Lord Brookeborough‘s 20 year old premiership is sometimes considered, especially in the light of hindsight and with the knowledge of what came after, as an unbroken period of stability and tranquility in the history of Northern Ireland. However, it is worth noting that this view of Brookeborough‘s period in office is somewhat misleading. Apart from the IRA Border campaign which was eventually defeated, the 1950‘s saw a period of industrial decline in Northern Ireland which resulted in growing unemployment even among the Protestant working-class. The result of this economic decline was both an increasing focus on economic issues (as opposed to constitutional matters) and an increase in support mainly (although not exclusively) from the Protestant working-class for the Northern Ireland Labour Party, which, with its natural focus on socioeconomic matters and its pro-union stand, appeared an attractive proposition to more voters
173Purdie, Politics in the Streets, 2.
174 Brendan Lynn, Holding the Ground: The Nationalist Party in Northern Ireland, 1945-1972, (Aldershot: Ashgate,
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in Northern Ireland, especially in the unionist working class.175 This economic decline impacted,
mainly, on the working classes in all communities including the Protestant one. This may also have nurtured a sense of insecurity and threat within sections of the Protestant working class, rendering them more likely to adopt a negative attitude to the CRM.
This increased support for parties of the left (such as Republican Labour, Independent Labour, Irish Labour or the Northern Ireland Labour Party) was evident in the elections from 1953 onwards. By the 1963 elections the Northern Ireland Labour Party‘s vote had risen to 25%. This in itself was alarming enough for the Unionist Party which in the 1963 election lost 3 seats albeit with a higher share of the vote. Soon after the election Lord Brookeborough was persuaded to resign as Prime Minister to be replaced by Terence O‘Neill.
O‘Neill‘s accession to the premiership was not universally popular. His desire to appear to be a reforming prime minister appealed to those within the Unionist party who favoured economic and political reform. However, a strong section of the party was opposed to reform which they anticipated would weaken the Unionist hold on political power. For O‘Neill advocated reform both in economic terms as well as in political terms. In particular, he favoured efforts at reconciliation with the Republic of Ireland and also within Northern Ireland between Protestants and Catholics. These efforts at reconciliation were advocated through rhetoric and symbolism. His speeches and interviews called for better conditions for Catholics in Northern Ireland as well as better relations with the Republic of Ireland. The symbolism of his meetings with the Irish Taoiseach Sean Lemass and his visit to a Catholic convent reinforced his rhetoric.
For those Unionists who were opposed to reforms this rhetoric and symbolism fueled their opposition to O‘Neill and his reforms. However, at the same time neither O‘Neill‘s rhetoric nor the symbolism of his acts were sufficient for those Catholics whose expectations were heightened by both O‘Neill‘s words and his symbolic actions. While in the short-term O‘Neill‘s policies and actions were applauded by numerous commentators along most of the political spectrum (but by no means by all) the medium to long term effects of his policies was to create unfulfilled expectations within the minority community and to harden the attitude of those Unionists who were antipathetic to change.
What then were the reforms that O‘Neill planned and in some cases implemented? It has been argued that O‘Neill‘s strategy was essentially an assimilatory one. Marc Mulholland has characterized O‘Neill‘s plan as one which intended to ―draw in Catholics into the Unionist
alliance, even at the expense of alienating some Protestant traditionalists‖.176 The tools with
which to implement his assimilationist strategy included economic re-generation through the attraction of new industry and the improvement of public infrastructure. The focus on economic
175 For an in-depth discussion of the NILP see Aron Edwards, A history of the Northern Ireland Labour Party:
Democratic socialism and sectarianism, (Manchester, Manchester University Press 2009).
176Marc Mulholland, ―Assimilation versus Segregation: Unionist Strategy in the 1960s,‖ Twentieth Century British
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planning and industrial investment as a theme of the O‘Neill premiership was clearly established in the first Queen‘s Speech presented soon after he became Prime Minister. The tone of
O‘Neill‘s comments in the Debate on the Address is best described as Wilsonian.177 He
emphasized technological innovation, industrial training and economic planning within a framework of a rapidly changing society. In the early parts of his comments he sought to create this aura of change as being driven not only by government but more broadly:
Many bodies outside the Government have applied their minds to our basic problems and there has been a more spectacular flow of ideas and advice than ever before in our history. Not all of those ideas may be practicable, but the new vigour which they demonstrate is an essential part of our revitalisation.178
The new society which O‘Neill was aiming to create was based on a belief in the primacy of economic factors: thus the emphasis in the Queen‘s Speech on education, training and job creation. There is no mention in the Queen‘s Speech nor in the speeches by the MPs proposing and seconding the motion on the Queen‘s speech (both delivered by Unionist MPs) of issues related to discrimination or civil rights. However, the subtext of the speeches as well as the Prime Minister‘s own response seems to have been that if the economy improves and if more houses are built and more jobs are created the whole population of Northern Ireland would benefit. ―Better education, better training, better management‖ were the points of the trident with which the Prime Minister proposed to kill the ills of Northern Ireland.
