Primer Experimento 41

As we have seen, there are, for Husserl, two types of universals: substan- tival and adjectival. For example, Tomato and Red. Now, it seems fairly uncontroversial to say, as Husserl does (as we have seen in Section 3.2), that to every substantival universal a series of adjectival universals may be associated that are collectively equivalent to it. The question, however, is: do substantival universals therebyreduceto the relevant adjectival ones?

In ILTK(1906/07), and in particular in Appendix XV, Husserl says that substantival universals may indeed be thought of as complexes of ‘universal moments’, i.e., adjectival universals, ‘specifiable each in its own right’. It is not clear to me whether that is his mature outlook as well. In EJ, for example, he says that to substantival universals, such as the empirical type Dog, belong ‘a stock of attributes’ determining them (EJ, §83a: 332) – which might be taken to speak in favour of constancy. On the other hand, in EJ, and not inILTK, Husserl clearly makes a distinction, and a definitory one (in terms, as we saw, of extension) between the two types of universals. Also, the empirical type is said to have an ‘open horizon . . . of further [possible associated] attributes’: since it has, as opposed to is, such attributes, and since the latter are only anticipated in the horizon, and are thus potentially but not actually associated to the type, it seems fair to say that what Husserl

has in mind inEJis not a reduction of substantival to adjectival universals. Be that as it may, the early view, regardless of whether it was later aban- doned or not, does not seem straightforwardly reductive itself. Because the fact that we can think of substantival universals in terms of sets of character- ising adjectival universals does not, by itself, entail that the former should be analysed in terms of, and thus reduce to, the latter. Thus, since in EJ

substantival universals appear to be treated as abona fidetype of universals, I propose to take Husserl to be a non-reductionist with respect to them.

Incidentally, this suggests that a further relation may be introduced in the Section-2.4 diagram between adjectival and substantival universals, which we may callassociation:

substantival

universal adjectival universal

individuum moment in st an tia te s in st an tia te s is a non-independent part of bears is associated with

1.4.3

Idealism and the Ontological Status of Ideal Objects

We have already seen what it is for an object to be ideal (as opposed to real): it is for it to be atemporal. In Section 1 I presented this characterisation in terms of existence, by saying that for Husserl ideal objects do not exist in time. Are we entitled, however, to put things this way in the Husserlian framework? A reason to think we are not is the following. As we saw in Section 1, Husserl refers to universals as ‘general objects’ (generelle Gegen-

stände). In Section 3.1 we also saw that Husserl’s use of the term ‘object’

is technical. The corresponding notion – viz., that of intentional object – is a phenomenological one, and, importantly, has no ontological import: the fact that a certain mental act of a certain subject is directed to a certain object has no bearing at all on the question as to whether the object exists. It would thus seem that the issue of the ontological status of all intentional objects, ideal and real alike, cannot even be brought up in the Husserlian framework.

Not so, however. Husserl does have an account – a phenomenological account – of what it is for an intentional object to exist, i.e., according to the terminology of Section 3.1, for it to be not only an intentional object, but also an entity. In this sense, in Husserl’s philosophy the issue of the ontological status of ideal objects (notably universals and propositions) does arise and, as we shall see, gets answered.

I said that the account in question is phenomenological. In fact, it is

idealistic: according to Husserl, for an intentional object to exist is for it to satisfy a certain necessary and sufficient condition to be spelled out itself

in terms of consciousness and intentionality. Before I go on to give the condition, however, I should mention that not all commentators agree that Husserl was an idealist. I am not talking about what we may call the ‘early’ Husserl (1886-1907), who was definitely not an idealist, but about the ma- ture Husserl (from 1913 onwards). Defending the idealistic interpretation, on the other hand, would take me too far afield; therefore I will simply refer the reader to the case A.D. Smith makes for that interpretation in Smith 2003: 179-182, which I endorse.

My view is that for Husserl the conditions that intentional objects must meet if they are to be entities (i.e., to really exist) are, at some level, the

samefor real (i.e., temporal) and ideal (i.e., non-temporal) objects. There is evidence for that. For example, the following passage:

The transcendence of the world[i.e., for my purposes, the reality of the world] . . . is of the same species as the transcendence of numbersand other [ideal] objects. (EP2: 180)

Now, the conditions for real (i.e., temporal) objects, and in particular for objects of perception, to be entities have been investigated more – both by Husserl and by commentators and fellow phenomenologists – than those for ideal objects to be entities. I will therefore work out the latter by first briefly explaining what the former are for Husserl, and then proposing an analogous explanation for ideal objects. I will then take this analogous explanation to be the Husserlian condition that ideal objects have to meet if they are to be not mere intentional objects, but rather entities in the fullest sense.

