PRESENTACION DE DOCUMENTOS PARA PERFECCIONAMIENTO, LEGALIZACIÓN Y EJECUCIÓN

According to the denotation account of representation, x is a model of y just in case x is a sign or symbol that refers to a target y. The liquid drop model of the atom can be considered a model precisely because it is a symbol that refers to a specific target, in this case the atom. Recall that the advantage of the denotation account over the

correspondence account is that it does not require that models be relevantly similar to their targets. As a result, the denotation account, like the integration account, is willing to consider the existence of contradictory models of the atom at one and the same time. The problem with the denotation account, specifically Goodman’s articulation, is the

stipulation that the target that any model refers to must actually exist. So Maxwell’s ether

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model cannot technically be a representation of the ether (and thus a model of the ether) because the ether does not to exist. In chapter two I argued that the existence requirement was unnecessarily severe. If we take it seriously, then fictional entities, like the ether, cannot be modeled, which seems counterintuitive.

The integration account, unlike the denotation account, does not discriminate between entities known to exist and those that do not. According to the integration account the primary goal of a model is knowledge proliferation. This means that as long as a model contributes to our knowledge of the world, it has every right to be called a model even if its reference does not exist. Maxwell’s mechanical model of the ether is a perfect example. Maxwell was able to use his “extraordinary assemblage of tiny spinning cells interspersed with even smaller ‘idle wheel’ particles”⁶¹ to not only mathematically represent Faraday’s lines of force, but also discover that light is an electromagnetic phenomenon—not bad for a model whose reference is not believed to exist.

The distinguishing feature common to the correspondence and denotation

accounts, but excluded from the integration account, is the idea that models are intended to be representations of targets. This particular approach takes it for granted that the targets being represented chronologically, ontologically, and epistemologically precede the models that are constructed to represent them. The integration approach denies this priority. Instead, it maintains that when models are created through the integration of:

theories, laws, background assumptions, paradigms, research programs, experiments, etc., a distinct ontological entity is ushered into existence that has a separate identity from anything else that already exists in the world. The integration account can downplay the

61. Basil Mahon, The Man Who Changed Everything: The Life of James Clerk Maxwell (West Sussex, England: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 2003), 99.

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representation of predetermined targets because it believes that targets are created during the integration process, which is just another way of saying that models oftentimes become their own targets.

3.5.3 Models as Mediators Account

According to the Models as Mediators Account of Morrison and Morgan, a model acts as a mediator between a model and a theory. The Models as Mediators Account and the Integration Account share the following characteristics in common:

• Both deny that the sole purpose of modeling is representation.

• Both deny that the sole purpose of modeling is instrumentation.

• Both deny that models are solely derived from theories.

• Both believe in the possibility of contradictory models for the same phenomenon.

• Both agree that models are comprised of elements besides theories, laws, and empirical data.

One difference between the two accounts is that the integration account emphasizes the idea of problem solving. Whatever a model is, a good one extends our knowledge by solving a problem. In the words of William James, “Any-idea that will carry us prosperously from any part of our experience to any other part, linking-things

satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labour, is true for just so much.”⁶² A model connects our various empirical, theoretical, metaphysical, psychological,

sociological, and historical experiences together in a reliable manner that allows

problems to be solved and our knowledge of the world to be extended. While Morgan and Morrison agree with the epistemic potential of models, they say very little about its role

62. Williams James, as quoted in, Nicholas Rescher, Pragmatism, (New Brunswick, NJ:

Transaction Publishers, 2012), 4.

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in solving scientific problems so as to distance themselves from a purely instrumentalist view of modeling.

The integration account focuses on the problem solving function of scientific models because it takes the idea of a naturalized epistemology seriously. Recall that naturalized epistemology has all but abandoned the idea of representation in favor of solving problems in the world. The integration account reflects this. Abnegating the problem solving function of scientific modeling will move scientific modeling back towards representation and all of the ontological and epistemological baggage that goes along with it (e.g., the quest for absolute truth, the idea that the latter can only be attained through logic and rationality, the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification, etc.)

3.6 Conclusion

According to version 3.0 of the integration of account of modeling:

A model is a temporary collection of integrated elements, interacting with one another, whose purpose is to help scientists solve different kinds of scientific problems.

This account is both deflationary and naturalistic. It is deflationary in the sense that it does not provide necessary and sufficient conditions for what a model is and ought to be.

It also takes a naturalistic approach, meaning it takes as its starting point how actual scientists practice science.

Nevertheless, there are some who remain skeptical regarding the practical value of scientific models. One such outspoken critic was Pierre Duhem who believed that the only conceivable purpose for creating a scientific model was pedagogical (i.e. they were intended for the edification of non-scientists). It is clear that the integration account

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presented here wholeheartedly disagrees with this position. The following chapter will carefully examine Duhem’s argument and provide an uncompromising critique of it so as to leave no question of the value of scientific models.

76 Chapter 4

Pierre Duhem’s Critique of Modeling

4.1 Introduction

The instrumentalist approach to modeling is the view that models are primarily heuristic devices that expedite solutions to scientific problems. Instrumentalists also maintain that models play a significant role in the production and development of

scientific theories. One of the most famous critics of scientific modeling (specifically, the instrumentalist approach) was Pierre Duhem. The latter was so distressed by the

privileged role that models commandeered that he devoted chapter four of his famous The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory entirely to the topic. Before launching into Duhem’s critique and the reasons for his vehement disdain, some background of Duhem’s philosophy of science is in order.