As an illustration of the new Ulster which O‘Neill was proposing he sanctioned the building of the new model town of Craigavon following in the footsteps of Milton Keynes in England, an
example of a modern Ulster.179 Yet even in this ‗model‘ the traditional sectarian divides could
not be avoided.180 The name of Craigavon in itself was perceived by the Catholic community as
a sectarian symbol commemorating the first Prime Minister of Northern Ireland who in the memory of Catholics was a symbol of the discrimination they felt that they had suffered. The difficulty in moving beyond the sectarian divide was highlighted in the same debate by the Nationalist MP Cahir Healy. Healy commenting on the push for industrial revitalisation warned that:
177Indeed there is a touch of Harold Wilson‘s 'the white heat of the technological revolution' rhetoric in O‘Neill‘s
early pronouncements as Prime Minister.
178 Captain Terence O‘Neill, Northern Ireland House of Commons, The Parliamentary Debates: Official Report,
October 22, 1963, col. 29
http://stormontpapers.ahds.ac.uk/stormontpapers/pageview.html?volumeno=55&pageno=1.
179 BBC, Craigavon town planning: British Modernism 50 years on, 24 October
2014,http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-29728971
180 It has recently been argued that ―The Craigavon brand was fundamentally and fatally flawed from the outset.
Naming it after the first unionist prime minister was perhaps an unwise opening move in terms of achieving cross- community buy-in.‖ Ibid
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No leader of industry wants to come to a locality where discrimination is being practised in housing or employment.181
Another difficulty with O‘Neill‘s reforms was that they were essentially paternalistic when paternalistic rhetoric and styles of government were out of favour. His comment that ―It is frightfully hard to explain to Protestants that if you give Roman Catholics a good job and a good house they will live like Protestants because they will see neighbours with cars and television sets; they will refuse to have eighteen children. But if a Roman Catholic is jobless, and lives in the most ghastly hovel, he will rear eighteen children on National Assistance. If you treat Roman Catholics with due consider and kindness, they will live like Protestants in spite of the
authoritative nature of their Church ...‖182 exemplify this approach and his beliefs which were
well intentioned but offensive to Catholics. What is instructive in this comment apart from the stereotyping of Catholics is the articulation of a certain unease which O‘Neill had in dealing with Protestants. This twin difficulty of persuading Protestants and alienating Catholics would eventually bring down O‘Neill‘s premiership.
Apart from the early promises of economic renewal and industrial innovation what were the steps taken by the O‘Neill government in the field of human rights? In particular did the O‘Neill administration respond to the concerns of the Catholic community vis-à-vis the Special Powers Act, the franchise, employment and housing? With respect to the latter two issues the O‘Neill government sought to include house-building and investment-attraction projects as key parts of its programme. These projects were not directly aimed at addressing the grievances, real or perceived, of the minority but were presented as necessary for the well-being of the community as a whole. However, O‘Neill was clear that Catholics should be included in the new economic dispensation. How far this was the case is, as a matter of course, disputed.
In the spheres of franchise and the Special Powers Act, the debate was sharper and there was little room for ambiguity. The Nationalists claimed that the franchise should be reformed and reflect the principle of ‗one person one vote‘ at all levels, national and local. The Unionist rank and file was unenthusiastic on this point. Likewise, as discussed in the previous Chapter, the Special Powers Act was considered to be an instrument of oppression that should be removed by the Nationalists and a tool to preserve law and order that should be maintained by the Unionists. There was no easy way of balancing these clearly conflicting views and expectations.
O‘Neill had to tread carefully so as not to alienate too many of his Unionist MPs while the impatience of the Nationalist community grew. If one sticks with raw facts one notes that the franchise issue was dealt with by the O‘Neill Cabinet in 1968 through the Electoral Law Amendment Act which ended the business vote and the university vote for Stormont elections. The thornier issue of the franchise for local authority elections was the subject of much debate
181Mr. Cahir Healy MP, Northern Ireland House of Commons, The Parliamentary Debates: Official Report, October
23, 1963, col. 52 http://stormontpapers.ahds.ac.uk/stormontpapers/pageview.html?volumeno=55&pageno=45.
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and dissent, in particular vis-à-vis the business vote and ratepayer suffrage which on the one hand gave multiple votes to company directors and on the other hand disenfranchised a considerable part of the adult population. O‘Neill‘s government did not manage to resolve this matter and it was only finally resolved after the Macrory Report was published in 1970. The Special Powers Act was semi-retired in November 1968 when Cabinet decided that it should be laid-aside for use only in case of an extreme emergency. The irony being that the extreme emergency in this case would materialize sooner than thought. At the same time the Cabinet decided a points-system for the allocation of public housing as well as an ombudsman for Northern Ireland. If one keeps to the bare facts, one notices that the major complaints of the minority community were either dealt with very late in the O‘Neill premiership or not at all. As shall be seen later on, the Civil Rights Movement claimed that these late reforms were only achieved as a result of the pressure exerted by the movement.