In order to spell out the existence-condition (first for objects of percep- tion and the for ideal objects as well), I will introduce the notion of ‘total harmonization of intersubjective experience’ – my attempt to bundle to- gether all the Husserlian insights that are relevant to the issue. I will first define the notion, and then explain it. Here is the definition:

thetotal harmonization of intersubjective experienceis the comprehensive system of all the actual and possible intentional experiences (percep- tions, hallucinations, thoughts, imaginations, fears, and so on) of all the actual and possible subjects in all their actual and possible mutual corrections and confirmations.

Appeal to ‘all the actual and possible subjects’ and ‘all their actual and possible intentional experiences’ should not be particularly problematic. I will now try to explain the last part of the definition, ‘in all their actual and possible mutual corrections and confirmations’ (their refers to experiences, of course).

Suppose I have a sensory experience of a tomato. As we have seen in Section 3, for Husserl a sensory experience is never static, so to speak: it rather consists in actual presentations of the relevant intentional object (the tomato) along with the awareness of its inner and outer horizons, and it develops through time in the progressive exploration of those horizons. Now Husserl distinguishes two cases, one good and one bad. In the good case, the overall sensory experience may develop in such a way that all the horizonal anticipations are fulfilled (satisfied): the tomato turns out to have indeed a rear side as I expected it to have, with its colour and shape

and so on; and it turns out to be solid as I expected, so that I can actually grab it and pick it up – and perhaps smell it (and it does have a smell, as I anticipated) – and, in sum, I can do with it everything I anticipate being able to do with it, and find in it everything I anticipate finding. I also close my eyes, open them again, and the tomato is still there, unchanged. I even go out of the room, go back in, and still the tomato is there, and still it is unchanged. Husserl calls this type of overall experience harmonious: everything goes well, every partial experience accords with every other and subsequent partial experiencesconfirmprevious ones.

If, on the other hand, at some point something goes wrong and my horizonal anticipations are fustrated in some important way – e.g., it turns out that I cannot pick up the tomato, because my hand grabs through it, or I close my eyes and then reopen them and the tomato is changed or gone – then, Husserl says, the experience is not harmonious: it ‘explodes’ (Husserl’s term).

Now, if my experience of the tomato is harmonious, then surely I will take the tomato to be not merely an intentional object (merely something I see, grab, etc.), but a real object, an entity – I will take it to really exist. Sub- sequent experiences, however, maycorrectprevious ones. E.g., I remember picking up the tomato a minute ago, but I do not seem to be able to do that now – my hand actually grabs through it. Thenthe overall experience, i.e., the system of the two, explodes: although the first experience was har- monious, the overall experience (i.e., the system) is not, and therefore the tomato turns out not to be real after all. I was probably hallucinating it. Or perhaps the second experience does not correct the first one at all, but

confirms it: I am still able to grab the tomato and do all sorts of things with it, and I still take it to be real.

This is for Husserl (a very simplified description of) how a subject’s con- scious life unfolds, and how the subject’s experiences relate to each other: in terms of confirmations and corrections. At least at a first approximation, for Husserl an object is an entity (it really exists) only if it is the correlate of a harmonious experience or system of experiences; or, as Husserl also puts it, only if a subject’s experiences of the object, after all corrections and confirmations, are such that the object’s positing holds good. ‘At a first approximation’, because for Husserl an object’s really existing – its existing in the real world, so to speak – must be the correlate not of the experiences, no matter how harmonious, ofone subject, but of acommunityof subjects. In Smith’s helpful words: ‘By a “real world” we mean something that is intersubjectively accessible and determinable. Such a world is “public”, as Russell put it’ (Smith 2003: 177). Husserl’s view, however, is that the experiences of the subjects of a community are related to each other in the same way as the experiences of one subject are related to each other: in terms, that is, of confirmations and corrections.

Suppose that, after a series of disharmonious experiences, I cannot make up my mind as to whether there really is a tomato in front of me. Plausibly, I will then ask someone else: ‘Canyousee a tomato there? Canyoupick it up?’. Whatever the answer, my own experiences will be either confirmed or corrected, and the tomato will gain the status of a really existing, inter- subjectively accessible object, or else of a merely hallucinated object. Of course, two people form a very small community. A better approximation

to what Husserl conceives of as the relevant community of subject is hu- manity. A second version of the Husserlian condition for the existence of objects of perception, then, is the following: an object really existsonly if it is the correlate of all the experiences of all humans in all their corrections and confirmations.

But we are still not quite there – because humanity is not enough. In fact, no actual community of subjects is enough. Indeed, suppose no sen- tient being had ever made its appearance on Earth or on any planet of the universe. Would, say, Mount Blanc still have existed? Of course it would have existed. The question is: how can Husserl be entitled to say so? The answer is: by modalising the condition above. Even if no sentient being had ever made its appearance on any planet of the universe, some sentient being, or beings,couldhave. Mount Blanc really exists only if those possible sentient beings, in the right spot and conditions, would have experienced it harmoniously.

