Presentación:

As we noted above assessment of the progress of civil service reform in Russia is rather difficult because of absence of clearly defined outputs and specific deadlines in the reform programme as well as frequent shortage of data about the extent of advance of reform.

Judging by the available information, interviews with participants and rare statements made by those who were directly involved in coordinating and managing reform activities we may state that notable advance of civil service reform has been registered mainly in the following areas:

a) adoption of legislation and other normative acts (laws, decrees, enactments);

b) considerable increase in monetary compensation of civil servants;

c) implementation of pilots and experiments in selected ministries and regions. Apart from the two laws “On the State Service System of the Russian Federation” and “On the State Civil Service of the Russian Federation” adopted in May 2003 and July 2004 respectively over 30 legal and regulatory acts were signed by the President and the Head of Government by mid 2006 as part of the secondary legislation specifying and complementing the provisions of these laws. These acts dealt with such issues as arrangements for resolving conflict of interest, organising competitive recruitment, awarding class ranks, carrying out appraisal of civil servants, conducting qualification examination, approval of the roster of civil service positions and others.

In connection with this a World Bank report noted “For the past two and a half years significant progress has been achieved in developing legal and methodologicalframework for the reform implementation” (World Bank, 2006).

Implementation of the reform Programme together with creation of material and technical base for efficient functioning of the civil service has brought about some quite tangible results. It is estimated that during the period 2004–2007 the monetary compensation of Russian federal civil servants increased on average 100-

with this one observer made the following comment: “The international intervention programmes in Russian civil service reform have accordingly tended to be either piecemeal, or ‘pilot’ in nature, and therefore uncoordinated, and hard to ‘scale up’, thus generating what is in effect a self-fulfilling prophecy about the country’s ‘openness to reform’. Some external interventions have by contrast been excessively ‘foundational’, assuming that development must start from a long way ‘back up the modernity ladder’, and thus perversely have the effect of reinforcing Russian ‘backwardness’ with legislative measures which have little chance of being implemented or are at such a high level of generality that they fail to address the pressing operational difficulties faced by Russian government day to day”. (Gray, 2005:14).

Establishment in January 2004 in Moscow of the Donor Secretariat funded by DFID (UK) to coordinate assistance to public administration reform offered by external donors appears to have contributed to increasing efficacy of the foreign intervention and ensuring its integrity with the Russian Government priorities.

4.14 Assessment of Civil Service Reform Progress and Mid-term

Results

As we noted above assessment of the progress of civil service reform in Russia is rather difficult because of absence of clearly defined outputs and specific deadlines in the reform programme as well as frequent shortage of data about the extent of advance of reform.

Judging by the available information, interviews with participants and rare statements made by those who were directly involved in coordinating and managing reform activities we may state that notable advance of civil service reform has been registered mainly in the following areas:

a) adoption of legislation and other normative acts (laws, decrees, enactments);

b) considerable increase in monetary compensation of civil servants;

c) implementation of pilots and experiments in selected ministries and regions. Apart from the two laws “On the State Service System of the Russian Federation” and “On the State Civil Service of the Russian Federation” adopted in May 2003 and July 2004 respectively over 30 legal and regulatory acts were signed by the President and the Head of Government by mid 2006 as part of the secondary legislation specifying and complementing the provisions of these laws. These acts dealt with such issues as arrangements for resolving conflict of interest, organising competitive recruitment, awarding class ranks, carrying out appraisal of civil servants, conducting qualification examination, approval of the roster of civil service positions and others.

In connection with this a World Bank report noted “For the past two and a half years significant progress has been achieved in developing legal and methodologicalframework for the reform implementation” (World Bank, 2006).

Implementation of the reform Programme together with creation of material and technical base for efficient functioning of the civil service has brought about some quite tangible results. It is estimated that during the period 2004–2007 the monetary compensation of Russian federal civil servants increased on average 100-

150% for mid level positions and 300-500% for top level positions. The Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) data published in March 2007 revealed that in 2006 average remuneration of federal civil service employees increased by 24% and amounted to 13,425 roubles which was higher than general Russia average of 10,728 roubles. In some Russian regions civil servants appear to be in a particularly privileged position in this respect. The same Rosstat data demonstrated that in 2006 the average salary of a civil servant in St. Petersburg was 30,990 roubles (approx. USD 1200) which was twice higher than the average salary in the city and higher than average civil servant’s salary in Moscow ("Kommersant Daily", 27 March 2007).

The advance in implementing pilots and experiments, though not even, was overall successful as it laid down the ground for practical enforcement of the innovative approaches contained in the reform Programme and legislation, provided there was sufficient will for these changes.

Some of the experiments appear to be truly innovative in the Russian context. For instance, in line with the Presidential Decree signed late 2006, selected federal ministries and agencies were allowed to retain the pay bill of those staff members, who have left (for whatever reason) public office or were dismissed, and to use the savings made to increase the salaries of the best performing civil servants (Sharov, 2007).

