasped by thought ar all. This is because in the theoretical reference system of 'modes of production' soda-historical phe nomena only ever occur qua structural elements or functional quanta. An
historical complex of events can only be partially derived by analyzing the scale of its functional mechanisms - namely, as an objective domain of events; however, the historical and factual exploitation of leeway in the system takes place within interactive contexts of action, which Althusser's theory must ignore. Because, with the analytic fr<1mework of the structur� ally unified theory of history, the historical process takes as its model only the reproduction of a social-structural totality1 this theory of history is not able to thematize the communicative process of interpretation through which the system-process becomes relevant .to action and thereby creates situations in the first instance, Due to this conceptual shortcoming, the historical reality which Althusser's theory of history is in a pos'ition ro grasp remains an impoverished reality; in this theory historical reality exists only as a functionally hierarchized history of a system, not -also as a collectively experienced history of actions.
HISTORY AND INTERACTION "
Alrhusser and his students seem not to be aware of this analytic obstacle to their theory of history. They begin fro� the assumption that the categorial framework of the univc:rsal theory of history already contains all the con� cepts needed to describe the real process of history in Marxist fashion, as a nexus of events. Under this presupposition a materialist version of history is a mere l'!ppllcation of the structural theory of history, Althusser's reference to the ''concrete analysis of concrete situations' towards which the theory of history is supposed tb be heading, bespeaks the same meth� odological self-understanding. Clearer still are Althusser's claims to be able to infer S:eam!essly from the level of abstraction of the general theory of sodal-structural totalities to the empirical history of events, These are made explicit in a de�and that Althusser makes upon his own version of Marxism. 'Marxism cannot claim to be the theory of history, unless,
evert
in its theory, it can think the conditions of its penetration into history, into all Strata of society, even into men's everyday lives.'40 This sentence reproduces a classical claim of Marxist theory. Historical materialism must be able to determine the social-structural presuppositions and historical domains of action within which it has a good chance of being translated into a politically effective programme of action. Only when theory has been informed as to the emancipatory content of collective repositories of needs and orientations of interests can it hope to deduce orientations of practice, adequate to the situations of social groups.
However, Althusser seems not to notice that his own structural theory of history, in its dispute with historicism, conceives historical development merely as a structural displacement of functional mechanisms, and there� fore expressly abstracts from situations of communicative action. But how is the theoty of history supposed to be able to inform itself about social learning processes, from which it could draw political strength, when dealing with specific historical situations, when it has already decided that it has to abstain from this historical context of'interaction? The structural theory of history has purified its basic concepts so thoroughly of determinations of social action that not even retrospectively -qua· historiography - can it understand individual historical occurrences in the interactive network of social struggle and collective processes of agreement. Hence in the- ambit of its own analytic framework the structurally re�interpreted historical materialism is indeed able, with increasing precision, to confine the histor� ic.al domain of events to the functional limitations of social sub·sectors. In other words, it can describe an historical period as an epoch of structurally
enabled possibilities of action. However, the .social realization (or rather non�realization) of the objective logic of reproduction is not theoretically accessible.
Pierre Vilar has difficulties such as this in mind when he questions the theory of history advocated by the Althussedan school as to its potential for practical investigation. For how can a materialist historiography which
96 AXEL HONNETH
concentrates on
'this
country,this
time, orthis
conflict' be theoreticaUy focused by means of basic structural concepts, when these basic concepts cannot be transposed onto an historical context of event!{?41 Urs Jaeggi reaches a similar conclusion: he attacks the categoria! exclusion of the 'class struggle' in structural Marxism'S ·rheory of history.41 In the opinion of these two authors the structuralist reformulation of historical materialism reaches its limits where a materialist analysis of a particular historical reality begins. Both authors nonetheless still hold the structural theory of history to be supefior to alternative approaChes and think that it would be relatively easy to extricate it from the difficulties that S"f;em to bes(:t its analysis, by simply extending its categories. For this rea!ion the systematic limitations of Althusser's reading of Marxism remain hidden in their appraisal of his theory. In contrast I hope to show, by way of conclusion, that structural Marxism only succeeds in reinterpreting historical mater ialism by means of the methodologically unsound move of making Marx's analysis of capital into the prototype of a general theory of history.IV
