PRIMERA OPCIÓN DE CIERRE DE TAPAS

Crimpro Evidence

SpecPro (No cases)

RULE 57: ATTACHMENT

SECURITY PACIFIC v AMELIA TRIA-INFANTE Facts: Anzures filed a complaint against Villaluz for violation of BP 22. Anzures filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Preliminary Attachment praying that pending the hearing on the merits of the case, a Writ of Preliminary Attachment be issued ordering the sheriff to attach the properties of Villaluz. The Writ was issued upon the posting of a bond duly approved by the court. The sheriff attached certain properties of Villaluz, which were duly annotated on the TCTs.

The RTC acquitted Villaluz of the crime but held her civilly liable. CA affirmed. Villaluz elevated case (GR 106214) to SC and during its pendency, posted a counter-bond issued by petitioner Security Pacific Assurance Corp. On the same day, she filed an Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment. The SC affirmed CA decision.

Anzures moved for execution, RTC issued a Writ of Execution. Sheriff tried to serve the writ upon Villaluz, but the latter no longer resided in her given address. Sheriff sent a Notice of Garnishment upon Security Pacific by virtue of the counter-bond.

Security Pacific refused to assume its obligation on the counter-bond it posted for the discharge of the attachment. Anzures filed a motion to proceed with the garnishment, which was opposed by Security Pacific contending that it should not be held liable on the bond. RTC granted.

Security Pacific filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, contending that respondent Judge and sheriff committed grave abuse of discretion and grave errors of law in proceeding against it on its counter-attachment bond, despite the fact that said bond was not approved by the SC and that the condition by which said bond was issued did not happen. CA dismissed.

While the case was pending with the SC, Anzures executed a Memorandum of Understanding, stipulating the total amount garnished from Security Pacific as well as the remaining amount sought to be executed. Security tendered and paid the amount of P300k upon signing and the balance of P658k was to be paid in installments. There was a provision in the MOU which states that the “this contract shall not be construed as a waiver or abandonment of the appellate review pending before the SC and that it will be subject to all such interim orders and final outcome of said case.”

Before the SC, Security seeks to escape liability by contending that the writ of attachment against the real properties of Villaluz was not discharged (no court order of discharge in GR106214) and hence, its liability did not accrue. Anzures, on the other hand, asserts that the filing of the counter-bond by Villaluz had already ipso facto discharged the attachment on the properties and made the petitioner liable on the bond.

Issue: Whether the attachment was ipso facto discharged by the mere filing of the counter-bond in court - YES

Ratio: Under the Rules, there are 2 ways to secure the discharge of an attachment. First, the party whose property has been attached or a person appearing on his behalf may post a security. Second, said party may show that the order of attachment was improperly or irregularly issued. The first applies in this case. It should be noted that in the resolution of GR 106214, the SC permitted Villaluz to file a counter-attachment bond and required the private respondents to comment on its sufficiency. It is quite palpable that the necessary steps in the discharge of an attachment upon giving the counter-bond have been taken. To requires a specific order for the discharge when the SC had already declared that Security is solidarily bound with Villaluz would be mere surplusage.

Although the SC ruled in Besile Investment that the mere posting of a counterbond does not automatically discharge the writ of attachment, since this needs hearing and order, the SC in this case had already virtually discharged the attachment after all the parties were heard on the matter in a previous resolution.

TORRES V. SATSATIN

Facts: The siblings Sofia Torres (Sofia), Fructosa Torres (Fructosa), and Mario Torres (Mario) each own adjacent 20,000 square meters track of land. In 1997, Nicanor Satsatin (Nicanor) asked petitioners’ mother, Agripina Aledia, if she wanted to sell their lands. After consultation with the siblings, Agrapina agreed to allow Nicanor to sell the properties for them. They authorized Nicanor, through a Special Power of Attorney, to negotiate for the sale of the properties.

