Presupuesto referencial equipos telefónicos

“H egel is to be honoured for having w illed som ething great and having failed to achieve it” *

This w as K ierkegaard’s sum m ation o f the appropriate attitude that one should adopt tow ard Hegel and his system and insofar as H egel’s overall strategy against the A ncient Skeptic has proved im practicable, we m ay w ell be inclined to agree with him. But before we accept this as the last w ord on the matter, we should pull together the strands o f the foregoing discussion and consider the im plications o f H egel’s approach for future treatm ents of A ncient Skepticism .

It w as suggested that in his analysis o f A ncient Skepticism Hegel identified two main strengths: the general applicability o f the skeptical tropes and the use o f the

opponents’ own principles against them. These w ere adapted in the construction o f his own system which yielded two distinctive features

1. The first was that the system m ust begin and proceed via description. By observing consciousness in its activity, by w atching it apply its conceptions to its objects, we w ere to avoid presupposition in the same way as the A ncient Skeptic claim ed to. By proceeding in this phenom enological fashion we were to avoid begging the question against the Skeptic.

2. The second w as that by providing a necessarily com plete account, in the sense outlined, we w ere to give a justification o f the system , dem onstrating that it is not open to skeptical attack.

T his second feature w as the one that proved im practicable. H egel could not

satisfactorily dem onstrate that the required com pleteness had been achieved. T hat the system is com plete w as o f course required in order for the phenom enological

description to be m ore than conjecture in the eyes o f the A ncient Skeptic. W e m ay, of course, allow that som e o f the descriptions given by H egel in the P henom enology are, perhaps, close to the truth o f the m atter and this w ould help explain the ongoing interest that the text has generated, but no independent grounds for their truth is to be found there.

W hile the failure to dem onstrate the com pleteness of his account in a w ay that is acceptable to the A ncient Skeptic is where H eg el’s account falls dow n, one thing that the account brings out is the extent o f what is required in providing a dem onstration that will satisfy such a Skeptic and the obstacles we face in attem pting to provide one. If we are to seriously engage with the A ncient skepic then every opposition m ust be overcom e, an absolutely com plete account m ust be given and this does appear to be beyond our abilities. D oes this mean that we should accept our efforts as ultim ately useless and sim ply give up, siding w ith the Skeptic? O r should we accept that

epistem ically circular answers are satisfactory, given our circum stances, and drop the dem and for fully reflective justification?

I t’s not clear that either course is a live option. One thing that H egel’s dialectic successfully highlights in its dealings with the various form s o f consciousness is our attitude tow ard our putative know ledge in our ordinary interactions w ith the world. Each form constitutes a certainty; we ordinarily trust our cognitive processes and practices, that is at least, until som ething leads us to doubt them , usually som e

‘external object’ or event. It is in such a situation that we do com e to view such processes and practices as sim ply ‘o urs’, as ‘being for-us’, and it is the result o f such situations that we find the notion o f a fully reflective Justification desirable. It is such situations that upset the certainty o f a form a consciousness, that disturb its

satisfaction with itself. In H egel’s system the desire for a fully reflective justification becom es a driving force; in each incom plete form of consciousness no satisfaction is to be found because a situation will always arise in w hich the certainty o f that form is disturbed. Until a fully reflective justification is gained we will alw ays be affected by doubts, w e can always com e to see the w orld and our know ledge of it as sim ply ‘for- u s ’. If a fully reflective justification is not to be had then this always rem ains possible and the S keptic’s worries will not go away. However, agreeing w ith the Skeptic w ould not banish the w orries, insofar as we ordinarily trust our cognitive processes and practices situations m ay always arise in w hich this trust is underm ined. Living as a Skeptic and attaining ataraxia w ould not seem plausible in the context o f everyday interactions with the w orld; we have certain expectations o f the w ay that things are and will be, when they turn out not to be so we cannot help being disturbed. It seems from his analysis of the m ovem ent through the form s o f consciousness that Hegel would agree. Ancient Skepticism for Hegel is not to be taken seriously because it proves an interesting and difficult intellectual problem , but rather because it results from reality, from a real m ovem ent o f consciousness. By the sam e token an

epistem ically circular answ er will not suffice, even though this seem s to be the best that can be offered. A ny real satisfaction it allows will depend on w hether or not we are actually justified. If we bracket o ff skeptical w orries, then such a response m ay seem satisfactory and w ould accord w ith the confidence we have in our cognitive processes and practices, but it could not guarantee that such confidence w as well founded.

H egel’s system on the other hand, if successful, could make such a guarantee. Hegel w as not content with offering a palliative for the situation like the A ncient skeptic but rather w as interested in a cure. H is m istake seems to be the confidence he placed in his system as being able to provide such a cure. It is for this aim o f providing a cure that K ierkegaard, in part, criticises H egel, and it is this aim that m ost obviously places H egel at odds with A ncient Skepticism^. It seems also that an epistem ically circular response can, at best, only offer a palliative. If we agree with Hegel that this will not suffice, and we also acknow ledge that H eg el’s efforts are ultim ately in vain, then the only option open to us seem s to be to live with the situation.

W hat we can perhaps save o f H egel’s approach is that the dialectic is productive, that a thorough consideration o f the application o f our conceptions to reality can result in a m ore com prehensive and coherent set o f conceptions. If we treat each set of

conceptions as a hypothesis w e can use the end point of H egel’s dialectic heuristically, as an ideal to strive for. W e can accept that the Skeptic is not to be beaten but refuse to drop the dem and for a fully reflective justification insofar as it represents a

^ It is no doubt this aim that has lead to H egel to be view ed, rightly or wrongly, as representative o f a wholehearted acceptance o f the restorative powers o f reason. See J. Stewart ‘H egel and the Myth o f R eason’ in The H egel M yths an d Legends ed. J. Stewart (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press) 1996, pp. 306-319.

desirable ideal. It seems that the A ncient Skeptic and his problem s, though not defeated, are not to be ignored or sidelined. R ather, they are to be em braced as a stim ulus to the ongoing im provem ent o f our epistem ological theories.