The notion of total harmonization of intersubjective experience – i.e., the notion of all the actual and possible intentional experiences of all the actual and possible subjects in all their actual and possible mutual corrections and confirmations – simply generalises and expands this idea. Thus, for Husserl, an object really exists only if it is a correlate of all the actual and possible intentional experiences of all the actual and possible subjects in all their actualand possiblemutual corrections and confirmations.

That, however, is still only an approximation. Notice that the last formu- lation, like the previous ones, is aconditional: if an object really exists,then

What this means is: being the correlate of the total harmonization of in- tersubjective experience is anecessarycondition for being an entity (i.e., for really existing). Now, one need not be an idealist to endorse this. Indeed, if one accepts the notion of total harmonization of intersubjective experience (if one thinks that such a notion makes sense), then one, I believe, will easily agree that if an object really exists, then it is an object that would be harmoniously experienced by any possible community of subjects.

What makes Husserl an idealist is that he takes the condition to be

necessary and sufficient. In particular, he thinks that being the correlate of the total harmonization of intersubjective experience suffices for the real existence of an object. The official Husserlian condition for an intentional object to be an entity is thus the following:

An intentional object is an entityif and only if it is a correlate of the total harmonization of intersubjective experience, i.e., of all the actual and possible experiences of all the actual and possible subjects in all their actual and possible mutual corrections and confirmations.

This is the Husserlian, idealistic condition for the existence of objects of perception. As I mentioned earlier on, my view is that according to Husserl something like this is true for ideal objects, too. We need not change the formulation of the condition, because, notice, the total harmonization of intersubjective experience includes not only perceptions, but intentional acts ofeverykind, including those directed to ideal objects. The problem is rather that it is not clear what the relevant corrections and confirmations

may look like with respect to experiences of ideal objects.

Here is my suggestion. Consider the (putative) property of being a non- self-exemplifying property (incidentally, we shall see more of this property in Chapter 5). There is, I believe, no doubt that we can think of that property; to such an extent, it is an intentional object. But does it really exist? What would be a disconfirmation, and thus a correction of the ini- tial, naïve assumption of its existence? For instance, to come to realise that it entails a version of Russell’s antinomy. If the property of being a non-self-exemplifying property exists, then either it is self-exemplifying or it is not self-exemplifying. If it is self-exemplifying, then it is a non- self-exemplifying property, and thus it is not self-exemplifying: contradic- tion. On the other hand, if it is not self-exemplifying, then it is a non- self-exemplifying property, and it is thus self-exemplifying: contradiction. Since the assumption that the property exists leads to an unsustainable logical situation, the property does not exist. Our initial experience of it – i.e., the intentional act of which it was the intentional object – has been corrected by a further experience, and the property has gained the status of a non-entity (which, however, does not preclude its being an intentional ob- ject). If, on the contrary, the experience of an ideal object undergoes no such correction and is thus included in the total harmonization of intersubjective experience, then the object is abona fideentity.

Thus, when we say that for Husserl real objects exist in time while ideal objects do not, this is the meaning we should attach to the word ‘exist’. On the other hand, having or not having a temporal location is for Husserl also part of the noematic sense of both real and ideal intentional objects

– regardless, that is, of their ontological status. A hallucinated object, for example, is intended as having a temporal location even though, in reality, it has none. Non-existent ideal objects, such as the property of being a non-self-exemplifying property, are different in this respect: they lack a temporal location in principle, and thus have none even in their noematic sense.

1.5

Summary

The task of this chapter was to clarify Husserl’s view about essence, thereby illuminating part of his essentialist account of necessity.

The most important concepts are those of (genitive) essence, (pure) uni- versal and truth about essence.

The essence of an object is the collection of the universals which the object has to instantiate or bear if it is to instantiate, or bear, a further, pre-given universal. Universals, in turn, are instantiable ideal objects.

An essentialist truth about an object-cum-universal aG states that, if a

instantiates or bearsG, then it must also instantiate or bear other universals, the collection of which is its essence. This is expressed by (4*), which, in turn, is a particular case of (2*), i.e., of the general principle governing the relations between predication on the one hand, and instantiation and bearing on the other.

The first two notions, presented in Sections 1 and 2, are strictly Husser- lian. The third was formulated, also in Sections 1 and 2, on the basis of (2*), which, although it is not strictly Husserlian, in Section 3 was shown to be

entailed by Husserl’s original account of predication.

All this raises a number of issues. Some of these were discussed in Section 4. In Section 4 I also presented Husserl’s view about the ontological status of universals and ideal objects in general, as well as his particular brand of idealism.

The Account of Necessity