It is interesting to note that the host and the principle financer of AJA, Qatar, also hosts and debatably finances Islamic parties such as the MB, Hamas, and Taliban, which raises questions about Qatar’s intentions and the impact of these relations on AJA’s editorial practices. A channel that is owned by Qatar, a country that hosts Islamists perhaps puts both Qatar and AJA in a frail position – neither is able to deny this apparent long- standing relationship.
Zavi Mazel (2009) argues - in an article published in Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs - that there was ‘never any doubt’ about the network’s political orientation: starting from being pro-Palestinian since the second Intifada; broadcasting against the United States at the time of the Afghanistan conflict (Bin Laden’s video and audio tapes); pro-Saddam in Iraq; behaving as the Hezbollah ‘spokesman’ in the Second Lebanese War in 2006; reportage of the Gaza war, in which a senior AJA reporter stationed himself at Al-Shifa Hospital, from where he broadcast a stream of carefully selected horror pictures, and so on. Mazel quotes the Egyptian critical writer, Maamun Fendi, who wrote in Asharq Alawsat that some 50 per cent of the network’s personnel belonged to the MB.
Fandi claims that by embracing Islamists while hosting American military bases, Qatar has found the perfect ground for Islamists to attack Arab
leaders. He further argues that AJA had become a weapon in the hands of an ambitious Emir Hamad, who may have been driven by the Islamic parties, particularly the MB, and who was ‘threatening’ the stability of the Middle East. He also accused the AJA and Qatari relationship as a ‘dangerous phenomenon’:
[…] with the Muslim Brothers increasingly aligned in recent years with Iran, by repeatedly attacking the Sunni Arab regimes and inciting against them, Al-Jazeera is serving as an important instrument for Tehran and its effort to undermine their internal stability […] with the help of the powerful satellite network he created, the Emir of Qatar, a man who does not overly care for democracy and freedom of expression, is trying to assume the mantle of a great power, aided and abetted by the Muslim Brothers – one of the most extreme movements in the Muslim world. (Fandi, cited in Mazel: 2009).
Wadah Khanfar, a Palestinian and former director of the AJA, was born and raised in Jordan where, consistent with a MB background, he was educated as an engineer. The same report indicates that he was also a student activist, organising a student union in keeping with a Muslim Brotherhood setting. An article published by The Economist (2011): ‘Al- Jazeera why did he go?’ (Referring to the resignation of Khanfar) attracted critical opinion that although AJA did not sponsor rebellion, it did promote one particular aspect:
Colleagues who quit the channel complain that Mr Khanfar packed its staff with Islamists, many of them sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood. In coverage of Libya, for example, Al-
Jazeera has put Islamist factions, some of which happen to be backed by Qatar, in the spotlight at the expense of secular rivals. Perhaps the appointment of a member of the emirate’s ruling family as the channel’s new chief will curb such enthusiasm (The Economist: 2011)
The American Foreign Policy Council’s ‘World Almanac of Islamism’, gave an overview of Qatar and its relationship with Islam, and explains that Islamism is very much an ‘in-house’ phenomenon in Qatar (American Foreign Policy Council: 2014). It pointed out that a necessary precondition for the rise of an Islamist opposition is the decline in government legitimacy and efficacy. These governments use their control of the media to create a monopoly on reporting, making the reportage itself a tool in regional rivalries.
The review defines the nature of Wahhabi Qatar and notes that Qatar’s government and ruling family have traditionally been strongly linked to Wahhabi-Hanbali Islam14. Not only is Wahhabi Islam the official state religion, but Islamic jurisprudence is the basis of Qatar's legal system: civil courts have jurisdiction only over commercial law.
