As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Stalin had used the controversy surrounding the discovery of the Polish officers’ graves at Katyń as a pretext for breaking off diplomatic relations with Poland. The evidence demonstrates that his plan for taking control of the
administrative apparatus in Poland and the annihilation of the Polish Underground was already in place in the beginning of 1943.2 In March 1943, a meeting between Stalin and prominent
Polish communists in the USSR, namely Wanda Wasilewska, Hilary Minc and Wiktor Grosz, resulted in the establishment of the Union of the Polish Patriots (UPP). It is worth mentioning that the UPP was formed on Russian soil regardless of the fact that non-Russian organisations were outlawed on their territory. Their political programme called for friendship with the USSR, recognition of the Curzon line and discrediting of the Polish government-in-exile as a legitimate governmental body.3 In many respects their manifesto was similar to that of the
exiled government; they did not refer to communist ideology, arguing instead for equal rights irrespective of nationality or religion. The main difference was that the UPP was promising the incorporation of the German northern and eastern territories after the war, namely East Prussia and Danzig and part of Silesia, something which the Polish government in London could not do. In addition, the UPP claimed that it was made up of Polish citizens expressing the will of all Poles. Positioning themselves as the guarantors of the freedom and independence of Poland, the Soviets endeavored to manipulate the Poles’ emotions by placing patriotism and pro-Soviet attitudes on the same level. As Davies demonstrates, ‘patriotic was a new code-word meaning pro-Soviet’.4 In their propaganda, special care was taken to convince the public that this
movement came from the Poles themselves, emphasised by the names chosen for the puppet government (Polish Patriots), its newspaper (Free Poland), and the radio station Kościuszko broadcasting in Polish from the Soviet Union, named ironically after a national hero who led an uprising against Russia in the eighteenth century.
2 Kochanski, H., The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War (London: Penguin,
2102), p. 371.
3 Duraczyński, E, Rząd Polski na Uchodźstwie: 1939-1945 (Warsaw: Ksiażka i Wiedza, 1993), pp. 229-
31.
Moreover, on the UPP initiative, in May 1943 the Polish Kościuszko Division was created in the Soviet Union under Zygmunt Berling’s command. Formed under Soviet auspices and the political control of the UPP, the Kościuszko Division, which in March 1944 expanded to become the First Polish Army, also known as the Berling Army, claimed to be made up of Polish volunteers residing in the USSR. In fact, joining the army was not entirely voluntary. As Kochanski points out, it was important to Stalin that the army was considered to be Polish.5 In
order to achieve his goal, in January 1943, he took the passports of all those who still remained in the USSR and Polish citizenship was offered to those who joined the Berling Army.6
However, the creation of the new army faced a bigger challenge. After the departure of the Polish Army under Anders command from the USSR in March 1942, there was a shortage of high ranking military men and the majority of those who wanted to join the Berling Army were of Jewish origin. The UPP, in charge of the creation of the army, decided to recruit Red Army officers and generals, whilst soldiers with Jewish origin were told to conceal their background in order to win the trust of the Polish nation and to demonstrate that all Poles, regardless of their religion and ethnicity, supported the UPP, as the Berling Army was to become central to
establishment of the communist rule in Poland.7 Therefore all soldiers were subjected to
Marxist-Leninist doctrine before being sent to the battlefield.
The creation of the UPP and the Berling Army was a difficult subject to deal with. Kirkpatrick argued that the BBC should not offer a platform for Soviet anti-Polish propaganda, but, at the same time, the Polish government should not be allowed to respond to UPP accusations on the air. 8 Subsequently, it was agreed that no information would be given by any of the BBC
channels without previous consultation with the Polish authorities regarding: the UPP promises of the incorporation of East Prussia and Danzig after the war, the Berling Army formed under Soviet auspices in the USSR, and news from Russian sources about resistance to the Germans in Poland promoted by the communists.9 The Polish government, on the other hand, was forbidden
to comment on UPP declarations and discussions of the Polish post-war frontiers. However, by November 1943 the ban on those topics was under discussion following an approach to the British Foreign Office by Moscow for Polish officials to speak kindly about the Kościuszko Division. Frank Roberts suggested that the BBC should re-evaluate its previous decision, arguing that it contradicted the BBC policy of impartiality and truthful reporting.10 Most of the
Polish bulletins from this period did not survive the war, but it is clear from the analysis of the
5 Kochanski, op. cit., p. 257. 6 Ibid. p. 377.
7 Ibid, p. 378.
8 BBC WAC, E2/13/2, Allied Governments Broadcasts: Poland, Memo from Kirkpatrick to all editors of
the European Services, 23 June 1943.
9 BBC WAC, E1/1148/3, Minutes of Meetings, 30 June 1943.
10 BBC WAC, E1/1149/2, Polish Service, file 1b-2, 1943-53, Memo by Frank Roberts, 24 November
PWE directives for the Polish Service that the Polish-Soviet political and territorial disputes remained taboo topics. It was only on 25 May 1944 that the PWE decided to break the silence on the Berling Army in the Polish broadcasts.11 Yet information regarding both the UPP and the
Berling Army was given on other BBC Services prior to this date, resulting in Polish
government complaints to the Foreign Office for describing the Berling Army as ‘a patriotic body liberating Poland’.12 However, this had little impact.