The Nationalist Party at Stormont did not significantly change its positions during O‘Neill‘s tenure as Prime Minister. It took over the role of Official Opposition between February 1965 and October 1968 but it essentially continued to repeat grievances as it had done in the previous 20 years. The more imaginative opposition came from the Northern Ireland Labour Party and Gerry Fitt (representing the Republican Labour Party). In terms of human rights issues the contribution of the Ulster Liberal MP Sheelagh Murnaghan needs to be highlighted as she battled to introduce a Human Rights Act for Northern Ireland on four separate occasions between 1964 and 1968. In March 1964, William Boyd of the Northern Ireland Labour Party presented a Racial Discrimination Bill which intended to render illegal and punishable by law discrimination (and incitement to discrimination) based on race, colour or religion. Without entering into the details of the debate on this Bill it is important to note that the governmental response was to reject the Bill on the grounds that:
…this Bill does not and, indeed, cannot achieve its objects and, therefore, should not be accepted. I doubt very much whether any additional legislation can improve the situation. What we must strive for is a better understanding between all sections of the community based on mutual respect183.
This reasoning (or excuse, depending on your viewpoint) would be repeated on numerous occasions in the period to reject Human Rights Bills presented by Sheelagh Murnaghan. The efforts by Ms. Murnaghan in this respect merit some consideration for two reasons: firstly, the Bills she presented outlined for the first time the prospect of a Human Rights Commission for Northern Ireland; and secondly they were debated at a time when the Civil Rights Movement outside parliament was in its infancy.
183 Minister of Home Affairs, William Craig MP, Northern Ireland House of Commons, The Parliamentary
Debates: Official Report, March 3, 1964, col. 1434
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The first attempt at enacting a Human Rights Bill was made by Ms. Murnaghan in June 1964. The Bill presented by the Ulster Liberal MP was intended to outlaw discrimination and provide a remedy to victims of discrimination. The Bill proposed the establishment of a Human Rights Commission with semi-judicial functions and also with the possibility of making recommendations to Governmental agencies and departments. The O‘Neill government rejected the Bill overwhelmingly with the Attorney General echoing the Home Affairs Minister quoted
above stating ―In short it is not a matter for legislation‖.184 He also stated that any discrimination
that existed in Northern Ireland was less than in most other countries and criticised the judicial functions assigned to the Human Rights Commission.
1964 was also the year that the Campaign for Social Justice was established and can be described as the year when the Civil Rights Movement started taking shape. It seems significant that in the same year two separate Bills dealing with anti-discrimination measures were debated (and rejected) in parliament. The history of the decade might have been somewhat different if the O‘Neill administration had enacted the legislation proposed by these MPs which would have provided aggrieved individuals, a legitimate vehicle through which their grievances could be adjudicated in a fair manner.
The subsequent attempts from 1964 to 1968 by Murnaghan to pass a Human Rights Act at Stormont were all roundly rejected by the Unionist Party. The reasons for rejecting the Bills were always articulated in terms of discrimination not being an area which one could legislate against
even as many parts of the world enacted legislation that did precisely this185. Thus Stormont lost
several opportunities to act in some manner to assuage the feeling of grievance held by the Catholic community. This lack of progress in the parliamentary sphere must account to some extent to the growth of the extra-parliamentary civil rights movement.
It was only in late 1968, after the 5th October Londonderry March of that year that the Unionist
government announced a number of measures that dealt with some of the grievances advanced by the civil rights movement. The reforms envisaged by O‘Neill at the beginning of his premiership never bore their fruit. The economic situation did not improve as promised nor did the great infrastructural projects result in greater opportunity for all. In this respect the fate of Craigavon, where only half of the planned buildings were completed could be a metaphor for the O‘Neill years. These failures were certainly not intentional, quite the reverse. Perhaps, in part, the failures were a result of O‘Neill being ―too full of vague good intentions‖ as his Cabinet
Secretary, Sir Kenneth Bloomfield remarked retrospectively.186 Part of the failure may also be
attributable to the fact that not everyone was as well-intentioned as he was both within the community he represented as well as in the minority community.
184 Attorney General, Edward Warburton Jones MP, Northern Ireland House of Commons, The Parliamentary
Debates: Official Report, June 16, 1964, col. 2023.
185Including in the United Kingdom where Westminster passed the first Race Relations Act in 1965. 186 ―Interview with Sir Kenneth Bloomfield‖ (BBC Radio Ulster, December 7, 2007).
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