Figure 3. Map of Cambodia Source: lib.utexas.edu
Closer to home, the involvement of Australians in the post Pol Pot era in Cambodia, under the leadership of the United Nations, known as the United Nations Transitional Authority Cambodia (UNTAC), had some Australian domestic political implications, due to the intimate involvement of the then Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, and the leadership of UNTAC by the Australian military commander, General John Sanderson. UNTAC involved a combination of Australian government elements, including the Australian Defence Force and two contingents of the AFP. It was a largely successful transition, from the turmoil and trauma of Pol Pot, to what is now a peaceful, if not fully-democratic country, and was a feather in the caps of both Gareth Evans and General Sanderson.
U.S. bombing and the Khmer Rouge
The genesis of the situation in Cambodia, lay in the conflation of its French post-colonial past and its proximity to Vietnam, which during the 1960s and 1970s, became engaged in a war with the United States, as part of the Cold War. Cambodia had been plunged into the U.S. war in Indo- China in 1969 when US President Nixon began a secret bombing campaign, codenamed Operation Menu, to attempt to destroy a Vietnamese communist headquarters, which the U.S. claimed had been operating inside Cambodia along the border with Vietnam since 1964, in violation of Cambodian neutrality. The North Vietnamese were operating with the approval of Cambodia’s leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Sihanouk tied to maintain neutrality however, [in] return for a North Vietnamese pledge to respect Cambodia’s frontiers, he allowed Vietnamese communists to operate covertly from bases inside eastern Cambodia.144
Over 200 nights, between March 1969 and May 1970, American B-52 bombers dropped more than 500,000 tonnes of explosives on Cambodia’s countryside. The pilots flew at such great heights they were incapable of discriminating between a Cambodian village and their targets, North Vietnamese supply lines – nicknamed the ‘Ho Chi Minh trail’, which ran inside Cambodian territory down the Vietnam border, to supply Viet Cong fighters guerrillas conducting a guerrilla campaign in the southern Republic of Vietnam.
Up to 500,000 Cambodians were killed, many of them children. The bombings drove hundreds of thousands of ordinary Cambodians into the arms of the Khmer Rouge, an ultra-Marxist organisation, led by Pol Pot, which seized power in 1975, and over the next four years, presided over the deaths of millions of people through starvation, disease and executions. The Cambodian Monarch, Prince Sihanouk, had courted both Moscow and China in an anti-U.S. stance. Despite courting both Beijing and Moscow he was ousted by his former Deputy Prime Minister, General
144https://www.britannica.com/biography/Norodom-Sihanouk. For a detailed explanation of this bombing
campaign please see Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia, Shawcross, W. Simon and Schuster, 1978.
Lon Nol, who took control of the Government. Between 1970 and 1975, Lon Nol and his army, the Forces Armees Nationale Khmer (FANK), with U.S. support and military aid, battled the Khmer Rouge communists for control of Cambodia. Lon Nol was later persuaded to leave Cambodia.
In 1973, the U.S. Congress succeeded in forcing a halt to the bombing of Cambodia, which left FANK without ground or air support. FANK held against the Khmer Rouge until 1975, when the Khmer Rouge took control of Phnom Penh, following daily rocket attacks, which created an estimated two million refugees. Once in control, the Khmer Rouge forced the bulk of the population into the rural areas, and forced them to work for their plan to re-mould Cambodia into a communist rural utopia. They succeeded in killing in excess of one million people by starvation, malnutrition, torture and execution over a four year period.
