PRINCIPALES ÁREAS DE LA INDUSTRIA A EVALUAR

Turkey’s relationship with the European Union can be traced back to the end of the 1950s but becoming a member has been ‘interpreted as a necessary counterpart of the westernisation and modernisation drive, which itself has been proclaimed as official state ideology’ since the1960s (Öniş 2003: 17)⁸⁵. Having applied for full membership in 1987 of the then European Economic Community (EEC), it was not until the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 that Turkey’s application as a full member was accepted. This is why the Helsinki Summit is viewed as a ‘turning point’ in EU-Turkey relations, as it created a major arena of change in the contemporary Turkish context, both in the economic and the political realms.

The EU has emphasised the ‘quality of democratisation’, ‘human rights’ and the

‘protection of minorities’ since the 1980s and 1990s (Öniş 2003: 9), and adopted the famous Copenhagen political criteria for its dealings with candidate countries. As Arıkan (2003) has remarked, the enlargement strategy which was set up at the EU’s 1993 Copenhagen Summit identified stability as its major component and enlargement was considered as a factor that could serve as a catalyst to solve the ethnic and nationalist conflicts in Eastern Europe. The Treaty on European Union (in force from 1993) and the Amsterdam Treaty (in force from 1999) made explicit references to principles of democracy and respect for human rights, which became

‘an increasing determinant feature in the EU’s external relations in general and its enlargement policy in particular’ (Arıkan, 2003: 105). According to Smith, the conditionality of the Copenhagen criteria in economic and political realms equipped the EU with ‘a powerful instrument’ for shaping the transition, especially in East and Central Europe (Smith, 2003: 3-4). The attachment of such conditionality to the opening of membership negotiations was reinforced at the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 when Turkey’s accession was frozen due to human rights abuses.

85 Also see Erdemli (2003) for a synopsis of Turkey-EU relations.

When Turkey’s status as a candidate country was accepted at the 1999 Helsinki Summit, it was considered by the EU to display ‘serious shortcomings in terms of human rights and protection of minorities’ although it possessed the basic features of a democratic system (EU, 2004: 165). Although various governments in Turkey have introduced ‘democratisation packages’ since 1991 (Müftüler-Baç, 1998), the scale of reforms that were undertaken after Helsinki summit was unprecedented.

The National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) was adopted on 19 March 2001, and identified the scale of reforms to be introduced. In October 2001, 34 amendments were made in the constitution in order to comply with the Copenhagen criteria. At the beginning of January 2002 a new Civil Code was adopted and an EU adaptation law on human rights was passed in the parliament in August. This law also allowed the use of traditional languages in broadcasting (namely Kurdish), the abolition of the death penalty and advanced the possibility for the use of minority languages in education (Erdemli, 2003). These attempts were completed before the EU’s Copenhagen summit in December 2002. This suggested that if the EU council in December 2004 came to a decision that Turkey had met the Copenhagen criteria, then the EU would start negotiations without further delay.

Despite the conditions attached to the 2004 date, as Aydın and Keyman (2004) have maintained, it created a ‘sense of certainty’ in Turkey-EU relations. Following the summit, four comprehensive sets of democratic reforms entered into force in 2003 that related to freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of association.

Significant amongst the various reforms of 2003 were the changes in the Political Parties law and the lifting of restrictions on the acquisition of property by non-Muslim community foundations. The last package of reforms, entered into force in July 2003, emphasised the ‘civilian control of the military’, as well as consolidating the fight against torture and the exercise of fundamental rights. Another important measure was taken in 2004 with a set of constitutional amendments that included judiciary reforms, the civilianisation of armed forces and freedom of press (Aydın and Keyman, 2004).

In this light, the so called ‘harmonisation’ or reform packages that were introduced up until 2004 were considered to signify ‘a rapid evolution of mentalities’(EU, 2004:

4) in Turkey. Furthermore, it was argued that the Copenhagen political criteria operated ‘like a leverage to make the Turkish modernisation and democratisation more plural, multi-cultural and consolidated’ (Aydın and Keyman, 2004; Öniş, 2003). On the 17th of December 2004, the EU agreed to start negotiations with Turkey in October 2005.

