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I don’t think Sorabji effectively makes the case that conscience beliefs are not central to our identity. In the above paragraph, Sorabji uses the Money Lover to seemingly illustrate that someone can have a moral identity without reference to conscience beliefs about what “would be morally wrong for him to do or not to do.” Contrary to Sorabji, however, it seems as though conscience beliefs at least partly constitute our moral identity – for it seems difficult to articulate one’s complete moral identity without ever referencing what they believe to be morally wrong to do or not do. While it is possible to highlight at least some aspects of our moral identity that are not necessarily conscience beliefs, it just seems impossible to discuss the totality of our moral identity without any reference to our conscience beliefs. If conscience beliefs are necessarily central to our moral identity, then it seems as though conscience beliefs might be necessarily central to our overall identity as well. After all, it seems plausible to think that our overall identity is at least partly

constituted by our moral identity. Even Sorabji seems to indicate as much: moneymaking allowed the Money Lover “to structure his identity” – which included “his moral identity.”

If I am right about this – namely, that conscience beliefs, religious or otherwise, are necessarily central to our overall identity insofar as conscience beliefs are a necessary aspect of our moral identity, and that our moral identity a necessary aspect of our overall identity – then is there reason to legally privilege the religious conscience over the nonreligious conscience? The answer seems to be “no” at first glance if both forms of conscience are similarly central to our moral identity if not our overall identity. It seems as if we should just treat both forms of conscience similarly before the law if they are at least similarly central to our moral or overall identity. As Gemma Cornelissen notes, “the identity approach locates a plausible basis for the concern behind religious exemptions, but it fails on its own to explain why religious beliefs should be considered more central to

individuals’ identities than other personal attributes, including non-religious beliefs.”293

But, importantly, what if these forms of conscience are dissimilarly central to our identity such that the religious conscience is somehow more central to our moral or overall identity?

Even if religious conscience beliefs are somehow more central to an individual’s moral or overall identity, I still don’t think that it is a sufficient reason for preferential treatment before the law. While it’s true that “the identity approach seems, at least at first glance, to come close to what people are concerned with when they claim a religious

exemption,”294 _{it doesn’t seem as though identity concerns are the only relevant grounds}

293 _{Gemma Cornelissen (2012), 105} 294 _{Gemma Cornelissen (2012), 93}

for an exemption worth considering. As such, it seems possible that the nonreligious conscience – as well as the religious conscience, really – could be justifiably granted the same legal exemption, but on non-identity grounds. In fact, Sorabji accepts this conclusion, believing that conscience’s “connection with being in the wrong accounts for the force of,

and respect for, conscience of others, for no one wants to be in the wrong.”295 _{As such, he}

doesn’t think that we would need to look for something additional in order to ground

protections for conscience – such as its “being central to people’s identity.”296 _{In this sort of}

scenario, religious conscience might be more central to one’s identity – moral or otherwise – but it might not matter much with respect to comparative treatment before the law: there might be adequate, non-identity grounds for legal exemptions that are similarly shared by either form of conscience. As noted by Sorabji, the relevant feature for grounding an exemption might just be that the belief in question is conscientious in nature, not necessarily that it is central – or more central – to one’s identity.

While that may be true, it’s also worth noting here that even if the religious conscience were understood to be more central to one’s identity – moral or otherwise – there might be simpler reasons to treat both forms of conscience equally. If we suppose that being central to one’s identity is a relevant consideration for determining the permissibility of an exemption and that secular conscience is nevertheless central to one’s

295 _{Richard Sorabji (2014), 217. For Sorabji, an appeal to conscience has force because “when it concerns the}

present or future, it represents a person’s belief about what it would be wrong for them to do in an expected situation calling for decision. A person’s sense of what it would be wrong for them to do has a special weight, and causes a degree of inhibition against overriding it.” (205)

identity even though it’s not as central as the religious conscience, then it seems plausible to think that the secular conscience would remain sufficiently central to one’s identity so as to warrant the exemption. We can see this point illustrated in the Seeger and Welsh cases, for example. We can, for the sake of argument, just suppose religious conscience beliefs against conscription were more central to the identity of the objectors than the secular conscience beliefs against conscription in these cases. But even if they were more central, it still seems as though the secular conscience beliefs against conscription were sufficiently central to their identity so as to warrant the same exemption. After all, the secular conscience beliefs in these cases qualified for the exemption because they seemed to sufficiently occupy “in the life of [their] possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of

those admittedly qualifying for the exemption.”297 _{As Charles Taylor and Jocelyn Maclure}

argue, “it is not religious convictions in themselves that must enjoy a special status but,

rather, all core beliefs that allow individuals to structure their moral identity.”298