Among the political exiles who sought refuge in Qatar are prominent figures of the Muslim Brotherhood, many of whom fled persecution at the hands of Nasser’s Egyptian government during the 1950s. Some of these
14 ‘Wahhabi doctrine is based on the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence and is
characterized by acceptance only of original texts of the Quran, the hadith, and the sunna’ (Rabasa: 2004: 15)
exiles reportedly laid the foundations for the Qatari Education Ministry, and taught at various levels there until the early 1980s. (American Foreign Policy Council: 2014, p. 291)
The nature of Qatari media was clarified: since the 11th September attacks on New York and Washington, AJA underwent a process of increasing ‘Islamisation,’ with many of its more secular staff replaced by Islamists. The channel was alleged to have moved away from its rather ideologically diverse origins to a more populist — and more Islamist — approach. It was increasingly becoming a participant in the sectarian feud between Shi’a and Sunni, and Qatar itself was centrally placed in this battle: on the one hand, it hosted an American military base on its soil, where tanks and vehicles damaged in the fighting were serviced and sent back into battle to protect the Shi’ite-led government of Iraq, and on the other, Qatar’s Sunni majority saw (and still see) Shi’ite Iran as the main threat to the region (American Foreign Policy Council: 2014 p. 291).
The questions asked in this overview are aligned with this research’s main investigation: how much of AJA’s increasing Islamist slant is a matter of design and how much is evolution? Has the station been changing its approach in order to promote the interests of the Qatari ruling family, or is the shift a simple reflection of the growing popularity of Islamist causes in Arab society? Whatever the true cause (and they are not mutually exclusive), AJA is more than a mirror of public opinion and is increasingly
taking the initiative in influencing events, rather than merely reporting on them.
Oxford Analytica (2005) published an article: ‘The Advent of Terrorism In Qatar’ in which it also claims that Qatar has a long-standing tradition of hosting exiled Islamic ‘terrorists’ and radical preachers from Algeria, Chechnya, Egypt, Lebanon and the Occupied Territories. Elizabeth Weingarten (2010) explains in her article in The Atlantic, the reason behind Qatar’s strong ties with Islamic groups is to allow the free flow of funds through the country:
Beyond Qatar's alleged funding of Al-Qaeda and its ties to Hamas and Iran, it has also tried to bolster its reputation by allowing money to flow freely through the country, no questions asked. Implementing more scrutiny would likely anger terrorist groups and put Qatar at greater risk (Weingarten: 2010).
Mohammed El-Oif (2011) states in his article in Le Monde: ‘What to do about Al-Jazeera?’ that the editorial position of the satellite TV network AJA, based in the Qatari capital of Doha, has allowed Qatari foreign policy to shape trans-national Arab sentiment. The channel drives its legitimacy from its media professionalism and its approach of blending ‘pan-Arabism’, ‘Islamic sensitivity’ and ‘liberalism’, has empowered AJA’s success and reach. The channel became an important media tool of the ‘revolution’ in January 2011 in Egypt, in spite of the closure of its office in Tahrir Square when the Mubarak regime shut down the Internet. It was AJA that
disrupted that communication strategy. El-Oif also speculates on the equivocality of the situation:
How do supporting Arab revolutions serve the interests of the local dynastic regime? Or defending Hamas against Israel but also against Fatah? These are concessions made by leaders to the Arab journalists they employ, and to public opinion. They are the price Qatar has to pay for sending warplanes to Libya or hosting Israeli leaders in Doha (El-Oif: 2011).
Steven Stalinsky (2007) identifies the fact that Arab reformists who had witnessed first-hand incitement by AJA often discussed its connection with the MB (Ikhwan) movement. This organisation is one of the world's leading Islamist groups, based in Egypt and founded in 1928 by Hasan Al-Banna (see Chapter 4). Today, its ideology influences groups ranging from Hamas to Al-Qaeda. He writes: ‘Many leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood use Al-Jazeera for their own platform’ (Stalinsky: 2007).
Judea Pearl (cited in Oren Kessler: 2012) claims, as many other critics do, that the channel had ‘unconditional’ support for Hamas’s ‘terror’ in Gaza, the Hezbollah takeover in Lebanon, and the Syrian and Iranian regimes, and that it is an illusion that democracy and human rights are on AJA’s agenda. Pearl continues by putting the channel’s strategy more plainly: ‘I have no doubt that today Al-Jazeera is the most powerful voice of the Muslim Brotherhood’ (p. 52).
Pearl’s arguments are based on his personal opinion rather than analysis; although his point of view is generally echoed by commentators, little has been done on the subject at academic level. This research attempts to examine whether or not AJA is the most powerful voice for the MB in Egypt, or whether it is only a platform for diverse ideologies, including secular movements.
