5. Las teorías relativas de la pena
5.1. La prevención general
5.1.2. Prevención general positiva
Socrates’ classification of philosophy as a kind of madness in his second speech is counter- intuitive because philosophers are usually considered to be supremely rational, while madness is assumed to refer to the absence of reason.133
I treat Socrates’ major discussion of philosophical madness (249c-250b) in some detail in the later parts of this section in which I discuss eccentricity and enthusiasm. It is sufficient for my
present argument to point out that the philosopher’s madness or (as Socrates says) ‘enthusiasm’ is a consequence of his recollection of the things which the soul saw before its incarnation (249d). Recollection here refers explicitly to human λογισμός: Socrates explains that human beings have a capacity for bringing a plurality of perceptions together into one thing by reasoning (λογισμῷ, 249b6-c1), and that this is a recollection of the things which the soul saw (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων ἅ ποτ' εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ, 249c1-2). The philosopher’s madness, then, rests on the fact that he is reasoning (λογισμός), and there is no scope here for the role of so-called non-intellectual elements in philosophical madness (even in the early stages of recollection).134
For this reason, I argue for a conception of madness that accommodates rational philosophical activity; however, I disagree with those who indicate that such a conception would represent an ad hoc or rhetorical concession, and that elsewhere madness implies unreason.135 I
think that madness is not consistently opposed to rationality over the course of the dialogue, and that the concept of madness can accommodate rational philosophical activity provided that such activity meets certain criteria.136 These criteria are not characterised as ad hoc or rhetorical;
instead, they are presented as conventional, and the broadest criterion, social eccentricity, is shared by all the kinds of madness under discussion; the other most prominent popular criterion which qualifies rational philosophical activity as madness is the notion of enthusiasm, referring to inhabitation by a god. I will discuss each of these criteria in turn, but first I will examine the relationship between madness and reason over the course of the speeches by tracking Socrates’ use of σωφροσύνη which, in his first speech, stands both for reason and sanity.
134 Nussbaum 1986, is silent about this key passage in her discussion of madness in the Phaedrus. Price 1989, 66 admits that the equation of knowledge and inspiration is the natural reading of 249c4-e4, but rejects this because ‘madness falls within the genus of the irrational (265e3-4)’. Burnyeat 2012, 242 emphasises the connection between recollection and reason.
135 e.g. Werner 2011, 58-64, Scott 2011, 169-200. Both come to the conclusion that Plato does not actually endorse the strong association of philosophy and madness offered in the palinode and that either he is being ironic (Werner) or that this is an example of misleading assimilation (Scott). My approach is closest to Vogt 2013, 179-181, 183 who suggests that rational madness is not, for Plato, a contradiction in terms, but is intuitive and forms part of his conceptualization of madness in other dialogues, notably in the Symposium where ἔρως is characterised as a
pervasive and violent motivational force (205d; cf. 208c4 on the ἀλογία of love; see esp. Vogt 2013, 180). Cf. Gonzalez 2011, 100-105, who takes Socrates’ presentation of rational madness seriously, suggesting that what makes it mad is neglect of human concerns (254b5-6) and confusion due to the partial vision of the Forms (103). However, neither Vogt nor Gonzalez seems much concerned with the supposed paradox of madness and reason.
136 Cf. the features of madness in the Phaedrus listed by Vogt 2013, 182-186 (ἄφρων: absence of reason; παράνοια: parallel to reason; activity: agitated state; custom: opposite of ordinary ways of doing things; alien: cognition affected by alien force; lack of ownership: cognitive activity not one’s own). These features are helpful, but do not satisfactorily address the unity of madness in the Phaedrus (they are additive and lack structure).
I have already shown (above, pp. 59-60) that some of Socrates’ key general terms for madness, τὸ ἄφρον τῆς διάνοιας (265e4) and τὸ τῆς παρανοίας (266a2), do not imply the absence of reason. I think that this argument is further supported by the way in which Socrates develops the relationship between self-control (i.e. σωφροσύνη) and μανία over the course of the dialogue. In Socrates’ first speech σωφροσύνη and μανία refer to the psychological dominance of rational and non-rational forces respectively, and they are opposed to one another.137 The simplicity of this
opposition is rhetorically effective as an apotreptic (σωφροσύνη involves the pursuit of τὸ ἄριστον; its opposite must be bad), yet this simple appraisal of madness as negative is too narrow, and prompts Socrates’ reconsideration of the term as a complex phenomenon in his second speech. It turns out that μανία is not always harmful, and sometimes has benefits. This breaks its opposition to σωφροσύνη: μανία sometimes delivers the greatest goods (266b1), and therefore cannot be consistently in conflict with the psychological motivation aimed at τὸ ἄριστον (i.e. σωφροσύνη).