Vietnam invades Cambodia 1978
Across the border in what was the former Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), in April 1975, the capital city of Saigon, fell and the communist Republic of Vietnam was declared. The Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese forces almost immediately became engaged in conflict over a disputed border, as well as Cold War competition for hegemony between China and the Soviet Union. The Khmer Rouge was backed by China, and Vietnam had moved closer to the Soviet Union 145. This
fighting intensified in 1976 and 1977, but by that time, Australian troops had left South Vietnam.146
In December 1978, a Kampuchean National Salvation Front was established with Vietnamese sponsorship, and, three weeks later, a Vietnamese force, along with some dissident Cambodian allies, invaded the country. These pro-Vietnam forces occupied Phnom on 7 January 1979 causing the remnants of the Khmer Rouge regime flee to sanctuary across the border in Thailand. This was the end of the Khmer Rouge as a government. Large numbers of non-aligned Cambodians also fled to the border camps clustered around the Thai town of Aranyaprathet. This had a significant impact on the newly created Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), particularly Thailand, whose proximity to Cambodia via a shared border, made it a ‘frontline state’ in the Cold War, which was still a very real concern in the region. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia was also seen by ASEAN as a violation of the principle of territorial sovereignty. The Cambodian refugees found themselves pawns in a geopolitical struggle which pitted Thailand
145 Frost, F. (2016). Engaging the Neighbours. Australia and ASEAN since 1974. ANU Press, p. 56. 146 Australian troops commenced their withdrawal from South Vietnam in December 1969, under the
Prime Ministership of Sir John Gorton, following the withdrawal of 25,000 U.S. troops and a plan to withdraw a further 50,000 U.S. troops. Australia’s military commitment to South Vietnam ended in December 1972.
and other ASEAN states, backed by the U.S. against communist Vietnam, which was developing a closer relationship with Soviet Union.147
For over a decade from 1979, the conflict over Cambodia became the dominant political and security problem in South East Asia. Within Cambodia, the Vietnamese-sponsored regime, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), whose dominant leader was Hun Sen, attempted to promote economic reconstruction and its own political consolidation. Vietnam and the PRK regime faced armed opposition from three Cambodian resistance movements, operating on and near the Thai border: the ousted Khmer Rouge (referred to widely as the ‘Pol Pot regime’ after its leading figure); the royalist FUNCINPEC (the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia) led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk; and the republican KPNLF (Khmer People’s National Liberation Front) led by Son Sann.
Vietnam and the PRK also faced opposition from ASEAN, which refused to accept the PRK regime’s legitimacy, and worked to deny acceptance of the regime internationally, and to mobilise support for Vietnam’s withdrawal. A key avenue for ASEAN’s diplomacy was sponsorship of a resolution in the UN General Assembly calling for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of Vietnam’s forces. The first such resolution was adopted on 14 November 1979, and ASEAN continued to gain large majorities in support of similar resolutions for the next decade.
This created a significant dilemma for Australian foreign policy. Loathsome as it was, the Khmer Rouge was seen as the internationally recognised government of Cambodia and Vietnam as an ‘invader’. Responding to domestic concerns in relation to the excesses of the Khmer Rouge, the then Fraser government, via its Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock, announced on 14 October 1980 ‘that Australia had decided on a policy of ‘de-recognition’; he stated that ‘Australia cannot prolong its recognition of such a loathsome regime as that of Pol Pot’.148
This resulted in de facto recognition of the Vietnamese ‘invaders’ by Australia, which created a divergence of views between Australia and its ASEAN allies in South East Asia, which had as its central pillar, non-interference in the affairs of other nations, under the ASEAN doctrine of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). The unfortunate outcome was that ASEAN was providing de facto support to a genocidal regime under the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, a situation by which an increasingly human rights aware Australian public could not abide.
147 The communist victory in Vietnam saw many former members of the South Vietnamese government
and armed forces sent to ‘re-education camps’, where they were held for up to a decade. At the geo- political level China denounced Vietnam’s invasion, and in February-March 1979, launched a limited invasion of northern Vietnam which failed to dissuade Vietnam from continuing its presence in
Cambodia, but which caused substantial economic and social dislocation in Vietnam (Frost 2016, p. 56).