In another case experimental introduction of performance related pay took place in 2006 in 20 government agencies and offices rendering services to citizens and businesses. The experiment envisaged considerable bonuses to the staff on top of their standard remuneration schemes in cases where the customers were satisfied with the quality of rendered services (Sharov, 2007).

Activities were carried out along other directions of reform as they were mapped out in the Programme but with limited scope and overall less convincing results. Starting from 2005 considerably more state budget funds were directed at training civil servants. This allowed to increase the number of staff trained and to diversify the forms of training, e. g. to use more long term and distance learning courses, to send more civil servants for training abroad. However, the shortcomings of the existing system of training - very formal competition among training institutions (often organised only for subsequent reporting); low fees for the teaching staff; and in most cases weak relevance of training programmes to the real practical needs of civil servants - basically remained.

Similarly, introduction of modern job descriptions in the majority of cases turned out to be formal. The Presidential Decree N 159/2005 “On the Official Contract of Employment by the Civil Service and Appointment to Civil Service Positions” set three months period for the development of job regulations by all federal government institutions in line with new requirements. However since no methodological guidelines had been developed to help ministries in drafting new job regulations the latter transformed the existing job instructions into job regulations without any substantive changes (World Bank, 2006:25).

In spite of much rhetoric a number of key issues in the reform programme, in particular, excessive politicisation of the civil service and fight against corruption have been left unattended in terms of achievement of any practical results.

The task of further democratization of civil service implying introduction of mechanisms for increased accountability to democratically elected institutions and civil society, transparency and openness, client orientation and responsiveness,

150% for mid level positions and 300-500% for top level positions. The Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) data published in March 2007 revealed that in 2006 average remuneration of federal civil service employees increased by 24% and amounted to 13,425 roubles which was higher than general Russia average of 10,728 roubles. In some Russian regions civil servants appear to be in a particularly privileged position in this respect. The same Rosstat data demonstrated that in 2006 the average salary of a civil servant in St. Petersburg was 30,990 roubles (approx. USD 1200) which was twice higher than the average salary in the city and higher than average civil servant’s salary in Moscow ("Kommersant Daily", 27 March 2007).

The advance in implementing pilots and experiments, though not even, was overall successful as it laid down the ground for practical enforcement of the innovative approaches contained in the reform Programme and legislation, provided there was sufficient will for these changes.

Some of the experiments appear to be truly innovative in the Russian context. For instance, in line with the Presidential Decree signed late 2006, selected federal ministries and agencies were allowed to retain the pay bill of those staff members, who have left (for whatever reason) public office or were dismissed, and to use the savings made to increase the salaries of the best performing civil servants (Sharov, 2007).

In another case experimental introduction of performance related pay took place in 2006 in 20 government agencies and offices rendering services to citizens and businesses. The experiment envisaged considerable bonuses to the staff on top of their standard remuneration schemes in cases where the customers were satisfied with the quality of rendered services (Sharov, 2007).

Activities were carried out along other directions of reform as they were mapped out in the Programme but with limited scope and overall less convincing results. Starting from 2005 considerably more state budget funds were directed at training civil servants. This allowed to increase the number of staff trained and to diversify the forms of training, e. g. to use more long term and distance learning courses, to send more civil servants for training abroad. However, the shortcomings of the existing system of training - very formal competition among training institutions (often organised only for subsequent reporting); low fees for the teaching staff; and in most cases weak relevance of training programmes to the real practical needs of civil servants - basically remained.

Similarly, introduction of modern job descriptions in the majority of cases turned out to be formal. The Presidential Decree N 159/2005 “On the Official Contract of Employment by the Civil Service and Appointment to Civil Service Positions” set three months period for the development of job regulations by all federal government institutions in line with new requirements. However since no methodological guidelines had been developed to help ministries in drafting new job regulations the latter transformed the existing job instructions into job regulations without any substantive changes (World Bank, 2006:25).

In spite of much rhetoric a number of key issues in the reform programme, in particular, excessive politicisation of the civil service and fight against corruption have been left unattended in terms of achievement of any practical results.

The task of further democratization of civil service implying introduction of mechanisms for increased accountability to democratically elected institutions and civil society, transparency and openness, client orientation and responsiveness,

consultation with citizens appears to have been so far of “second priority”. For example, in his annual address to the Federal Assembly in 2003 the President stressed the necessity of developing effective mechanism for resolution of disputes between a citizen and state through improving administrative and judicial procedures. However, a year after this statement very little if anything had been done in this respect. (Otechestvennyie Zapiski, 2004:114).

The managers of the reform programme appear to have defined development of civil service legislation as the principal reform implementation tool. This decision does not seem to be fully justified for a number of reasons. First, because of weak law enforcement in Russia in general and of civil service related legislation in particular. Secondly, because there has been definite shortage of qualified and skilful experts in Russia capable of drafting legislation and other normative documents on civil service issues. Thirdly, because this priority overshadowed other important implementation tools such as networking, coalition building and fiscal incentive instruments which turned out to be partially or entirely “forgotten”.