Socrates explains (244a) that the distinction between μανία and σωφροσύνη in the previous speeches formed the basis of the youth’s decision between the lover and the non-lover. This contrast is only a good index for decision-making if μανία brings harm and σωφροσύνη brings benefit. However, in Socrates’ second speech, this relationship is modified: since μανία receives a positive evaluation, σωφροσύνηis no longer appropriate as a contrast term. Despite this, madness and σωφροσύνη are sometimes contrasted in Socrates’ second speech, and I suggest that this contrast helps to show a conflict between popular and expert moral psychology.
In the opening of the palinode, μανία brings greater goods than σωφροσύνη: the ancients attest that madness from the gods is more beautiful than σωφροσύνη from human beings (244d3- 5), and poetry produced by poets who are mad (τῶν μαινομένων) is far superior to poetry composed by the self-controlled poets (τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος) who rely on τέχνη (245a5-8).138 This is hardly
surprising. In Socrates’ examples of divine madness, some god has taken over the thinking faculties of a human being, and theologically they are bound to deliver results which far outstrip the efforts of the person who is not similarly enthused. The sort of σωφροσύνη which is here
137 For the equivalence of ὕβρις and σωφροσύνη with irrationality and rationality in this speech, see North 1966, 178. 138Cf. the Pythia at Delphi who is mad (μανεῖσαι) and lacks σωφροσύνη (σωφρονοῦσαι), 244b1-2. Compare Plato’s Ion;
although σωφροσύνη does not feature in the dialogue, divine inspiration is clearly opposed to having knowledge or a
particular skill. The inspired poet does not possess τέχνη; instead, his mind is no longer inside him as it has been
contrasted to divine madness is likely similar to the mortal (θνητή) σωφροσύνη dismissed by Socrates towards the end of the speech (256e5, cf. σωφροσύνη ἀνθρωπίνη, 256b6).139 Here Socrates
describes how the non-lover’s mortal σωφροσύνη leads to a lack of freedom (ἀνελευθερίαν) which causes the soul to roam mindlessly (ἄνουν) around the earth for nine thousand years. This contradicts the strong link made previously between σωφροσύνη and rationality (e.g. νοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνην, 241a3).
The non-lover’s σωφροσύνη is praised by the crowd as a virtue (ὑπὸ πλήθους ἐπαινουμένην ὡς ἀρετὴν, 256e6), and this recalls Socrates’ emphasis in his first speech that σωφροσύνη is aimed at τὸ ἄριστον.140 Although σωφροσύνη carries an intellectual connotation (signalled by its association
with νοῦς), Socrates is clearly interested in the term’s moral dimensions: its moral value is crucial for persuading the youth to choose the non-lover over the lover.141 One consequence of this is that
the crowd, which has limited moral insight, is not a good authority when it comes to judging the nature or essence of σωφροσύνη. For the crowd, the non-lover’s σωφροσύνη is a praiseworthy alternative to madness of love, and refers to those goods for which the non-lover is praised in these speeches, such as looking after property and reputation.142 By contrast, the benefits of
philosophical madness are visible only to the wise (245c): the philosopher has access to unique moral insights which come from the recollection of those objects which the soul once saw before its embodiment (249c-250c). Σωφροσύνη is itself one of these objects,143 and, as a Form, its essence
is stable and not determined by popular views.
139 For this identification, see e.g. Werner 2011, 63-4. Cf. Moore 2015b, 156 and Griswold 1996, 75.
140The connection between mortal σωφροσύνη and σωφροσύνη in the first speech is supported by the relationship of
σωφροσύνη with τὸἄριστον in the first speech (237e2), and with ἀρετή in the second (256e6). The adjective and the
abstract noun are each frequently paired with σώφρων and σωφροσύνη on epitaphs, see Dover 1974, 67. Cf. the non- lover’s ἀρετή (232d5) and the rhetorician’s ability to impart ἀρετή through prescribing custom (νομίμους, 270b8).
141The moral and intellectual dimensions of σωφροσύνη are often emphasised by the Socratic association of virtue and knowledge in Plato’s works; see e.g. Plato’s Charmidesin which σωφροσύνη is identified both as a form of knowledge, and as something which has a benefit (163e). Traditionally, σωφροσύνη has both moral and intellectual dimensions,
and these are often seen to be dichotomous; see North 1966, 1-149 who describes the emergence of the moral senses of σωφροσύνη diachronically. However, this dichotomy is sometimes overstated, and the moral and intellectual
features of σωφροσύνη are often found together. See Rademaker 2005, 9-10 who challenges North’s diachronic approach with a synchronic reading that avoids the dichotomy between intellectual and moral senses of the term (see esp. 251-292).