148 Frost, F. (2016), p. 68.
The Australian Government’s change of policy on recognition had responded to domestic opinion but produced some critical reactions from ASEAN, and from China and the US, especially after the May 1981 announcement on recognition policy at international forums. In late May, the policy change was criticised by Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister Sinnatamby Rajaratnam, as one that ‘will certainly damage the foreign-policy interests of Australia, seriously question its credentials as a reliable ally of those who have taken up the Soviet challenge in South-East Asia and bring comfort to the Vietnamese’149
At the time of the ASEAN foreign minister’s meeting in June 1981 in Manila, the Philippines foreign minister described Australia as being ‘recalcitrant’ on the issue, and reservations were also reported to have been expressed by U.S. and Chinese officials. The Australian conservative government of Malcolm Fraser had been replaced in 1983, by the ALP, under Prime Minister Bob Hawke, which in Opposition, had welcomed the Fraser Government’s withdrawal of diplomatic recognition of the Khmer Rouge Democratic Kampuchea. In Government, Prime Minister Hawke and Foreign Minister Hayden decided to explore some options to resolve the Cambodian situation. Prime Minister Hawke wrote in his memoir:
[O]ne of the most important initiatives of my entire prime ministership was our diplomatic effort to help bring about a lasting peace in the tragic, conflict-ridden country of Cambodia…Both Hayden and I were acutely aware of the obstacles ahead. ASEAN had arisen from the instability in Indo-China and the intrusion of the Soviet Union and China into the affairs of the region; its members remained suspicious of Vietnam and the two communist giants. The antagonism between China and Vietnam stretched back a thousand years. Cambodia itself remained sunk in conflict, with an uneasy alliance of forces arranged against the puppet Hun Sen regime. Our knowledge of and closeness to the regional players had its advantages, but understanding the range of their conflicting interests meant that Australia’s diplomacy would have to be deft in the extreme.150
Hayden, as Foreign Minister from March 1983-August 1988, observed:
[t]he aim was to facilitate a process of dialogue leading to a peaceful settlement of the warring inside and near the borders of Kampuchea. I regarded the proposal with some caution. There were a great number of differences between many of these parties and some had large political interests at stake. Australia strolling into this particular pastry shop and upsetting the wares so carefully if unsteadily arranged could well be disastrous.151
On the ground, there was a new form of stalemate. ASEAN had the strength and unity to stand behind Thailand and the Cambodian coalition in their resistance to Vietnam; while on the other hand, Vietnam took comfort from the fact that the situation on the ground in Cambodia was largely in its favour despite resistance to its occupation, especially in the border areas.
149 Frost, F. (2016), p. 61.
150 Hawke, R. quoted in Frost, F. (2016), p. 69. 151 Haydon, W. quoted in Frost, F. (2016), p. 380.
The Australian approach sought a comprehensive solution based on Vietnamese acceptance of a phased troop withdrawal, and an arrangement to facilitate the return of displaced Cambodians which prevented the return of the Khmer Rouge, as well as an act of self-determination in Cambodia itself, all predicated on the universal acceptance that Cambodia should be neutral, independent and non-aligned; and the restoration of normal relations on the part of Vietnam with China, ASEAN and the West.152
By 1988, after five years of diplomatic activity, the efforts to promote dialogue over Cambodia, had raised Australia’s profile as a concerned regional participant, but had produced little result, as the major power blocs maintained their intransigence: the Soviets backing Vietnam, the Chinese backing the Khmer Rouge and the U.S. backing ASEAN. Australia was politically isolated, as it had de-recognised the Khmer Rouge, was neutral on Vietnam and was an active supporter of ASEAN. Frost points out that this isolation stood it in good stead when putting forward its peace initiative in 1989, since the country was clearly not aligned to any of the major powers in their client Cambodian factions.153
In strategic geo-political terms, the stalemate was broken only when European communism collapsed in 1991. The end of the Cold War in Europe, following a ten year Soviet occupation and humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, and the fall of the Berlin Wall in the same year, brought about some profound changes globally, regionally and domestically in Australia and its region. A key catalyst internationally was the impact of President Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev’s speech in Vladivostok in July 1986 introduced a new era of flexibility in foreign relations as the Soviet Union sought to curtail costly foreign involvements. This included the withdrawal of support provided by the Soviet Union to countries such as Vietnam.
This provided the catalyst for some more assertive action by ASEAN to resolve a long-standing regional issue. In July 1988, further negotiations occurred when ASEAN’s largest member, Indonesia, hosted formal multilateral talks among the Cambodian parties, along with the other ASEAN members and Vietnam and Laos.