Nicanor offered to sell the properties to Solar Resources, Inc. (Solar). Solar allegedly agreed to purchase the three parcels of land, together with the 10,000-square-meter property owned by a certain Rustica Aledia, for P35,000,000.00. Nicanor was supposed to remit to them the total amount of P28,000,000.00 or P9,333,333.00 each to Sofia, Fructosa, and the heirs of Mario.

Despite the fact that Solar has already paid the entire purchase price of P35,000,000.00 to Nicanor, has only remitted the total amount of P9,000,000.00, leaving an unremitted balance of P19,000,000.00.

Despite repeated verbal and written demands, Nicanor failed to remit to them the balance of P19,000,000.00.

Nicanor allegedly acquired a house and lot at Vista Grande BF Resort Village, Las Piñas City and a car, which he registered in the names of his unemployed children.

The siblings then filed a Complaint for sum of money and damages, against Nicanor and his unemployed children. They also filed an Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment, alleging among

other things: that respondents are about to depart the Philippines.

Thereafter, the RTC issued a Writ of Attachment dated November 15, 2002, directing the sheriff to attach the estate, real or personal, of the respondents.

On November 19, 2002, a copy of the writ of attachment was served upon the respondents.

On the same date, the sheriff levied the real and personal properties of the respondent, including household appliances, cars, and a parcel of land located at Las Piñas, Manila.

On November 21, 2002, summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served upon the respondents.

On the same day respondents filed their answer, they also filed a Motion to Discharge Writ of Attachment claiming that there was irregularity in the issuance and implementation of the writ of attachment.

Issue: Was there irregularity in the issuance and implementation of the writ of attachment?

Held: YES. There was irregularity in BOTH the issuance and implementation. With regard to the implementation, every bond should be accompanied by a clearance from the Supreme Court showing that the company concerned is qualified to transact business, which is valid only for thirty (30) days from the date of its issuance. However, it is apparent that the Certification issued by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) at the time the bond was issued would clearly show that the bonds offered by Western Guaranty Corporation may be accepted only in the RTCs of the cities of Makati, Pasay, and Pasig.

Therefore, the surety bond issued by the bonding company should not have been accepted by the RTC of Dasmariñas, Branch 90, since the certification secured by the bonding company from the OCA at the time of the issuance of the bond certified that it may only be accepted in the above-mentioned cities. Thus, the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when it issued the writ of attachment founded on the said bond.

With regard to the implementation, the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages: first, the court issues the order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant.

In this case, the trial court had not acquired jurisdiction by serving summons upon the respondents prior to or simultaneously with the implementation of the writ of attachment as required by the rules of

court. The trial court validly issued the writ of attachment on November 15, 2002, which was implemented on November 19, 2002, it is to be noted that the summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served only on November 21, 2002.

INSULAR SAVINGS V. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Far East Bank and Trust Company instituted an Arbitration case against Insular Savings Bank. The dispute involved 3 unfunded checks with a total value of P25.2M. The checks were drawn against Far East Bank and were presented by Insular Bank for clearing.

Insular Bank’s account with Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC) was credited with P25.2M. When Far East Bank returned the check beyond the reglementary period, Insular Savings refused to refund the money to Far East Bank. Pending arbitration, Far East Bank instituted a civil case praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. RTC granted the application for preliminary attachment upon posting by Far East Bank of an attachment bond of P6M. Bond posted and attachment issued. In one of the arbitration hearing, the banks agreed to divide between them the disputed amount (P12.6M) while the dispute has not yet been resolved. Later on, Insular Savings filed a motion to discharge attachment by counter-bond in the amount of P12.6M, which was denied by the court. MR denied as well. Petition for certiorari to the CA was denied as well ALTHOUGH CA acknowledged that RTC judge erred in his order that the counterbond should be P27.2M because he erroneously included unliquidated claims, such as actual and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation. MR denied.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erroneously denied Insular Savings Bank’s motion to discharge attachment by counterbond in the amount of P12.6M Held: Yes. Insular Savings Bank wins.