AJA became more widely known in the West, principally when it made headlines in Western media following its broadcasting of Bin Laden’s tapes. Some Western commentators, as previously discussed, accused the channel of serving Bin Laden’s propaganda while claiming a direct link between Al-Qaeda and AJA (Figenschou: 2013). These claims were later made solid by the arrest of a few AJA reporters such as Tayseer Allouni (under house arrest) on the grounds that they collaborated with Al-Qaeda by serving them financially, especially after he secured an exclusive interview with Bin Laden, only a month after the 9/11 attacks in America (Beckman: 2013; Zayani: 2005).
Dima Dabbous-Sensenig (2006) focuses on one particular programme, which, by definition, is a religious programme, but she observes that the channel’s general abandonment of its diversity was illustrated by not presenting both views from different religious backgrounds. Dima presents an interesting argument, however, on which this research could further build a case by investigating the current news programmes such as
Opposite Direction and Without Borders, and examining the language and what stands beyond it in AJA’s framing of the MB, before and after the fall of Mubarak (see Chapters 7 and 8).
The nature of the language used by AJA, according to Haim Malka (2003), is ‘biased’. He notes the different Islamic views and analyses one particular incident:
[…] three main arguments have emerged: the first, endorsing the attacks of September 11 and against Israeli targets, the second, rejecting attacks like September 11, but supporting attacks against Israeli targets, and the third, rejecting all suicide attacks, wherever they take place. This academic piece shows how Qaradawi has gained popularity and legitimacy throughout the Arab world by questioning the authority of the state, and he reaches a broad audience through his regular appearances on the Arabic satellite channel, Al-Jazeera (Malka: 2003, p. 8).
Malka further asserts that Qaradawi has emerged as one of the pre- eminent Islamic religious figures in the Arab world, and arguably represents the mainstream of Arab Muslim society. Oren Kessler (2012) highlights the channel’s backing of the Islamic movement, Hamas, in its rivalry against the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA), ‘It’s unmistakable — Al-Jazeera is not just pro-Palestinian, but pro-Hamas’ (p. 53).
Previous analysis research was made on the fragmentation of U.S. cable news media, specifically comparing CNN and The Fox News Network, showed that Fox consistently resonated more and was thought to have
less bias with a more conservative audience and CNN was more likely to resonate with people who viewed the press, as a whole, as a less biased entity (Morris, 2005; 2007).
The rising power of political Islam ideology was not only limited to the Arab media but also to the Western ones. Kelsey Glover (2011) explains how the U.S. media (CNN and Fox News) framed the MB during the Egyptian revolution in 2011. Her research specifically focuses on the characterisation of, and information reported about Egypt’s leading political opposition group, the MB, both during the revolution and directly following Mubarak’s resignation. Glover’s study examines the portrayal of the MB by CNN and Fox News through a content analysis of television broadcast transcripts. She notes that the change in the Egyptian leadership put the ‘revolution’ in the headlines of virtually all major news media outlets in the U.S., due to the rise of MB and its playing a potential leadership role in Egypt. Glover finds the results were most often associated with radical Islam or a threat to democratic ideals, after examining the context in which the MB was discussed through both cable network transcripts:
The significance of portraying MB in such a manner will almost certainly affect American public opinion of the MB when taking into account America’s sensitivity concerning Terrorism. Furthermore, on numerous occasions, the MB was evaluated as a threat instead of as a positive part of a pluralistic system in Egypt (Glover: 2011: p. 130).
The fact that Glover’s analysis is primarily focused on the U.S. media network in relation to the MB supports this research on how media framing of the MB can directly or indirectly shape public perception and opinion about it.