142 Cf Dover 1974, 273-8 and see North 1966, 136-8 on the orators’ use of σωφροσύνη in the fifth and fourth century to connote responsible (law abiding/civic minded) conduct in public and private life.
This emphasises an important point: the philosopher who recollects the Forms does not
disregard σωφροσύνη, and so the philosopher’s madness (which results from his recollection) does not come at the expense of self-control.144 Because σωφροσύνη is a stable moral term, it cannot be
consistently opposed to a morally indeterminate and socially delimited phenomenon such as madness.145 The crowd’s narrow understanding of σωφροσύνη as mental health or sanity (i.e. in
opposition to madness) turns out to be naïve,146 and rather than avoiding or rejecting it, certain
kinds of madness (such as philosophy) actually embody σωφροσύνη.
Even if σωφροσύνη is sometimes shown to be compatible with madness, this need not mean that σωφροσύνη no longer denotes rationality. Socrates implies that the crowd is not only mistaken in its moral priorities, but also in its conception of rationality: just as the best moral insights are only accessible to the philosopher, so the non-lover’s so-called rationality is called into question. Socrates’ account in the palinode not only introduces a stable picture of what is good that is not determined by popular opinion (the moral Forms), but also a means of considering the good (through recollection) which amounts to λογισμός. I suggest that Socrates continues to foreground a moral and intellectual conception of σωφροσύνη in his second speech (moral because σωφροσύνη is mentioned as a Form and because the Phaedrus focuses on moral Forms; intellectual because the Forms are objects of human λογισμός), and shows both that philosophers have the clearest moral vision and that they are supremely rational. Socrates’ conception of σωφροσύνη as a moral term helps to show some of the ways in which philosophical madness is rational insofar as reason refers to a motivation aimed at the good.
In Socrates’ first speech, both the best-seeking impulse and the pleasure-seeking impulse are described as irresistible (οἷν ἑπόμεθα ᾗ ἂν ἄγητον, 237d7) despite the fact that the former leads
144 See Griswold 1996, 75-6 and Gonzalez 2011, 104.
145 Madness is morally indeterminate because knowing that something is an instance of madness does not tell us, in itself, whether it is admirable or the opposite.
146The philosopher disparages the popular conception of σωφροσύνη. Cf. Dover 1974, 68 on the traditional possibility of ‘negative σωφροσύνη’ which is contrasted with ἀρετή. There is a pervading cultural antithesis between the heroic
virtue of ἀνδρεία (exhibited, for example, by Achilles, Ajax or Antigone) and σωφροσύνη which is sometimes
considered negatively; see North 1966, IX-X. More specifically, the non-lover’s σωφροσύνη under criticism in the
Phaedrus resembles the foolish (εὐήθης) σωφροσύνη described in the Phaedo as the quality of a person who avoids some pleasures only to indulge in others; see Hackforth 1952, 47 and North 1966, 166. For pseudo σωφροσύνη, cf. Jason’s claim to be σώφρων in Euripides’ Medea (548–549).
by reason (λόγῳ, 237e3) and the latter leads non-rationally (ἀλόγως, 238a1).147 Surprisingly perhaps,
the distinction between rational and non-rational psychology is not based on the extent to which human motivation and agency are constrained by particular priorities, but instead the distinction is based on the priorities themselves.148 Socrates considers the difference in moral terms: an
irresistible psychological motivation aimed at the best is rational, and a similar force aimed at destructive pleasures is non-rational and said to lack control. The first speech shows that σωφροσύνη implies a condition in which human agency is controlled by beliefs about the good. The second speech shows that, in the case of the philosopher, such beliefs (i.e. about the good) are best derived from special moral insights.
Philosophical madness is a product of philosopher’s recollection (249d-e), and the recollecting philosopher adjusts his priorities: his motivational psychology undergoes a reorientation as a result of the discovery of previously obscure moral terms. If the philosopher’s psychology is motivated towards what really is best, then he possesses authentic σωφροσύνη, and is truly rational. In this way, the philosopher’s σωφροσύνη and rationality are enhanced by recollection insofar as σωφροσύνη and reason relate to what is good. During this process the philosopher may seem disoriented (e.g. ἐκπλήττονται, 250a6; cf. θάμβους 254c), or may appear to be acting under some kind of force, but this does not damage his rationality. In the chariot myth, for example, the team is forced forward (ἀναγκαζομένω, 249d1) by the dark horse, but the charioteer is compelled (ἠναγκάσθη 254b8) by the memory of beauty and σωφροσύνη to resist, only to be forced forward again (ἀναγκάζων, 254d1), and again (ἠνάγκασεν, 254d5).