The reform period was divided between two governments, the DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government that won the general elections in November 2002. The conservative and Islamic-based single-party AKP government ended the period of coalitions in Turkey, and is considered to be a strong symbol of political stability. According to Öniş (2003) this was because, before the Helsinki summit, none of the political parties on the left or right had initiated the reforms needed for EU membership. Furthermore, ‘none of the major political parties were able or willing to challenge the fundamental precepts of state ideology on key issues of concern such as ”cultural rights” or the “Cyprus problem”- issues which appeared to lie beyond the parameters of the normal political debate’ (Öniş, 2003: 17).

The AKP’s ability to deliver some of the most controversial reforms is firstly due to its powerful presence as a single party government within the parliament, and secondly because of its fundamentally different outlook on the established parameters of state ideology. However, it also has to be mentioned here that the AKP, which won the general elections in 2007 and is now serving a second term in power, has lost its enthusiasm for Europeanisation reforms. The EU Commissioner for enlargement, Ollie Rehn, noted on the first anniversary of the start of full membership negotiations, that there had been a slow down in the reform process since 2006. He remarked that a 9^th harmonisation package might be needed for

further reforms in areas such as freedom of expression⁸⁶ and labour rights (Milliyet, 3^rd October 2006).

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the official definition of minorities that was stipulated in the Lausanne Treaty, and its subsequent interpretation, continues to obstruct the development and betterment of human rights in some areas, and has generated another area of dispute within EU-Turkey relations. For instance, the annual progress reports produced by the European Commission continue to refer to problems that are faced by Kurdish or Alevi communities in Turkey under the section of ‘human rights and protection of minorities’ even though they are not officially recognised as such. These problems include access to places or worship (Cem evi) for Alevis and education and broadcasting in Kurdish (EU Commission reports, 2005 and 2006). The description of Kurds and Alevis as minorities has been a source of major dispute between the EU and Turkey during the Europeanisation reform period because Turkey bases its minority protection on the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty, which only recognises non-Muslim communities.

According to Oran (2007: 43) the Lausanne Treaty is one of the earliest human rights documents, as it contains some articles that extend certain rights to everyone living in Turkey. However, as he expressed, Turkey has been implementing a

‘narrow definition of minority and using it to limit the applicability of rights in Lausanne and the subsequent human rights treaties’. The principles of Lausanne and

86 One of the most significant problems in this realm is Article 301 of the Penal code, which addresses the offences committed in ‘insulting Turkishness’. This article replaced the former Article 159 of the penal code in 2005, and it continues to create an impasse in Turkey-EU relations (Berkan, 2006). As Amnesty International (2006) has stated, the article has been widely used to prosecute journalists, writers such as Nobel Prize winner Orhan Pamuk, the former editor in chief of Armenian Agos newspaper - Hrant Dink, and other well known intellectuals such as Đsmet Berkan, Murat Belge and Haluk Şahin. Amnesty also maintains that it ‘poses a direct threat to the fundamental rights to freedom of expression’ which contravenes Article 10 of the ECHR and Article 19 of ICCPR, of which Turkey is a party. The EU officers have expressed their concerns about its impact on the future of membership negotiations and have demanded that all the Articles of the penal code in Turkey should be brought in line with EU regulations (Hürriyet, 25^th September 2006). According to the Ministry of Justice, in 2006 there were 835 court cases under Article 301, in which 314 people have appeared in court, and within the first three months of 2007 there was a total of 744 cases in which 189 people stood trial (Hürriyet, 31^st March 2008).

the way Turkish national identity and citizenship is configured were re-evaluated during the Europeanisation reform period by a subcommittee of the Human Rights Consultation under the office of Primer Minister. The subcommittee included Professor Baskin Oran, and published its Minority and Cultural Rights Report in October 2004.