The amount of the counter-attachment bond is to be measured against the value of the attached property, as determined by the judge to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching creditor may recover in the action. Without necessarily diminishing the sound discretion of the issuing judge on matters of bond approval, the counter-bond should as much as possible correspond in value to, or approximately match the attaching creditor’s principal claim. Excessive attachment should be avoided.

In the case at bar, the records show that the principal claim is in the amount of P25.2M. However, before the Arbitration Committee of PCHC, the parties agreed to equally divide between themselves, on a temporary basis, the disputed amount, subject to the outcome of the arbitration proceedings. Therefore, Far East Bank’s principal claim against Insular Savings prior to the filing of the motion to discharge attachment has been pruned down to P12.6M.

Accordingly, the trial court should have allowed a total discharge of the attachment on a counterbond in the amount of P12.6M based on the reduced claim of Far East Bank. If a portion of the claim is already secured, there is no justifiable reason why such portion should still be subject of counter-bond.

Section 12 of Rule 57 provides that the court shall order the discharge of attachment if the movant

“makes a cash deposit, or files a counter-bond . . . in an amount equal to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment, exclusive of costs.”

YU v. NGO TE FACTS:

- Spouses Gregorio and Josefa Yu (Spouses Yu) purchased from Ngo Yet Te (Te) bars of detergent soap worth P594,240.00, and issued to the latter three postdated checks as payment which were subsequently returned dishonored and stamped

“ACCOUNT CLOSED”.

- Te demanded payment from Spouses Yu but they refused. Te filed with the RTC a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment.

- In support of her prayer for preliminary attachment, Te attached to her Complaint an Affidavit executed by Sy that Spouses Yu were guilty of fraud in entering into the purchase agreement for they never intended to pay the contract price, and that, based on reliable information, they were about to move or dispose of their properties to defraud their creditors.

- Upon Te’s posting of an attachment bond, the RTC issued an Order of Attachment/Levy on the basis of which the Sheriff levied and attached Spouses Yu’s properties in Cebu City consisting of one parcel of land and several vehicles.

- Spouses Yu filed an Answer with counterclaim for damages and an Urgent Motion to Dissolve Writ of Preliminary Attachment. They also filed a Claim Against Surety Bond in which they demanded payment from Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation (Visayan Surety), the surety which issued the attachment bond representing the damages they allegedly sustained as a consequence of the wrongful attachment of their properties.

- RTC issued an Order discharging from attachment some of the vehicles on humanitarian grounds but maintained custody of the land and the passenger bus. Spouses Yu filed a MR, which the RTC denied.

- CA: The writ of preliminary attachment issued by the respondent court was improvidently issued and should be discharged.

- Te filed a Motion for Reconsideration but to no avail. Te filed with the SC a Petition for Review on Certiorari but was denied. Thus, the finding of the CA on the wrongfulness of the attachment/levy

of the properties of Spouses Yu became conclusive and binding.

- However, the RTC, apparently not informed of the SC Decision, rendered a Decision in favor of Te ordering Spouses Yu to pay the former and saying that “On the counterclaim, this Court declines to rule on this, considering that the question of the attachment which allegedly gave rise to the damages incurred by the defendants is being determined by the Supreme Court.”

- Spouses Yu filed with the RTC a MR questioning the disposition of their counterclaim. RTC said that nowhere in the decision of the Supreme Court and for that matter, the Court of Appeal’s decision which was in effect sustained by the High Court, contains any ruling or directive or imposition, of any damages to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendants. The RTC also denied their 2 Notices of Appeal.

- Spouses Yu filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, which was granted. They also questioned the RTC Decision declining to rule on their counterclaim for damages.

- CA affirmed in toto the RTC Decision but made a ruling on the counterclaim of Spouses Yu by declaring that the latter had failed to adduce sufficient evidence of their entitlement to damages. They filed a MR but was denied. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE: W/N the writ of preliminary attachment was procured in bad faith entitling Spouses Yu to damages.