I do not think that this language implies a loss of agency or passivity on the philosopher’s part; rather, it reflects the complex reorientation of the philosopher’s own priorities visualised from the respective vantage points of his new and his former personality.149 From the perspective
of his former personality, the recollection of σωφροσύνη is a restraining force; to his new
147 These impulses are sometimes opposed (but not always; see 237e). The thought seems to be that whenever we act, we are led by one (or both) of them, and when we are led by one/both, we go wherever it leads/they lead.
148 Cf. Nussbaum 1986, 205 who suggests that ‘only the logistikon is the author of genuinely voluntary actions, while the other elements are unselective causal forces.’
149Contra e.g. Price 1989, 63-102 and Nussbaum 1986, 214-7 who view initial recollection (Price) and the force of the emotions and appetites (Nussbaum) as irrational factors which constitute the philosopher’s madness. Cf. Rowe 1990, 237 who suggests that madness is a feature of these early stages of philosophical love because the lover is initially confused and the intellect is not yet fully in control, and Werner 2011, 55.
personality, the retrograde attraction to the pleasures of earthly beauty sometimes threatens to overwhelm. Compare the mental affliction of the hubristic lover in Socrates’ first speech which is described as a product of necessity (ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ἀνοήτῳ, 241b7). Despite the language of compulsion (e.g. ἠνάγκασται, 239c5; ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης τε και οἴστρου, 240c), Socrates' portrait shows that the lover does not lack the decision-making capacity to achieve his goals. There, the lover does not seem to be acting irrationally or passively, but soon after this, the lover is described as ruled by desire, compelled to seek pleasure and driven by frenzy (240c-d). The term ἀνάγκη captures the striking contrasts witnessed in the lover's identity: the lover seems alien to the person he becomes when he is no longer in love, and therefore seems himself to be a helpless victim of his past passions (241a-b), just as the youth had been.150 The lover’s irrationality and lack of σωφροσύνη are
products of his morally defective priorities, rather than the limitation of his agency.
This capacity of madness to include intentional calculation explains why important parts of the philosophical life, such as deliberation and regimen, need not be prevented by madness in general.151 Moreover, the complex changes in the priority of motivational powers within the
philosopher’s soul in Socrates’ second speech does not mean that philosophical recollection is ever irrational as long as it instils the right priorities, nor does the language of compulsion imply a lapse of control or reason. Instead, it reflects one way of illustrating the philosopher’s changing priorities. It is easy to assume that madness must have something to do with conflicting drives in the tripartite soul, but this is not necessarily the case.152 The philosopher who has mastered his
irrational drives (represented by the dark horse) is still mad, despite the lack of conflict in his soul. Socrates implies that recollection is a rational process (λογισμῷ), and the philosopher’s rationality, along with his psychological freedom and control, is an extension of his special moral insights.153
Since the philosopher’s priorities are shifted towards the moral objects of recollection, his
150 Compulsion is a product of this kind of difference and earlier in the speech Socrates relates ‘compulsion’ (τὸ
ἀναγκαῖον, 240c4) to the ‘dissimilarity’ (τῇἀνομοιότητι, 240c5) between the lover and the youth.
151Contra Rowe 1990, 237 n. 37; for Rowe, madness is the antithesis of the well-ordered regimen of philosophical life (described at 257a7).
152 Socrates never refers to any part of the soul as mad; rather, the name is applied to the entire human being (and sometimes perhaps, to the whole soul, e.g. οἰστρᾷ, 251d6, ἐμμανὴς, 251d8).
153 At 256b2-3 Socrates relates psychological freedom and slavery to moral virtues and vices (δουλωσάμενοι μὲν ᾧκακία
psychology is not irrational.154 It is only from the perspective of the crowd (who have a different
idea about the good), that the philosopher might be thought to lack rationality and self-control. This shows that madness does not imply the absence of reason or of σωφροσύνη, and that, depending on its moral outcomes, madness might sometimes be indistinguishable from σωφροσύνη. This is the case in philosophical recollection. Indeed, if reason refers to σωφροσύνη which is an overriding psychological motivation aimed at what is best, and if the highest goods are otherworldly objects visible only to the philosopher, then true reason is madness. The philosopher considers entities which no-one else can see, and these esoteric priorities translate into visibly eccentric behaviour. Because philosophers have a different opinion about the good, they are often seen to neglect precisely those things which appear to the crowd to be the most important (such as commitments to family and friends, and concerns about property, cf. 252a).
Importantly, however, the intellectual and moral aspects of philosophical recollection and