The report argued that the Sevres syndrome should be eliminated and the provisions of Lausanne Treaty implemented correctly and fully. It also recommended the replacement of a monocultural Turkish identity (Türklük, or ‘Turkishness’) with a supracultural identity (Türkiyelilik, of/from Turkey) that could encompass all the other sub-identities in Turkey. The report also suggested that Turkey was violating certain articles of the Treaty and that Turkey’s restrictive attitudes to minorities did not coincide with the contemporary international trends⁸⁷. The most significant aspect of this discussion about the limited implementation of the Lausanne Peace Treaty covers the use of Kurdish language in media outlets. The use of Kurdish language in broadcasting has been made possible by a new set of legal and administrative measures that were introduced for broadcasters in the so-called harmonisation packages. However, as Baskın Oran (2007) and O’Neil (2007) have indicated, Turkey already has obligations under the Lausanne Treaty not to restrict the use of any languages for any Turkish national, which is stated in Article 39/4 thus: ‘No restrictions shall be imposed in the free use by any Turkish national of any languages in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings’ (Oran, 2007: 43)⁸⁸.

According to Oran, the interpretation of this clause highlights three important issues.

87 Professor Baskın Oran was a member and Professor Ibrahim Kaboğlu was the head of the committee. They were charged under Articles 216 and 301 of the Penal code, which stipulates offences ‘inciting the public to commit crimes’ and ‘denigrating Turkishness’ respectively. Both Professors were acquitted of the charges in May 2006 (Bianet, 2005; CnnTurk, 2006). It also has to be mentioned that the government did not give its support to the report and, although the sub-committee functioned under the Prime Ministry, its legitimacy was questioned. The sub-sub-committee was closed down quietly.

88 The full text of the treaty is available at

http://untreaty.un.org/unts/60001_120000/14/30/00027480.pdf

Firstly, all Turkish nationals are free to use any language they choose in public and private spaces; secondly, the expression ‘press’ can be extended to include radio and television because neither media existed in the 1920s; and thirdly, this clause is relevant to those nationals whose mother-tongue is not Turkish (Oran, 2007).

However, at the time of preparations for a new legislative framework that could allow Kurdish broadcasting, these aspects of the Treaty did not appear to have been taken into account. As Chapter 6 will demonstrate, authorities opted for other legislative measures through which broadcasting in different languages could be made possible. This choice can be understood in terms of a general dilemma within the area of minority rights, and Turkey’s particular sensitivity towards recognising national minorities other than non-Muslims.

As the previous chapter demonstrated, human rights instruments such as FCNM and ICCPR grant states a degree of flexibility and room for manoeuvre in terms of defining their national minorities. This is because reaching a consensus on what is considered to be a minority group in different political contexts has not been possible.

However, as Çavuşoğlu explains (2005) there still exists a degree of anxiety over granting ‘collective rights’ to minorities because states fear that it may lead to secessionist claims. This is why international human rights instruments refer to the

‘rights of persons belonging to minorities’ in specific, and it has been made clear in these instruments that minority rights can be enjoyed by members of minority communities but are not construed as collective rights. Furthermore, the emphasis on the notion of ‘protection of territorial integrity’ in all the international human rights instruments endorses the principle that ‘self determination’ is not a part of minority rights.

In this light, in Turkey the notion of ‘territorial integrity’ is of acute importance in formulating minority rights and protection and may explain the reasons behind Turkey’s non-participation in several major international conventions that deal with

minority rights (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997)⁸⁹. As Kirişçi and Winrow (1997: 45) have explained, behind the resistance to recognising national minorities other than non-Muslims lies the notion of protecting ‘the integrity and the indivisibility of the state with its nation’. This notion, as they further explain, is also mentioned in Article 3 of the Constitution (one of the non-changeable articles), and is of utmost importance for the Turkish authorities. Ironically, it also adds weight to the media focus of this thesis because, as Oran (2007: 46) has pointed out, the notion of ‘the integrity and the indivisibility of the state with its nation’ is part of Article 5/A of the Law on Turkish Radio and Television (No.2954); and Article 4 of the Law in the Establishment and Broadcasting of Radio Stations and Television Channels (No.3984)⁹⁰.

