PRIMEROS DATOS

Experts on the culture, history, and politics of Korea and East Asia would mostly agree that Korea has a strong ethnic nationalism (Shin 2006), whether it is South or North (Armstrong 2003; Hart 1999), before the Japanese annexation of Korea (Schmid 2000, 2003; Duncan 1998) and during the Japanese colonial rule (Em 1999), through the state apparatus (Moon 2005), even in the student movements (Abelmann 1996; Lee 2007a; Grinker 1998) and labor movements

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(Koo 2001) that lead to Korean democratization. Ethnic nationalism has been expressed and maintained by the Korean legal system even in ways that discriminate against foreigners, migrant workers, adoptees, and expatriates (Kim 2015a). This seems to be because Korean intellectuals, especially historians, accepted ethnic nationalism before Japan colonized Joseon in 1910 even before a nation-state had been formed in the Korean peninsula.⁴⁶ This ethnic nationalism, which began with the belief that Koreans are descendants of the mythical King Dan-gun,⁴⁷ continued in the Korean peninsula and abroad through the independence movements during the colonial period. After liberation, the subjects taught in school, including history, social studies, Korean, as well as morals, based on ethnic nationalism were incorporated into a formal curriculum. Many cultural products based on ethnic nationalism - songs, novels, movies, radio shows, TV

programs, and plays - were created. Nationalist researchers also pay attention to the unique homogeneity of the Korean nation and the robust ethnic nationalism that arose from it.⁴⁸ A comprehensive study of Korean nationalism (Shin 2006) most recently defined Korean nationalism as ethnic nationalism.

Critical researchers on Korean nationalism argue that the state-centered nationalism of Korea was formed from social Darwinism which was most influential when Koreans first studied Western ideas and the pre-modern notion of state (Park 2005). Some assert that such

46 For example, Sin Chae-ho, who is regarded as the father of Korean historians, was well known for his existentialist historical view. For Sin Chae-ho and his creation of Korean nation, see Em (1999). Since it was published, Kim (1989) provides the most extensive development of the nationalist idea in the late Joseon dynasty. For the growth of modern ideas in intellectual society in the same period, see Schmid (2003). Not only official history in Korea but also many dissident historians have shared this ethnic nationalist view and some continue to do so.

47 Dan-gun has been believed to have established ancient Joseon, dating back to 2,333 BC. According to Samgukyusa, one of the oldest history books written in the 13thcentury, the god of heaven, Hwanin, decided to send one of his sons, Hwanwoong, to Backdu mountain with 3,000 followers and the gods of wind, rain and cloud. A tiger and a bear visited Hwanwoong and asked him to change them into humans. Hwanwoong gave them cloves of garlic and bundles of mugwort, saying they would become humans if they could feed themselves only with the garlic and mugwort for 100 days in a cave. Only the bear could obey and became a beautiful woman. She became the wife of Hwanwoong and their first son, Dan-gun, later became the founder of ancient Joseon. Until 1961, the Republic of Korea officially used Dan-gi, which begins from 2,333 BC, to number years. “The descendants of Dan-gun” is still used as the most obvious expression that the North and the South are connected to each other.

48 Hobsbawm (1990, 66) points out this homogeneity. Many of the Korean nationalism and discourses around unification assumes this homogeneity. On the discourse on unification, see Grinker (1998).

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centered nationalism is reinforced from the Park Chung-hee era by militarily styled organizations, such as schools under the mandatory education system, the conscript army, factories organized and managed by nearly military discipline, Bansanghoe (neighborhood associations) and the Saemaeul Movement, social organizations at every level of society (Moon 2005). Others argue that even the dissident movements are not exceptional in this militaristic culture and organizing method (Lim 1999, 2000, 2004). Another criticism of ethnic nationalism arises from the view represented by the so-called New Right and spoken of approvingly by the mainstream media, that Korean history and political tradition stand against Korean liberal democracy. This tends to grant legitimacy to North Korea, which shares blood with the South, but was excessively influenced by leftist ethnic nationalism during the democratization. It is clear that the major criticism of nationalist researchers is directed toward the state, elites and intellectuals who have created a powerful state-centered, exclusive, and militaristic nationalism.

On the other hand, the New Right and conservative mainstream media appear to not be interested in criticizing state-centered nationalism but only seem particularly critical of the ethnic

nationalism that feels affinity to North Korea. In other words, anti-nationalist researchers criticize the fact that Korean nationalism centered on the state rather than universal values, such as freedom, equality, and human rights, and that the people should be sacrificed — especially in their economic plight – for the values proposed by the state while the New Right, which emerged in the 2000s, and mainstream journalism criticize the progressive camp that puts the value of the nation first over anything else. Although almost all of these anti-nationalist researchers not only oppose state-centered nationalism but oppose nationalism itself, some of the South Korean leftist nationalist groups criticized by the mainstream media and New Right have more emphasis on universal values than unconditional ethnic nationalism. At this point, can we define Korean nationalism as ethnic nationalism or civil nationalism?