HELD/RATIO: NO! To merit an award of actual damages arising from a wrongful attachment, the attachment defendant must prove, with the best evidence obtainable, the fact of loss or injury suffered and the amount thereof. Such loss or injury must be of the kind which is not only capable of proof but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty.

As to its amount, the same must be measurable based on specific facts, and not on guesswork or speculation. In particular, if the claim for actual damages covers unrealized profits, the amount of unrealized profits must be estalished and supported by independent evidence of the mean income of the business undertaking interrupted by the illegal seizure.

Spouses Yu insist that the evidence they presented met the foregoing standards. They point to the lists of their daily net income from the operation of said passenger bus based on used ticket stubs issued to their passengers. They also cite unused ticket stubs as proof of income foregone when the bus was wrongfully seized. They further cite the unrebutted testimony of Josefa Yu that, in the day-to-day operation of their passenger bus, they use up at least three ticket stubs and earn a minimum daily income of P1,500.00.

Spouses Yu’s claim for unrealized income of P1,500.00 per day was based on their computation of their average daily income for the year 1992. Said computation in turn is based on the value of three ticket stubs sold over only five separate days in 1992. By no stretch of the imagination can we consider ticket sales for five days sufficient evidence of the average daily income of the passenger bus, much less its mean income. Not even the unrebutted testimony of Josefa Yu can add credence to such evidence for the testimony itself lacks corroboration. Moreover, petitioners did not present evidence as to the damages they suffered by reason of the wrongful attachment of the land.

Nonetheless, the SC recognized that Spouses Yu suffered some form of pecuniary loss when their properties were wrongfully seized, although the amount thereof cannot be definitively ascertained.

Hence, an award of temperate or moderate damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is in order.

RULE 58: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

UNIVERSAL MOTORS CORPORATION vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO G. ROJAS, SR.

Facts: Universal Motors Corporation (UMC) is the exclusive assembler and distributor in the Philippines of Nissan light commercial vehicles and spare parts. It maintains a network of authorized dealers who purchase vehicles and spare parts from UMC and resell them in specified territories in the country. One of UMC’s dealers was Nissan Specialist Sales Corporation (NSSC) which ordered from UMC vehicles and spareparts worth P5,476,500.00. NSSC issued several postdated checks in favor of UMC to pay for the purchases. The checks, however, were dishonored due to insufficient funds. UMC demanded payment but NSSC repeatedly failed to comply.

Hence, UMC stopped transacting with NSSC, although NSSC still remained as dealer. UMC later appointed Nissan Cagayan De Oro Distributors, Inc.

(NICAD) to co-exist as dealer with NSSC to meet the market demand in Northern Mindanao. In October 2001, because of NSSC’s continued failure and refusal to pay its obligation, UMC terminated its dealership agreement with NSSC. It also filed a criminal complaint for violation of B.P. No. 22 and/or estafa against the officers of NSSC.

On February 2002, NSSC filed a Civil Case for breach of contract against UMC and its officers and NICAD and its officers. The case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge Rojas, Sr. On March 1, 2002 Judge Roxas issued an order setting a summary hearing on March 7, 2002 on the propriety of the issuance of a TRO. But it was only on March 6, 2001 that the NSSC amended its original complaint to include a prayer for TRO.

Judge Rojas granted TRO against UMC, NICAD and their respective officers, essentially enjoining UMC from transacting with NICAD and to stop NICAD from continuing sell, deal and market motor vehicles and spare parts of Nissan. NSSC filed an Urgent Motion to

Judge Rojas granted TRO against UMC, NICAD and their respective officers, essentially enjoining UMC from transacting with NICAD and to stop NICAD from continuing sell, deal and market motor vehicles and spare parts of Nissan. NSSC filed an Urgent Motion to