Kirişçi and Winrow (1997: 45) further explain that the sensitivity of the principle of

‘the integrity and the indivisibility of the state with its nation’ might be due to the fact that ‘granting certain rights to an acknowledged ethnic or national minority’

might lead to further demands, including ‘calls for secession in the name of self determination’. According to them, Turkish authorities fear that granting cultural rights to one group, such as the Kurds, could incite awareness of a distinct identity among other groups such as the Laz and Circassians. Kirişçi and Winrow’s accounts reflected the situation in 1990s yet, as the discussion in Chapter 6 will demonstrate, this notion and its key position in the way cultural diversity is expressed in the media continued to resonate during the Europeanisation period and left its mark on the way new legislative measures were formulated.

89 However, since Kirişçi and Winrow’s book, Turkey joined several human rights systems due to its increasing integration with the European Union. Yet, as Oran (2007) has maintained, it has been reluctant to change.

90 It is also found in the law on associations, law on political parties and the law on the duties and authority of the police.

Conclusion

This chapter has offered a historical overview of Turkish modernisation since the early attempts in the 19^th century and has focused on the place of minorities in the formation of Turkey’s national identity and citizenship regime. This has shed light on the factors that prompt, limit or enhance expressions of cultural identities in the public realm and media. In doing so, the discussion has accounted for the reasons behind current problems and difficulties in Turkey’s minority relations and the general political and social context within which cultural diversity is experienced in Turkey.

The Chapter has demonstrated that suspicions towards expressions of different identities in Turkey are historically embedded and stem from the turbulent events that dismantled the Empire, as well as from Turkey’s failure to sustain its multi-cultural character. The collapse of the empire left a legacy of traumatic experiences, such as the impact of nationalistic movements among various millets, the loss of non-Muslim populations due to conflict, deportation or international agreements, and the Turkification policies of the Republican period. These experiences were entrenched as ‘taboos’ in the collective memory and, until recently, allowed little room for discussion in public culture. On the other hand, identification of the Kurdish issue as a security and ‘national unity’ concern rendered it difficult to offer an open-minded approach to understanding the social, cultural and economic aspects of the problem.

This chapter has also showed that Turkey’s minority undertakings were in line with the wider practices in the European context during the Cold War, when minority issues were still considered to be a matter of domestic politics. However, post-Cold War developments turned this understanding upside down and, as the institutions of

‘global governance’ and human rights instruments gained more ground, minority protection gained a privileged place in international politics and became a transnational concern.

In the contemporary setting, minority rights and protection in Turkey - as stipulated in the Lausanne Treaty - clearly belongs to an old international framework, namely the League of Nations system. Although Turkey became a member of various international organisations after the Second World War and was a signatory in major international agreements, the founding Lausanne Treaty signed under the League system still forms the basis of its citizenship and minority protection regime. It also continues to shape Turkey’s responses to contemporary human and minority rights instruments.

The changes after the end of the Cold War necessitated a re-evaluation of the older approaches to minority protection in Europe. Despite the lack of consensus over its definition and a clear hesitancy to provide a universal framework, respect for minorities and their rights have become the norm for a democratic European country.

The growing presence of the EU and its transformation into a political and cultural union not only strengthened this norm, but it also set it as a condition for aspiring candidate states. The official reconfiguration of citizenship regimes to these developments has not been so straightforward. Hence, it is against this background that we need to understand the dilemma of modernisation and minorities in Turkey during the Europeanisation process.

The nation building period in Turkey depended on the strict rejection of old religious or ethnic loyalties and aimed to construct a unified, modern, secular nation under a universal citizenship model. Also, due to the legacy of the millet system, Turkey attempted to assimilate the non-Turkish or non-Sunni Muslim elements into the national category. Therefore, recognition of minority rights for those groups not covered by Lausanne has not been welcomed straightforwardly. As this chapter has demonstrated, accommodating cultural diversity within the imagined nation proved too costly and controversial and changes in domestic and international politics influenced the relationship between the state and minorities. It is for these reasons that the factors driving the transformation of national membership, especially the significance of human rights instruments in global governance, have been met with a certain level of resistance. Hence, official definitions of citizenship and historical

taboos have been seminal in shaping the limits of cultural diversity and its expressions.

The reforms that have been introduced since 2001 have highlighted Europeanisation

The reforms that have been introduced since 2001 have highlighted Europeanisation