Presentación de resultados

The European Union, which was established in order to avoid another world war, has been an influential actor in its relations with other countries. The Union promotes fundamental values and norms ranging from human rights, democracy to rule of law.

Having 28 countries as members, the Union has been an attractive option for other countries. However, for a country to be a part of the Union, it also has to have the fundamental values and norms. In order to give countries aspiring to be a part of the Union a guideline for change, in 1993, with Copenhagen Criteria was adopted. Like other countries that want to be a member of the Union, Turkey applied for full membership to the EU in 1987 although the relations goes back to before 1987.

Motivated by various factors, Turks’ wish to become an integral part of the European Order has been on the agenda of Turkish Politics for a long time. Even before the 1950s, newly emerged Turkish Republic looked up to the West so as to develop.

Starting with the end of the Second World War, Turkey gradually became a significant actor for the West. With NATO membership, a seat in the Council of Europe and OECD, Turkey has been a part of Europe. Considering the external factors that made the mentioned steps possible, one can argue that history between the European Union and Turkey has been affected by divergent layers encompassing both internal and external actors, circumstances. The road to the membership for Turkey has not been linear; on the contrary, the process has had its ups and downs. From the beginning to a certain point of time, both the EU and Turkey were committed to the process.

As the external incentive model suggests, the success of the conditionality differs under certain circumstances. The speed, the size of the reward are influential. In addition, the domestic costs and the credibility of the rewards are also quite important. In the case of the European Union, the conditionality occurs with the reward of membership. With regards to Turkey, from 1998 to 2005, the credibility of conditionality was high as both

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actors were committed to their promises and to the process. However, as already mentioned before, the dynamics are affected by both external and internal political conditions. The problems and conditions, such as the Euro Crisis, the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, which the European Union has encountered caused it to be sceptic towards enlargement. In addition to these problems and conditions, the enlargement of Turkey also posed some concerns due to its population, identity, cultural differences as well as the bad records on human rights, democracy and rule of law.

Therefore, the European Union gave mixed signals to Turkey which can be clearly observed from the statements of the EU officials as well as the EU institutions. Hence, in the eyes of Turkey, the European Union started not to keep its promises and started to discriminate against Turkey as in the example of Cyprus. Likewise, the suggestions of privileged partnership and other options for Turkey rather than membership and the fact that the European Union over-emphasized the open-ended nature of the negotiation process all contributed to the losing credibility of conditionality after 2005 and especially after 2011. For Turkey, the compliance with the EU rules became more costly with the losing credibility of conditionality as the Turkish public was also angry with the Union’s discriminative actions. The fact that the reforms that the EU wanted Turkey to adopt are mostly sensitive issues did not help the relations. With all this on the table, Turkey considered why to comply if the promises of the EU are not credible.

In order to answer the question of how the losing credibility of political conditionality has worked for Turkey with respect to political criteria of the accession negotiation, the human rights-based analysis of political criteria of the progress reports of 1998, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2013, 2018 are evaluated as well as indexes with regards to civil liberties, political liberties, women’s civil liberties, freedom of expression. The reports show that Turkey started off the process with promising reforms and developments. In fact, the reports of 1998, 2004, 2005 are highly positive with regards to Turkey’s adoption of reforms and improvements of human rights instruments although they also stated that more is needed. The EU was also glad about the reforms between 1998 and 2005.

However, the reports of 2008, 2013 are not as promising as the previous years. Even though Turkey still adopted reforms such as amendments to Article 301 of the Turkish Criminal Code in order to improve safeguards for freedom of expression in Turkey in 2008. Whereas in 2013, Turkey was criticized with regards to its reactions to Gezi Protests. For instance, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly in Turkey are heavily criticized and the 2013 report states that Turkey did not improve in many areas.

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On the contrary, fundamental freedoms are suppressed. Likewise, the 2018 report demonstrates that Turkey violated many fundamental rights under a state of emergency.

Moreover, the points that 2018 Report makes show the fact that Turkey has been detaching from the path of the EU. In addition to the reports, the overall indexes in freedom of expression, political, civil liberties and women’s civil liberties show that over time they started to deteriorate after 2011. However, with the state of emergency in 2016 in response to the failed coup attempt, there is a sharp decline in fundamental rights in 2016.

The conclusions that can be taken out of the results are:

First, the fact that there have been such a sharp decline in human rights in an ascending country raises questions about the EU’s rules and transformative power as well as the success of its conditionality.

Secondly, it can be concluded from the analysis that Turkish compliance is in steady decline as the progress reports of Turkey and indexes for fundamental rights demonstrate. The proposition that external incentive model suggests that if the credibility of the rewards and threats are high, the compliance is consequently higher in a candidate country might be related to the example of Turkey with high compliance in 1999 when the credibility was high and with low compliance in 2018 when the credibility was low. Therefore the reason for the decline in compliance might be caused by the losing credibility of the EU’s conditionality; however, this thesis will not be enough to show the conclusion that the losing credibility of conditionality is the only reason for Turkish compliance to decline as it is beyond this thesis.

Thirdly, despite the ongoing negotiations, there is a decline in compliance in Turkey with regards to human rights.

Lastly, in addition to the decline in Turkish compliance, the situation with regards to human rights in Turkey is now worse than 1998 and it is still in a path of deterioration which can be observed from the empirical evidence of regular progress reports and indexes that show the change in fundamental rights in Turkey.

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Although Turkey has been detaching from the European Union, it would be unfair to overlook the long way Turkey has come from the very start. Today, considering the history of relations between the two actors, Turkey and the European Union relations are still on the track and have four legal bases that Turkey could count on and still refer to; Ankara Agreement, Customs Union, Accession Process and 2016 Migration deal.

Even though the accession process has been in decline, these legal bases represent that Turkey was and is still an important actor and part of Europe. The dynamics between them will surely change over time, with regards to its impacts on the conditionality of the EU is a puzzle for both Turkey and the European Union.

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