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Before dealing with the criticisms of strengths-based approaches, it is important to recognise that ambiguities and differences can be seen within the respective strengths-based models. For instance, the issue of cognitive dissonance in the motivational interviewing model being inconsistent with a strengths-based approach has already been discussed above. It is also worth noting Burnett’s (2004) point that when talking about desistance, many of the issues involved could be equally discussed in relation to counselling, probation casework or the previous probation slogan ‘advise, assist and befriend,’ although such labels would probably be seen as passe, in relation to current probation practice. A similar point can be made in relation to the strengths-based approaches,

described above. Although strengths-based approaches can be seen to have distinct unifying qualities (see definition of the strengths-based approach at the beginning of the chapter), many of the interactive skills and methods within strengths-based models overlap, and can be seen in many other forms of therapy and ways of working with people, albeit labelled differently.

A contradiction can also be seen between the solution-focused approach and the narrative therapy and desistance models. The solution-focused approach tends to pay scant attention to past problematic behaviour, viewing an analysis of the problem as unnecessary in the search for a solution. However, this neglects the emphasis in the narrative therapy, desistance approach and Good Lives Model on the importance of making sense of the past in order to construct useful future narratives and identities.

There are also characteristics of strengths-based approaches that can be found in models considered to be more problem-orientated. For instance, as explained in the previous chapter, cognitive-behavioural therapy is the current method of choice in the probation service. Like strengths-based therapy, cognitive- behavioural therapy also seeks to empathically work within the person’s frame of reference (Wills and Sanders, 1997). Vanaerschot (1993) makes the point that there is no neat division between empathy and cognitive change, explaining how capturing and better organising generated meaning for a person can lead to shifts in cognitive perception. Moreover, as the title of Wills and Sanders’ book

suggests -Cognitive Therapy, Transforming the Image - it is debatable whether significant shifts in cognitive processing can be divorced from changes in identity formation. Likewise, within the psychoanalytical approach to sexual abuse issues, empathically engaging with the person, facilitating cognitive and behavioural change which, in turn, can alter self identity, is core to much of the work (Woods, 1998). Hence, there would seem to be a cross fertilisation of therapeutic techniques across a range of strengths-based and non-strengths- based models.

McNeill (2009), whilst advocating the potential usefulness of the Good Lives Model with general offenders, not only with sex offenders, calls into question the foundational idea that human goods are universally sought. Criticism can also be made of the ‘can do’ influence of positive psychology on strengths-based approaches. Both de Botton (2004) and James (2007) argue that the ‘can do’

message of much of positive psychology can lead to the advantages of stoical acceptance being downplayed. Both authors also point out that individuals, constrained within limits of functioning and circumstances, can feel a strong sense of failure due to not being able to meet unrealistic expectations for improvement, which pervade the positive psychology mindset. Thorne (1999) also questions the solution-focused approach’s tendency to collude with a perceived Zeitgeist of quick-fix solutions and short-termism. As outlined above, desistance research shows how dispensing with criminal behaviour is a long­

term process for many individuals. Deviant sexual urges can also be notably

enduring (Finkelhor, 1984). Hence, it would seem untenable for the solution- focused model, or the strengths-based approach, to be naively perceived and used by practitioners as a means of quick-fix rehabilitation with sex offenders.

There are two further points of criticism which can be levelled at the strengths- based approach, in particular the GLM model and the desistance model of crime reduction, and their applicability to work with sex offenders. The GLM is premised on the idea of an offender being enabled in pro-social ways to obtain primary human goods, human goods being an arguably clumsy term, failing to capture the non-material aspects of a constructive life. If the offender obtains human goods pro-socially, s/he will not have to resort to anti-social means of obtaining universal and legitimate satisfactions. Often an example is given of sex offenders developing social skills in order to meet intimacy needs through relationships with fellow adults, rather than through relationships with children. This seems feasible in cases where the motive for sexual abuse is linked to other needs such as emotional intimacy or a need for power and control. However, in cases where the motive for abuse is primarily, if not wholly, erotic, where an individual’s exclusive sexual attraction is toward children, then a sexual relationship with an adult may not be possible or desirable. In such cases, it must be debatable whether other pleasurable activities (secondary goods) can ever replace or sublimate the sexual urge, leaving orthodox avoidance goals of self-control and risk management as the only seemingly viable options.

With regard to the desistance approach, as stated above, rehabilitative change is conceptualised as a long-term, fluctuating process (Burnett, 1992), with offenders relapsing into crime at different points in their lives but with most eventually leaving offending behind. As illustrated in the previous chapter, a minority of high risk sexual offenders will repeatedly offend if not curtailed and effectively managed in the community. A sizable majority of convicted re-offenders will not go on to re-offend. Many sex offenders pose a moderate risk. They may or may not re-offend. If they do, there may be many years between offences. Such sex offenders can be seen to conform to the fluctuating offending pattern suggested by desistance research. However, stealing a car is different from committing a sexual offence. The former may be disapproved of but reluctantly and philosophically tolerated, until the offender finally gives up crime. It is difficult to extend the same tolerance with regard to the latter, when a fluctuation means the sexual abuse of a child.