– PREVISIONES Y OTRAS SITUACIONES CONTINGENTES

As stated at the outset of the above section, American intellectuals of various schools of thought tend to view Islamism through three broad lenses: the political ideology that shapes Islamists’ worldview and hence determines their attitude towards the western-based political modernity; the compatibility of Islam and democracy and Islamists commitment to democratic values, including the peaceful transfer of power; and a geostrategic posture that Islamists in power may embrace towards American vital interests in the Middle East. In the post-9/11 era Islamism continued to be debated within these three contexts. Ironically, both accommodationists and rejectionists interpreted the 9/11 attacks in such a manner that validated their respective conceptual stances. Accommodationists argued the American-backed authoritarianism provided fertile ground for the growth of Islamic extremism, which loomed large because of its violent acts. Hence, accommodationists, observed, the 9/11 attacks were partially attributed to lack of a pluralistic, inclusive, and responsive political setting that would encourage moderation and curb violent radicalism. Nonetheless, accommodationists concluded, as a result of its aimless and unjustified violent acts, Al Qaeda lost ground to moderate Islamists, who unambiguously

denounced violence, and, instead, embraced constitutional struggle as a means for change. As Fawaz A. Gerges, a well known writer on the Middle Eastern affairs suggests:

Indiscriminate targeting of civilians has turned Muslims opinion against Al Qaeda, its tactics, and ideology. For most Muslims, Al Qaeda stands accused of having brought ruin to the ummah [Muslim global community]. Some insist that Al Qaeda is an American invention, a pretext to intervene in Muslim lands. …. [AL Qaeda] has lost the struggle for Muslim hearts and minds, a fact that is more evident in the wake of the Arab popular uprisings. …. The Muslim world did not hail September 11 as a triumph but considered it as a catastrophe. Since September 11, I have argued that, contrary to the received wisdom in the West, Muslim opinion has embraced neither Al Qaeda’s extremist ideology nor its murderous tactics and that Bin Laden and his cohorts did not speak for the mainstream Islamists who represent the majority of the religiously based activists, let alone the ummah.42

John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed strongly condemned the equation of terrorism, as

exemplified by Al Qaeda and its affiliates, with the mainstream political Islam. They contended:

The catastrophic events of 9/11 and continued terrorist attacks in Muslim countries and in Madrid and London have exacerbated the growth of Islamophobia almost exceptionally. Islam and Muslims have become guilty until proven innocent. The religion of Islam is regarded as the cause, rather than the context, of radicalism, extremism, and terrorism… [which are partly attributed to] some aspects of U.S. Foreign policy representing intervention and dominance, Western support for authoritarian regimes, the invasion and occupation of Iraq, or support for Israel’s military battles with Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon.43

The 9/11 attacks were arbitrarily exploited to support the notion of a ‘clash of civilizations’, where Islam was portrayed as the primary source of resistance to western-based universal values of democracy, freedom, and human rights. This interpretation, accommodationists believe, offered a misconceived perception of Islam, perpetuating the Western-Islamic cultural conflict and misinterpreting a Muslim attitude towards the West as a cultural entity. As John Esposito suggested, “the attacks of September 11 and the global threat of Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda have resurrected a knee-jerk resort to ‘the clash of civilizations’ for an easy answer to the question: why they hate us?. ……September 11 unleashed new updated versions of an Islamic threat as many found it more expedient to fall back on convenient stereotypes of a monolithic Islam, an historic clash of civilizations, and a conflict between Islam and modernity, rather than examine the complex political, military, economic, and social causes of terrorism.”44

Accommodationists disapproved of the George W. Bush administration’s approach to Islamic activism, most notably the Global War on Terror (GWoT) that the administration waged to

undermine terrorism. Ironically, the GWoT severely discredited America’s moral authority, fueled anti-American sentiment, and was viewed by the majority of Muslims as a war against Islam. Emile Nakhleh, a former CIA analyst, observed, “seven years after 9/11, the global war on terror and the commitment of enormous American resources in manpower and treasure in pursuit of that ‘war’ have not made Americans measurably safer than they were on the eve of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington.”45 Furthermore, U.S. counterterrorism efforts tarnished America’s geopolitical image, identifying the U.S. with the colonial powers that the region historically experienced. John Esposito concluded, “The resultant image of America and American foreign policy is increasingly that of ‘imperial’ America whose overwhelming military and political power is used unilaterally, disproportionately, and indiscriminately in a war not just against global terrorism and religious extremists but also against Islam and the Muslim world.”46 Nonetheless, compatibility of Islam and democracy remained the foundational them around which accommodationists’ argument revolved, calling Washington to allow democratization to proceed in the Muslim world without America’s involvement. Graham E. Fuller warned, “Ideally, Washington should keep its hand off the process so as not to tarnish it, as has been the case in the past through association with U.S. self- interest. Past selective and instrumental use of democratization by Washington for pursuit of U.S. strategic goal has discredited the very concept of its democratization program……The United States must accept that under democratic process Islamic parties will be legitimately elected in early elections in most Muslim countries.”47

Indeed, the 9/11 attacks and their consequent catastrophic political and military implications for the Muslim world, accommodationists argued, undermined the violent trends and empowered moderate Islamists who unambiguously disassociated themselves from radicalism, denounced violence, and endorsed democracy as a means for change, developing a sense of pragmatism. Exemplified by the Muslim Brotherhood, moderate Islamism, Fawaz Gerges suggested, “learned the art of compromise and pragmatism through hardship and persecution. Ideology takes a back seat to the interests and political well-being of the Brotherhood and Ennahdah [of Tunisia]. More than ever, their message targets specific constituencies and interest groups – a sign of an ideological shift to pragmatism.”48 In short, accommodationists concluded that the 9/11 attacks were a result of the authoritarian rule and political exclusion of Islam from the public sphere.