The Law “On Procurement of Services and Goods for the State Needs” provides good illustration of weak law enforcement. The Law envisaged that almost all purchases should be tender/competition based whereas in reality nine out of ten procurement procedures were exempt from competition (Dmitriev, 2005:42). Another example is linked to the Law “On the State Civil Service of the Russian Federation” which envisaged measures to regulate conflict of interest situations. As a result, commissions on conflict of interest were set up in the majority of ministries and other state institutions. However, in course of the two years following adoption of the law in 2004 no single case of such a conflict was reviewed (ibid).

One of the weaknesses of reform implementation was evident shortage of committed reform stakeholders. Mobilisation of internal and external support for reform has been largely disregarded. As a result only 11% of interviewed civil servants were ready to fully support the reform, 79% were ready to do it only partially, and 8.5% were not supportive of reform at all (RACS, 2004:17).

Reform implementation has been accompanied by a number of unforeseen side effects. It turns out that while Russia’s population has decreased steadily in recent years, the number of civil servants has increased at an inversely proportionate rate.

According to the data of the Federal State Statistics Service only in 2005 the number of state administration employees at the federal level increased by 10.9%. A report by the consulting company Troyka Dialogue indicates that in the course of three years (2004-2006) the number of civil servants had grown by approximately 17%, whereas labour productivity in the public sector had dropped 7% for the same period.

Even more interesting is that funding of public administration from the state budget for the period 2000–2006 increased 11 times in nominal prices whereas, for instance, expenditures on social protection grew 3 fold only. (Business Week, Russia, 28 August 2006). The same period saw expansion of privileges for top level civil servants. For example, since 2005 officials from the level of Deputy Head of Department upwards gained the right for business class travel by air and 1 class travel by train.

Summing up we may conclude that the civil service reform has failed so far to make considerable advance in most of priority directions as mapped out in its

consultation with citizens appears to have been so far of “second priority”. For example, in his annual address to the Federal Assembly in 2003 the President stressed the necessity of developing effective mechanism for resolution of disputes between a citizen and state through improving administrative and judicial procedures. However, a year after this statement very little if anything had been done in this respect. (Otechestvennyie Zapiski, 2004:114).

The managers of the reform programme appear to have defined development of civil service legislation as the principal reform implementation tool. This decision does not seem to be fully justified for a number of reasons. First, because of weak law enforcement in Russia in general and of civil service related legislation in particular. Secondly, because there has been definite shortage of qualified and skilful experts in Russia capable of drafting legislation and other normative documents on civil service issues. Thirdly, because this priority overshadowed other important implementation tools such as networking, coalition building and fiscal incentive instruments which turned out to be partially or entirely “forgotten”.

The Law “On Procurement of Services and Goods for the State Needs” provides good illustration of weak law enforcement. The Law envisaged that almost all purchases should be tender/competition based whereas in reality nine out of ten procurement procedures were exempt from competition (Dmitriev, 2005:42). Another example is linked to the Law “On the State Civil Service of the Russian Federation” which envisaged measures to regulate conflict of interest situations. As a result, commissions on conflict of interest were set up in the majority of ministries and other state institutions. However, in course of the two years following adoption of the law in 2004 no single case of such a conflict was reviewed (ibid).

One of the weaknesses of reform implementation was evident shortage of committed reform stakeholders. Mobilisation of internal and external support for reform has been largely disregarded. As a result only 11% of interviewed civil servants were ready to fully support the reform, 79% were ready to do it only partially, and 8.5% were not supportive of reform at all (RACS, 2004:17).

Reform implementation has been accompanied by a number of unforeseen side effects. It turns out that while Russia’s population has decreased steadily in recent years, the number of civil servants has increased at an inversely proportionate rate.

According to the data of the Federal State Statistics Service only in 2005 the number of state administration employees at the federal level increased by 10.9%. A report by the consulting company Troyka Dialogue indicates that in the course of three years (2004-2006) the number of civil servants had grown by approximately 17%, whereas labour productivity in the public sector had dropped 7% for the same period.

Even more interesting is that funding of public administration from the state budget for the period 2000–2006 increased 11 times in nominal prices whereas, for instance, expenditures on social protection grew 3 fold only. (Business Week, Russia, 28 August 2006). The same period saw expansion of privileges for top level civil servants. For example, since 2005 officials from the level of Deputy Head of Department upwards gained the right for business class travel by air and 1 class travel by train.

Summing up we may conclude that the civil service reform has failed so far to make considerable advance in most of priority directions as mapped out in its

programme. That means that the announced transfer to an effective, merit based and accountable civil service is still pending. One of the top managers of civil service reform, Head of the Commission on Improvement of State Governance, D.Medvedev remarked that “the reform got stuck in bureaucratic problems, in inability to organize work and activities in an appropriate manner” (Izvestia, 27 December 2005). Similar opinion was expressed by the World Bank report, which noted that civil service reform “has so far not moved significantly, overall from the status quo” (World Bank, 2006:7).