The decline of secular political parties in the Arab world has strengthened Islamic opposition, which exerts a powerful influence on social norms throughout the Arab world (Touzani: 2009). It is at this juncture between media and religion - which is the main emphasis of this research project - that the focus on AJA and its relationship with MB is relevant; although a significant topic, it has been under-represented in Arab and Western scholarship, with the exception of a few studies focusing on AJA’s promotion of the Islamic veil. Sam Cherribi (2006) for example, argues AJA is equivalent to the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN) and not to Cable News Network (CNN). He based his study on an analysis of AJA’s coverage of the story of the veil in France between 2002 and 2005, showing that the channel had devoted significant time to the views of Islamic leaders, and argued that the channel’s religious message was mono-denominational.
Khaled Hroub (2011), in his article ‘Qatar: the source of Arab Spring’ on the ABC website, describes the channel as having pushed the boundaries of information by providing live coverage of major developments in the Arab world and elsewhere:
It is a platform for political and religious opposition groups in the Arab countries…. Al-Jazeera is not a tool of the CIA, Israel or Al-Qaeda. Rather, it is the sophisticated mouthpiece of the state of Qatar and its ambitious Emir, Hamad Al-Thani. Simply put, the Al-Jazeera success story would not have been possible without Qatar's backing. For Al-Thani, Al-Jazeera is integral to the national "branding" of Qatar and its foreign-policy aspirations (Hroub: 2011).
Hroub’s argument regarding the channel is seen as integral to the national branding of Qatar and its foreign policy aspirations. To what extent have Qatar’s relations with Islamic groups affected the channel’s attitude towards Islamic parties, considering that it is host to both AJA as well as exiled MB members such Al-Qaradawi? Hroub particularly notes that Qatar created strong links with both Israel and many Islamist movements, including Hamas and Hezbollah. This paradox of Qatar’s association with Islamic parties as well as with the West and Israel requires investigation.
Ahmad Azem (2012) authored an article published in Middle East Online: ‘Qatar's Ties with the Muslim Brotherhood Affect Entire Region’ in which he argues that the association between the MB and Qatar was becoming noticeable in the restructuring of the Arab world. He based his assertion on three reasons:
First, the relationship ensures that Islamists will not criticise Qatari government policies or be active there. Second, as Islamists head towards power in several countries, Qataris are in a position to expect special economic and political treatment
in each. Third, Qatar will be well-positioned to mediate between Islamists and their rivals and also between Islamists in general and the West (Azem: 2012).
Looking at the intimate ties between Qatar and MB benefits this research, as it could be argued that such relations could be directly or indirectly represented as a basis for AJA having a solid bond with MB, translated throughout its programmes, including ‘Shari’a and Life’ (Al-Qaradawi is the main speaker), and its agenda in promoting MB by providing them with the space and time to project their viewpoints.
3.5 Summary
The channel’s relationship with Islamic political Islam in general was noted by observers in terms of AJA’s religious programmes, the channel’s regular guests such as Al-Qaradawi, the history of its staff such as the former director of the channel, Wadah Khanfar, and Ahmed Mansour, who were known to be active members of the MB, and the language used by AJA in its news and current affairs programmes that reflected the channel’s policies and agenda.
The close ties between Qatar, AJA’s host country, and the MB can open academic interpretation on the effect of this association on AJA’s editorial practices, seen by observers as a public relations tool for the tiny country of Qatar. This research, nonetheless, raises the question: is it a
coincidence that Qatar hosts Hamas and the Taliban offices, and granted the newly-elected president at the time, Mohamed Morsi, billions of U.S. dollars? Does this warm welcome extended to these Islamic groups, directly or indirectly influence the channel’s coverage of Islamic political parties such as the MB? These questions are once again, open to academic debate.
AJA’s coverage of the popular uprisings in the Arab world in general, and Egypt in particular, also gives a clear idea of the channel’s position in endorsing ‘the opposition’ against dictatorships. The channel’s language and ‘electrifying messages’ were clear and therefore, it could be seen that the channel positioned itself to backing one side of the story rather than the other. The station was a clear platform for an opposing voice of the Mubarak regime, yet unaccommodating for the views of Mubarak’s supporters.
The next chapter presents an overview of the history of the MB which is said to be one of the oldest Islamic movements in the Arab world. It is essential to this research to understand what the MB symbolises, who its members are and their motivation, and what they have undergone since the movement’s inception and during certain historical periods, particularly before and after the Mubarak regime’s tenure.
Chapter Four