In July 1989…the Paris International Conference on Cambodia…met for one month and was attended by the four Cambodian factions, the six ASEAN members, the ‘Permanent Five’ members of the UN Security Council (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States), Vietnam, Laos, Australia, Canada, India, Zimbabwe (representing the Non-Aligned Movement) and a representative of the UN Secretary-General.154
152 Frost, F. (2016), pp. 70–71. 153 Frost, F. (2016), p. 72. 154 Frost, F. (2016), p. 73.
Contemporaneously, the surrounding nations in the region including Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and even China were in the midst of an economic boom. This gave added incentive for Cambodians to solve their differences.
The global strategic situation was also changing. The dissolving Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact ended aid, to both their long-standing ally Vietnam, and the PRK, while Thailand and other members of ASEAN concluded that Indo-China was more lucrative as a market-place than as a battle-field. Several attempts were made to negotiate a peace settlement for Cambodia in the 1980s; the most successful were meetings in Jakarta brokered by India and Indonesia.
Called the Jakarta Informal Meetings, (JIMs) they were attended by all four factions, Laos, Vietnam and the ASEAN member states. This was followed by a Sino-Soviet meeting in 1988 which resulted in a thaw in relations between Vietnam and China. Further talks involving Thailand in 1989 produced a key breakthrough in the shape of Vietnam’s offer to withdraw its troops…and agreement to an international peace-monitoring force.
Vietnam, facing a decline in economic and military assistance from the Soviet Union and anxious to extricate itself from Cambodia, announced its withdrawal of combat forces from Cambodia, and in September 1989 declared this process completed. Building on initial suggestions by Prince Sihanouk and U.S. Congressman Stephen Solarz, Australia suggested an enhanced role for the UN in the transitional process which had been initially proposed in November 1989. To avoid:
the power-sharing issue that had confounded the Paris conference, and to constrain the role of the Khmer Rouge, Australia proposed that the UN be directly involved in the civil administration of Cambodia during the transitional period. A UN military presence to monitor the ceasefire, cessation of external military assistance, a UN role in organising and conducting election, and UN involvement in the transitional administrative arrangements would, it was hoped, ensure a neutral political environment conducive to free and fair general elections.155
A departmental task force, under the direction of Evans, drew up a detailed set of scenarios and plans for a UN role in Cambodia, and these papers were presented to a meeting of the ASEAN members, the Cambodian parties, Vietnam and Laos in February 1990. These were then published and became known-because of the colour of the cover-the ‘Red Book’. The issue of Cambodia was a substantial instance where Australia and ASEAN cooperated on a major issue of security and regional concern and achieved a significant outcome.
United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAC) Cambodia 1992–1993
The Australian Foreign Minister Senator Gareth Evans engaged in a re-formulation of a concept originally proposed by Prince Sihanouk and enunciated by US Congressman Stephen Solarz. The
155 Frost, F. (2016), p. 75.
‘proposal envisaged that, instead of a quadripartite power-sharing arrangement, the UN itself would temporarily take over the administration of Cambodia, canton and demobilise the armed forces of the various parties and conduct the election, after which it would transfer power to a new Cambodian government. This was to become the UN Transitional Authority Cambodia (UNTAC).
Overshadowing the entire peace process was the question of the atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge. The term ‘auto genocide’ was diluted to the un-recognisable ‘no-return to the policies and practices of the past’. The compromise to restore peace to Cambodia was the withdrawal of the charges of mass murder, as no provision would be made for war crimes trials or other means of achieving justice. In 1991, the Paris Peace Accords were formally adopted by the UN in New York.
AFP in Cambodia
Thus, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, UNTAC, was created by accord and in May 1992, 10 members of the Australian Federal Police were dispatched to Cambodia. They were stationed at Thmar Puok, and had a patrol area of 2500 square kilometres which was home to approximately 78000 Cambodians in a state of post-conflict shock. The infrastructure was poor and the police along with their international counterparts had to construct many of their own places of accommodation and work from available materials.
The overall role of the contingent was to assist the UN in bringing peace and democratic elections,