Althusser and his students have taken the critique of historicism to the point at which their programme of structurally re-interpreting historical materialism comes dearly into focus. The structural concept of history is supposed to suppress the received ideas that have been so influential within the history of Marxism, and which imply that historical reality is the result of a co!lective human or technological progress of creation. Whilst these his torical conceptions depend upon the assumption of a history-constituting subject, Althusser seeks to gain access to the histotical totality in a wholly different way, not via the philosophy of history. To this end his structur alist premises play the role of fundamental assumptions with which his torical processes can be understood as supra-individual acts of reproduction. If 'modes of production', which Marx investigates with the example of capitalism, can be understocx:l structurally, as systems of rules, then every historical process of development can be conceived as a succession of in· ternai!y regulated processes of reproduction. In this mannet Althusser can convert the whole of history into an object of theory, which does not have to make the comp!'ementary presuppositions of an historical macro-subject and the continuity of all historical occurrences. [n this theory history is only accessible in the various histories in which operative modes of produc tion structurally reproduce themselves. However, the limits
o£
this. pro gramme of the theory of history are only really visible agai�t the backdrop of Althusser's theoretical self-understanding. Both the critique of histor icism and the carefully constructed theory of history promise more than they deliver.HISTORY AND INTE.AACTION "
The critique of historicism blurs the difference between a continuity of history which is simply presupposed as an appendage of the philosophy of hiscory, and a continuity which has been reconstructed from material his tory, by imputing to both the same basic notion of the subject. Althusser makes no distinction between a Marxism which only speaks of a unified history with respect to the rea! historical unification of all particular read ings of history, and a Marxism which already presupposes this unity in the guise of a unified centre of all histonca! occurrences. In both cases Althusser attacks the notion that all historical processes are centred around a macro subject, although it is only in the latter case that the unification can be. imputed either to a collective subject of action or ro a technological substrate of history; whilst the former conception of history orientates itself around the historical relations of inter-subjectivity. But then, in the former case, the critique of historicism is us-Cless, for history is no longer thought as the product Of a history-constituting macro-subject, in analogy to a world· constituting epistemological subject Althusser makes no effort to distin
guish between a conception of the subject that is over-burdened by the philosophy of history and a conception of historical Inter-subjectivity; he is therefore forced to leap from the critique of a Marxism which is grounded in the philosophy of history to the concept of a supra-individual systemic history1 without even becoming aware of the function of interactive con texts of. action in realizing history. However� he pays the price for the false critique_ of .historicism in his expositmn of the theory of history.
The- structural theory of history attempts to explain an historically con· crete nexus of events simply by reconstructing the functional logic of the social·str�ctural totality. rr is interested solely in the supra-individual sys temic nexus so as to avoid completely the danger of dissolving the social process of reproduction into inter-personal actions. FuttheFmore, it is in· terested only in rhe structure of this systemic nexus in order to exclude theoretically the historical centering of history in a history-constituting subject. However, Althusser can only identify the actual course of history by its structural possibilities and cannot provide a concrete material explana· tion of events as historical realities. Althussees theory of history fails to consider that the structurally construed functional tendencies of social systems are only translated into real historical occurrences through the interactive historical pr11,ctices of subjects of action, which is precisely what his approach categorically excludes. The social framework of instances does not isolate individual actions
per se,
but only in the -form of their social interpretation, in order that the historical 'surface of events' can then be composed from these actions. Fo:r by methodologically isolating social functions from the interactive relations in which they ate realized as situations, the structuralist rheory of history encounters similar analytical limitations to structuralist linguistics, with its division of linguistic rule systems from the practir;al context of spoken language." AXfL HONNETH
Since the systematic conception of the structural theory of history can� not be derived solely from the critique of historicism, Althusser is forced to call upon the scientific model of Marx's analysis of capital in order to make it intelligible. The general theory of history is scientifically estab lished insofar as it is a fruitful ge.neralization of the methodologu:al and categorial framework of
Capital.
Only this prior structuralist reading of the critique of political economy enables Althu�ser: to transpose the basic tenets of structuralism onto a Marxist theory of history This is because in Althusser's view the analytic framework of the analysis of capital is tailored wholly to the supra-individual functional mechanism of the capit alist process of reproduction, and by virtue of this narrowness of analytic· focus the theory of history manages to mesh with the structuralist con(:Cp tion of the event-constituting system of rules. Moreover, it is only because, in Althusser's view, the categorial framework of Marx's analysis of capital is tailored to the elementary components of:the capitalist process of repro duction, that the theory of history is supposed to be able to confine itself categorially to the structural elements of the mode of production. The vindication of the structuralist unification of historical materialism then hangs on a very tenuous thread of argument. Althusser makes the theoret· icai claims of his theory of history depend solely on the contention that Marx, in the critique of political economy, also worked out the general framework from which a theory of historical totality could be extrapo· Ia ted. In this contention, though, Althusser and his coliaborators subscribe to a crass misunderstanding of Marx's own claims for his analysis inCapital.