They sought to make a clear distinction between Al Qaeda’s rootless radicalism, and Moderate Islamism whose socio-political appeal is evident.

Rejectionists, on the other hand, argued that the 9/11 attacks confirmed both the undemocratic and anti-western nature of Islam as a faith. Al Qaeda and its like-minded factions, rejectionists suggest, represent the norm rather than the exception. This school of thought built its argument upon the assumption that Islamic societies, throughout history, never experienced democracy, simply because Islamic doctrines do not enshrine democratic values. Violence, confrontationalists believe, is an expression of hatred, which is in turn entrenched in the Islamic texts, notably the Quran. Intellectuals like Bernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes, Fouad Ajmi, and Robert Satloff played crucial roles in shaping the George W. Bush administration’s geopolitical perception of Islamism in the post-9/11 era, and hence influenced the administration’s geostrategic preferences, including the invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003).

Indeed, rejectionists’ point of departure is their interpretation of Islam. Islamists political activism is a mere manifestation of Islamic ideology, which is, rejectionists remarked, not in harmony with the core values of the judo-Christian civilization. Hence, simplistically identifying the 9/11 terrorist attacks with Islam as a faith, Sam harries wrote, “It is time we admitted that we are not at war with terrorism. We are at war with Islam. …..we are absolutely at war with the vision of life that is prescribed to all Muslims in the Koran. …. The idea that Islam is a ‘peaceful religion hijacked by extremists’ is a dangerous fantasy.”49 Similarly, Charles Krauthammer attributed the 9/11 events to the intolerant nature of Islam and the deteriorating socio-political condition of Arab Middle East: “it’s not Osama bin Laden; it is the cauldron of political oppression, religious intolerance, and social ruin in the Arab-Islamic world …It’s not a one man; it is a condition. ……And our problem is 9/11 and the roots of Arab-Islamic nihilism.…. September 11 felt like the initiation of a new history, but it was a return to history, the twentieth- century history of radical ideologies and existential enemies.”50

Bernard Lewis, a prominent American historian, and Middle East expert, interpreted the 9/11 attacks in terms of Islam’s failure to cope with modernity. Islamist violence, according to Lewis, reveals Muslims frustration and increasing feeling of powerlessness. Lewis equated Islamism with authoritarianism, warning that Islamists posed threat to democracy. In his book, “The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror”, which was published in 2003 (two years after 9/11

events), Lewis wrote, “For Islamists, democracy, expressing the will of the people, is the road to power, but it is a one-way road, on which there is no return, no rejection of the sovereignty of God, as exercised through His chosen representatives. Their electoral policy has been classically summarized as one man (men only), one vote, once.”51 Likewise, arguing against the compatibility of Islam and liberal democracy, David Bukay, a Jewish intellectual, claimed, “Such basic principles as sovereignty, legitimacy, political participation and pluralism, and those individual rights and freedoms inherent in democracy do not exist in a system where Islam is the ultimate sources of law. …. The political Islam espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists is incompatible with liberal democracy.”52

While appreciating Islam as a civilization and spiritual mission, Daniel Pipes views Islamism as a form of radical utopianism, seeking to transform Islam into a political ideology. Islamism, Pipes asserted, “loath the West because of its being tantamount to Christendom, the historic archenemy, and its vast influence over Muslims. Islamism inspires a drive to reject, defeat, and subjugate Western civilization. ….Islamism accurately indicates an Islamic-flavored version of radical utopianism, an –ism like other –isms, comparable to fascism, and communism. …. We will triumph over this new variant of barbarism so that a modern form of Islam can emerge.”53 Clearly, this confrontational line of thinking not only preheated the policy circles in Washington in the aftermath of 9/11 events, but also provided conceptual justification for the George W. Bush administration’s neoconservative agenda. Supporting the administration’s military campaign against Iraq, Fouad Ajami, a regular commentator on Middle Eastern affairs, wrote:

It was September 11 and its shattering surprise, in turn, that tipped the balance on Iraq away from containment and toward regime change and ‘rollback’. …. No great apologies ought to be made for America’s unilateralism. The region can live with and use that unilateralism. The considerable power now at America’s disposal can be used by one and all as a justification for going along with American goals. …in the end, the battle for a secular, modernist order in the Arab world is an endeavor for the Arabs themselves. ….. The Islamists’ apparent resurgence in recent months was born of their hope that the United States may have lost the sense of righteous violation that drove it after September 11, and that the American push in the region may have lost its steam. These Islamists are supremely political and calculating people; they probe the resolve of their enemies. … A new war should come with the promise that the United States is now on the side of reform.54

In a conference sponsored by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (September 24, 2005), Robert Satloff, an American expert on Middle East policy, argued against the political engagement of Islamists, identifying Islamism as “the greatest ideological challenge America faces in the world today. Islamism and democracy are, by their very definition, antithetical. [Hence] we should not encourage political engagement with Islamists. Instead of moderating the radicals, let us commit ourselves to the project of empowering the moderates.”55 Clearly, Satloff and his like-minded intellectuals appeared to have conflated violent and non-violent Islamists. Their argument is based on the assumption that the two groups are united by the ultimate end – the recreation of the Caliphate (the sharia-based global Islamic state).