Presentación de escritos y documentación por las partes

numerous small and larger corporates in the USA pay wages with cheques, while many corporates in Italy do so with prepaid (payroll) cards. (MasterCard developed a card specifically for this purpose with the trade name “payroll”.) Article 52, paragraph (3) of Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on payment services in the internal market refers the possible prohibition or restriction of the payee charging a fee for the use of a given cash substitutive payment instrument to the authority of the Member States.102

We examined103 _{the extent in which the EU Member States apply any prohibitions/restrictions. We determined that some} of the Member States apply prohibitions/restrictions (Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Greece, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Sweden and Slovakia), while others − keeping with earlier traditions − do not apply these (Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Finland, Ireland, Malta, Netherlands, Slovenia). Thus, European countries apply different practices, and we believe that they aim at establishing a balance between four criteria. The four criteria: efficiency (card payment is definitely more efficient than cash payment above the social optimum), consumer protection (the consumer should not feel misled), transparency (the cost of payment should be visible) and competition (there should also be competition between the payment instruments).

Countries applying prohibitions/restrictions were principally motivated to avoid distortion between the socially efficient card payments and socially inefficient cash payments. (The decision in some countries is also attributed to the fact that merchants were to be spared from a complex system.) The prohibition/restriction generally applies to all sectors and any card in the countries concerned, with the exception of Denmark, where the charging of a surcharge is in all cases permitted in relation to online purchases and payments with foreign cards. The prohibition/restriction did not produce a particularly negative effect, although there were cases in Austria and Sweden, where smaller merchants were not willing to accept payment cards, or only above a certain value limit. In Sweden and Denmark, the price of card payment is thought to be hidden by the merchant in the price charged for product/service sold.

Countries not applying any prohibitions/restrictions did so on the premise that the surcharge is rare, and they did not wish to hide the cost of payment from customers or intervene in the legal relationship between customers and sellers. In practice, the surcharge is commonly applied in a few sectors or smaller stores. In fear of bad press coverage, Finnish merchants refrain from applying the surcharge in practice. The box below summarises the practical experience in the Netherlands.

Retailers can freely decide on applying a surcharge, including the payment instrument, transaction value linked to the surcharge and the amount thereof. Some retailers charge a surcharge only for debit card purchases under a limit determined by them. Only 20% of retailers accepting debit cards charge a surcharge; the average limit is EUR 10. (20% of retailers apply a maximum EUR 7.50 limit, 60% apply a limit of EUR 8-12.50, and the remaining 20% apply a higher limit.) The average surcharge is 23 euro cents (the surcharge was generally between 10 and 50 euro cents).

The concerned experts of the central bank hold the view that the introduction of the surcharge system initially improved the efficiency of the POS system. The limit applied by retailers, namely, matched the social optimum, but due to technological development and the rise in the number of transactions, the social optimum declined and the change of the limit barely followed this decline. In reaction to the surcharge, a large number of Dutch consumers (69%) either choose a different payment instrument (cash or, to a lesser extent, the e-purse) or go to another store. Price sensitivity varies according to age, gender, income and education levels (consumers under the age of 35, women, those with higher income and higher education show greater price sensitivity).104

102 _{Source: European Parliament and Council (2007).} 103 _{European Commission (2010b).}

SUMMARY OF INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE

In connection with transposition of the EC Directive, as of 1 November 2009, Norway permits merchants to apply a surcharge for the acceptance of cards bearing an international trademark that are much more costly than cards bearing the domestic trademark (BankAxept).105 _{In the view of the central bank, this change not only favours merchants, but} improves the cost efficiency of payment services overall. Currently, merchants pay a fee of NOK 0.12-0.20 (≈ 1-2 euro cents) − irrespective of the transaction value − for the acceptance of the BankAxept card, but 1-4% of the purchase value in relation to international cards. (Since the bulk of purchases are made with BankAxept cards that have a lower cost and fee, overall merchants in Norway pay less for the acceptance of payment cards than in other countries.)

As noted under point 6.2.1.3, merchants in Australia may also charge a surcharge for card purchases.

In Argentina, a law106 _{obliges taxpayers selling real estate and certain consumer services to end consumers to accept debit} card payment, but they may reclaim the cost thereof to the debit of payable VAT. Private individuals paying with debit cards for such goods and services were also temporarily (from 2001 to 2007) entitled to reclaim VAT (in different amounts for the given products, but for up to 5% of the transaction value), but an implementation decree limits the reclaiming of VAT by households (bound to a maximum transaction value of 1,000 pesos and excluding gas, electricity and water supply). Taxpayers registered in the VAT register are obliged to accept debit card payments, unless the point of sale is not a shop or store, the sale is not transacted in a municipality with a population of less than 5,000 and the value of the payment transaction is not less than 10 pesos. Such taxpayers are entitled to reclaim the debit card processing costs each month (monthly and for up to 30 pesos per POS terminal).107

We found a few other examples of regulatory intervention through statutory regulation. − In Italy it is mandatory to set up POS terminals at tobacconists.108

− In South Korea it is mandatory to use credit cards over certain value limits relating to travel and entertainment costs. In South Korea retailers may pay less VAT if they accept cards and they are required to pass on some of such deduction to buyers.109 _{It is assumed that tax revenue did not decline overall and the share of cash payments fell from 50% to 25%} in four years.110

In relation to emerging countries, a MasterCard presentation111 _{indicated a threat of greater control of the payment} instruments offered by merchants.

− Threat of a tax inspection for those who have uncommonly low revenue from electronic payments (South Korea). − Fitting of black boxes on ATMs which are connected to the tax authorities (Argentina).

− Required implementation of the tax collection system relating to POS transactions at acquirers (Brazil).

Beyond regulatory intervention, it is useful to review the multifaceted approach applied by the Netherlands to promote the further increase of the ratio of debit card transactions.

105 _{Source: Norges Bank (2010).}

106 _{Source: Argentinean regulation (in translation into English).}

107 _{We did not find any substantial information relating to the impact of legal regulation.} 108 _{Source: Visa (2009).}

109 _{Thus, in practice, in relation to a product with a price of 120 won, including VAT, the government remitted 5 won of the 20 won VAT from the} merchant if the purchase was made with a payment card, and it required the merchant to pass on 2 won of the 5 won to the buyer in the form of a lower price. Thus, the buyer paid 118 won if he paid with a payment card (if he paid with cash, he would have to pay the total 120 won), and the merchant was only required to pay 15 won as VAT, thereby keeping 3 won and a total of 103 won for the price of the product, in contrast to cash payment, where he would only keep 100 won.

110 _{Source: Visa (2009).} 111 _{Source: MasterCard (2010a).}

Box 11