One does not need a highly nuan'ced critique of the structutalist reading ofCapital,
but only the most cursory glance at the fundamental structure of the analysis of capital, to show that Marx made his concep· tion of method and the categorial formation of his theory depend unequivocally on the historically specific structure of the capital relation.
Capital
is so closely interwoven with the sodo-historical presuppositions of its object of enquiry, that it can only be made into a general theory ofhistory by over�simplifying its analysis.
Recently, several different attempts to dear up the method of the analy sis of
Capital
have been able to throw light upon the historkal content of Marxian theory.43 In direct confrontation with Althusser's reading ofCapital
these works focw; their interest on the theoretical presuppositions under which Marx harnesses the structure of Hegel'sLogic
fOr a systemath; critique of capitalism. They follow a line of questioning which has been well known since Lenin's reference to the exemplary sratus of Hegel'sLogic,
but hasnever been given a detailed and explicit treatment. I shall make do at this juncture with a brief sketch of the results of these interpretations, insofar as the different accounts find points of agreement. They concur in the contention that, although Marx distances himself from Hegel in hi� early works, with his critique of idealism, he nonetheless gravitates back towards
HISTORY AND INTERACTION "
Hegel's systematic form of reflection in the economk theory of the late work.
The Marx of the &anomie
and Philosophical Manuscripts
thinks Hegel'sPhutometJology
as an anthropological and epistemological insight into the universal-historical significance of human labour. Against Hegel Marx emphasizes the left-Hegelian motif of. the factidty of human subjectivity, which evaporates under the presuppositions of identity philosophy to a moment of the self-developing spirit. At this stage Marx holds the theory of capitalism to be a theory of the self-alienation of labour through private property. The Marx ofCapital�
however, seeks a quite different meth odological access to the critique of capitalism. He no longer describes capitalist social relations from the immed�te standpoint of human subjec tivity as a relation of alienation, but rather immanently follows the cap italist suppression of subjectivity. Marx takes the real historical autonomy of the capitalist process of valorization as the point of departure for the analysis of capital, by making the self-valorization ofvalue into the subject of theory. Because Marx sees the 'structural identity'(Reicheft)
of capital through the lens of Hegelian 'Spirit', he is able to make systematic use of the structure of argument in theLogic.
The process of the unfolding of capital can be expounded in the dialectical figures of thought of the self knowing Spirit. Marx thus abstracts, along with Hegel, from all human subjectivity in order to be able to harness the latter's dialectical logic as a model method for the analysis of capital, suited to the real abstraction of capitalism. However, as a critique of capitalism this method remains embedded in the anthropologically grounded theories of the early work, from which perspective the subject o f capital can be shown to be an illu$ory subject that is grounded in human labour.These -sketches alone suffice to demonstrate the consequences of such interpretation for Althusser's theory of history; for if the critique of political economy systematically grasps only the process in which capital subsumes living social relations, then the historical reality which is investigated in this critique can also only be t_he social nexus which has been oppressed and deformed by capitalism. The price of the form of exposition borrowed from Hegel's
Logic
is an attenue,ted picture of realit�. 'The fully fledged critique of political economy does not aim to expound the historical phe� nomenon of capitalism, but first and foremost the "general concept of capital", Thereby history, insofar as it-amounts to more than the documen tation of social struggles, can only be thematized from standpoints coveredby this concept. Histor� steps into the purview of theory exclusively as the ground upon which the general. concept of capital is realized.'44 Structural Marxism ignores precisely this methodological limitatJon of historical reality in
Capital:
instead it blithely generalizes the methodological and categorial basis of the analysis of capital into a theory of history, whereas Marx took it exclusively as a scientific �ttempt at the exposition of capitalism.100 AXEL HONNETH
In the critique of political economy Marx abstracts from social relation!! of interaction, because he wishes theoretically to expound only those do mains of reality which have already been subsumed by the capitalist process of valorization. He denotes acting subJects with the category of 'character masks' because, in terms of the methodological analysis of the framework of capital, he is only interested in the functions of individuals which are relevant to valorization. Moreover, he largely .reduces the social context of action to instrumental or instrumentalized socia1 relations, because in the process of capital accumulation only these reduced forms of action could be relevant. However, this conceptual move only makes sense owing to the