PREVALENC IA DE SO BRE PESO Y O BESIDA D

In examining the SEA, however, Burgess notes that the Act was a compromise between the intergovernmentalists and the supranationalists.230 In respect to the SEA’s federalist dimension, Disnan notes that the SEA "sought to infuse" the Community "with a renewed sense of purpose"231 and, as Article 1 of the Commission Provisions of the SEA observes, make "concrete progress towards European unity."232 Under the SEA, the EC member states agreed to the establishment of a single market in which all trade barriers would be lifted and all internal frontiers abolished, so to ensure the free movement of capital, goods, and services .233

The SEA’s supranational agenda also expands Community competences into other areas of state activity which include research and technological development, the environment, and regional and social policy. 234 In establishing the single market the

229 George, An Awkward Partner, 130.

230 Burgess, Federalism and the European Union,

205.

231 Disnari, Ever Closer Union?, 129.

232 "The Single European Act, " Bulletin of the

European Communitias, Supplement 2/86 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities), 7.

233 Ibid., 11. 234 Ibid... 13-16.

Council of Ministers, as outlined in Article 100A of . . .

the SEA, will use qualifi^' majority voting m laying down provisions for health, safety, and environmental and consumer protection. 235 Moreover, in pursuing improvements in the work place, Article 118 B asserts that the Commission ’’shall endeavor to develop the dialogue between management and labor at European level whic?Vcould, if the two sides consider it desirable,

lead to relations based on agreement.”236

Brigid Laffan writes, however, that the political success behind the SEA also "lies in the capacity of the negotiators to strike a new intergovernmental bargain, especially among the larger member states."237 * Thatcher’s support for the SEA’s single market program, "with the strong support of British industry and business, "23S was made possible because deregulation "and economic liberalism began to replace Keynesian demand management as the dominant mode of economic policy in the 1980s."239 There were other incentives for the intergovernmentalists to support the SEA. While Thatcher agreed to the use of majority voting on some treaty articles dealing with certain aspects of the internal market, 240 other aspects such as the free

235 Ibid., 12. 236 Ibid., 13.

237 Laffan, Integration and Cooperation in .Europe,

57.

23S Parliamentary Debates, 5 December 1985, col. 429.

239 Laffan, Integration and Cooperation in Europe,

57.

240 Parliamentary Debates, 5 December 1985, col. 429

movement of peC'&C'^H and fiscal harmonization,- covered in Article 100A(2) of the SEA., are based on unanimity.241 What makes this point interesting, however, is that Thatcher and her fellow Euro-skeptic colleagues (like Bill Cash and Michael Spicer) would come to regret the significance of the above provisions in their fight against ratification of the TEU in 1992-1993 .242

SEA’s Title III, which pertains to foreign policy of the EC, is purely intergovernmental in nature. Under Article 30.1, for example, the EC states ’’shall endeavor jointly to implement a European foreign policy.”243 Laffan asserts that word "endeavor" "conveys the limits of the process as it exists"244 for a European foreign policy would, as stated in Article 302 (a) of the SEA, require "the convergence of [the member states’] positions and the implementation of joint action,"245 * Laffan also asserts that much of the language in Title III is "non-binding.,,24G In Article 30.2(d), for example, the SEA asserts that

the [member states] shall endeavor to avoid any action or position which impairs their effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations or within international organizations.247

241 "The Single European Act," 12.

242 See Chapter VI of this dissertation. 243 "Single European Act," 18.

244 Laffan, Integration and Cooperation in Europe,

152.

245 "Single European Act," 18. (Emphasis added.) 245 Ibid.

Laffan seems to identify the SEA’s Article 30. 2 as a ’’key" factor to the SEA’s intergovernmental dimension248 for as is asserted in Article 30.2(c) the member states "shall take full account of the positions of the other partners and shall give due consideration to the desirability of adopting and implementing common European positions.’’249 250

In her report to the House of Commons,- however, Thatcher noted that SEA’s Title III "looks to a steadily closer relationship."™ in foreign policy among the EC's member states. In her Bruges speech, Thatcher asserted that she perceived it in Britain’s interest to work on problems of common interest.251 252 Having said that, Thatcher also asserted in her Bruges Speech that "working together" on common problems does not ’’require power to be centralized in Brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy."™

For Thatcher, the intergovernmental approach to European unity preserves

the different traditions, parliamentary powers and sense of national pride in one's own country; for these have been the source of Europe's vitality through the

centuries.253

Like Thatcher, Major (through the TEU agreement) aspired for Britain to retain its ability to act

248 Laffan, Integration and Cooperation in Europe,

152.

249 "Single European Act," 18.

250 Parliamentary Debates, 5 December 1985, col. 429. (Emphasis added.)

251 Thatcher, "Britain’s Policies Towards Europe, Trade, and Defence."

252 Ibid. (Emphasis added.) 253 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

unilaterally on other issues. This includes the special relationship with the United States and the difficulties over the issue of Hong Kong.254