The question whether Korean nationalism is ethnic or civic was intensified when the New Right emerged in the early 2000s and the conservative media began calling anyone who opposed them and the ruling class a leftist nationalist who denies liberal democracy.⁴⁹ The New Right labelled themselves as “the advancement group” (seonjinhwa group), positioning themselves

49 The introduction of New Right in conservative media was begun by Donga Ilbo, providing the New Right’s idea and blue print for the future in a series of columns.

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between the failed populist democratic camp and the past-oriented and statist “old right.”⁵⁰ They claim that they adhere to the market economy and democracy while they criticize contemporary government leaders as being like North Korea in that they try to reach out to the public directly, ignoring laws and institutions. They also differentiate themselves from the “old right,” which has long been regarded as symbol of “privilege, corruption, irrationality, opacity, favoritism, and collusive link between politics and business.”⁵¹ They claim that they are a liberal and future-oriented right whereas the old right is stagnant and past-future-oriented. One of the most impressive activities of the New Right is their attack on the progressive or democratic camp for their

anachronistic [ethnic] nation-centered view of history. They think this nationalist view of history is dangerous for Korean society. First, the nation-first view of history can easily make Koreans have a negative view of their own history. Since nationalist tend to give credit only to the politicians and intellectuals who helped to try to build unified nation, they often disparage most of political leaders and intellectuals who collaborated during the colonial period or who tried to build an independent South Korea as they made North Korea as an enemy after the liberation.

New Right believes that nationalists do not appreciate the achievement of Korean political leaders, the founders of the Republic of Korea, who relentlessly had tried to defend the independence and liberal-democracy from the threats of North Korean communists, and the leaders like Park Chung-hee who had accomplished the great task of economic development.

Second, the same view can lead to blindly worshipping the value of North Korea in its efforts to preserve its self-reliant nationhood. According to them, these so-called minjung historical perspectives, widely shared by progressive and democratic groups, condemn the great former presidents of Korean history who have protected liberal democracy against the communists’

threats and built the foundation for the prosperity that present-day Koreans enjoy. In other words, they criticize that the nationalist or minjung view of history as being insufficiently critical of North Korea because it shares blood ties with the South, while it is too critical of the past leaders

50 Sin Jiho, “Future should be led by Liberalism,” Donga Ilbo, Nov. 22, 2004. It is not surprising that Sin used the term “advancement group,” which reminds us leftist term “vanguard” (jeonwi) since many leaders, including Sin, who launched the New Right were former leaders of student movements in the 1980s, mostly in the National Liberty camp. Most terms, tactics and rhetoric that the New Right uses, therefore, can be seen as appropriation of those of student movements.

51 Ibid., Donga Ilbo, Nov. 22, 2004.

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who have defended liberal democracy and enabled economic prosperity despite their failure to achieve national unification. Thus, although the New Right seems to have a greater estimation of liberal democracy and the market economy, in fact it values anti-communism and economic development over anything else. Greed seems to be the ideology that captures New Right. They are state-centered nationalists to the degree that they need a state to achieve the economic prosperity that only the state can. But a correct view of history is only possible if people recognize the full importance of the leaders that have made it possible.

Even though this reappearance of nationalism or conservatism after globalization is not a unique phenomenon, as it is seen in the emergence of Tea Party in the US, the National Front in Europe, and the reemergence of nationalist discourses in other East Asian countries, Korea's New Right is distinct in that it promotes state-centered nationalism while they strongly oppose to ethnic nationalism and claim they are promoting liberal democracy. First, the so-called “new right” seems oblivious of the fact that they largely share the ideas of nationalist discourses elsewhere. This is partly related to the fact that nationalism is misunderstood and used in a variety of ways in Korea, according to how the concept of nationalism is translated into Korean.

Nationalism was first translated as “minjokjuui” (mizokushugi in Japanese, minzuzhuyi in Chinese) when Japanese intellectuals first learned Western ideas. The term was used to refer to nationalism in Chinese literary culture. “Minjok” (minzoku in Japanese, minzu in Chinese), however, has been used to refer to a community that shares cultural commonality, such as blood, language, custom, or religion. For Korean (and Japanese and Chinese), the term “minjok” itself and its cognates, therefore, can hardly bear the meaning of citizens sharing the same legal and political duties and rights or the members of a nation-state. Of course, in scholarship the

multifaceted sense of the original term for nationality and nationalism is well understood, but in general usage, its civic aspect is often overlooked. People can deny that they are nationalists when they are not talking about the ethnic aspects of Korea, even when emphasizing the peculiarities and superiority of Korea, just as typical nationalists do. The peculiarity and superiority of Korea that they praise seems to be not in Koreans but in the Korean state and the leaders of the state. It should also be mentioned that the difference between the official

nationalist discourse and the counter-hegemonic discourse in Korea may be much smaller than what people commonly think. They may differ as to whether they prefer ethnic Korea or the

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Korean state. However, they both agree to reify the nation as a group, acknowledge its particularity, and confirm the superiority of the group over individuals.

Is Korean nationalism civic or ethnic? Before we answer this question, it is once again worth emphasizing that there is a state-oriented nationalism such as the New Right, as we have seen. The existing dichotomy of civil and ethnic nationalism seems to be inappropriate to explain and analyze this nationalism of Korea. I will discuss below how to go beyond this civil and ethnic nationalism.