Principales políticas de contabilidad (continuación)

the issue has theological undertones too, namely that the nascent Salafi and Wahhabi movements of Egypt and Saudi Arabia criticised the practices at the tombs from a theological perspective. Fourthly, in the age of modernism and increased rationalism, the supernatural and metaphysical associations with the dead were “scientifically and empirically groundless.”53

The next article, “The Cult of Saints and Religious Reformism in Hadhramaut” also published in 1997 appears to be the same aricle, with slight differences. Here, we will only site the points not found in the previous article “The Cult of Saints and Religious Reformism in Early Twentieth Century Hadramawt.”

One important point related to why the world-wide movement to reform the visitation of awliyci’ (besides the geographical distance of Hadramawt from the central islamic lands), is that “the British colonial administration...was anxious to preserve the political and social status quo in the Arabian territories under its sway.”54

Overall, this article arrives at the same conclusions as the above one, holding that the IrshadI movement eventually became “a vitriolic and often indiscriminate campaign against the sada.” Further, it could not affect real change; their efforts ultimately amounted to a “war of words.”55

In a departure from the topic of tomb visits and the IrshadI movement, Knysh authored a brief article on the historiography of the A1 Ba 'Alawl entitled “The Sada in History.” His findings were that “the scarcity of historical

53 “Twentieth Century,” 160.

54 Knysh, “Reformism in Hadramaut,” 204. 55 “Reformism in Hadramaut,” 209.

documentation” makes it difficult to construct a critical history, particularly for the Middle Ages.56 Also problematic was the biases of kinship ties.

About the sayyids, Knysh places doubt on some of three of their major historical claims. The first regards the religious prestige of the first sayyid of Hadramawt, Ahmad ibn Tsa, who is celebrated for his “piety and scholarship, as

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well as...charismatic qualities.”' Knysh argues here that there was a material aspect too. “Ibn 'Isa’s travels across Hadramawt,” Knysh says, “follow [a] pattern [of] buy and donate.” As a result, he soon “acquired the reputation of a...poltical and military leader” with many loyal followers.58 Knysh suggests that ibn 'Isa was “simply buying the loyalties of HadramTs.” 59 He later admits that this suggestion sounds “crude.” Could it be possible that loyalty to Ahmad ibn 'Isa derived from spiritual as well as material means? He does not say. He further criticizes the glossy image of the early sayyids by citing Balfaqlh who discusses a “thorny issue” that would be “embarrassing” for the Al Ba ' Alawi, namely that the people of Tarim did not welcome Ahmad ibn 'Isa and his family with open arms. Rather, they

barred the descendants of.,,Ahmad ibn 'Isa from settling in that great centre of Hadrami learning on account of their Shl'I propensities. According to this story, they were allowed...[into]...Tarim only after disavowing their Shl'I beliefs in favour of the Shafi'i Sunnism which by then predominated among the Hadrami Muslims.60

Knysh is sure to say that this is a “story” that, among historians, is subject to “debate.”61

56 Knysh, “Sada in History,” 215. 57 “Sada in History,” 221. 58 Ibid.

59 “Sada in History,” 221. 60 “Sada in History,” 218. 61 Ibid.

The second point regards the spread of ShafiT Law in Hadramawt. Historians 'Alawl ibn Tahir and Salih ibn Hamid hold that the dissemination of Imam al-ShafiTs knowledge is rooted with Sayyid Muhammad ibn 'All Sahib Mirbat, a major figure in Ba 'Alawl history. The more important issue for Knysh is the sayyids’ “attempts to explain away the severe chronological inconsistencies” with this claim,”62 for another historian, Ba Tahan from Zafar of the second half of the Twelfth Century asserts something to the contrary. He “squarely attributed the honour of spreading Shafi'I \fiqh]..to the Syrian Muhammad b. 'All al-Qal'i (d. 577/1171), who was indeed the author of several works on ShafiT//#/?..”63 Knysh delves into the details of the each camps’ historical evidence, which is, for our purposes, beyond scope.

The third and last assumption that Knysh challenges is the idea that the Al Ba 'Alawl inspired the first Sufi tariqa in Hadramawt. “[S]dda literature gave the credit for spreading Sufi doctrines in Hadramawt to Muhammad b. 'All ah'Alawl, alias al-Faqih al-Muqaddam or al-Ustadh al-A'zam.”64 Ba Tahan disagrees and holds that it was a shaykh from Zafar, Shaykh Sa'd al-Zafari, who was “the spiritual master and confidant of al-Faqih al-Muqaddam.”65 Sayyid historians do not deny a connection, but “flatly reject” the suggestion that he was al-Muqaddam’s master. Again, the author discusses some details into which we cannot delve here.

In Knysh’s concluding assessment,

sada historians seem to be driven by clear clannish agenda, which

lies in establishing the priority of the sada, inall fields of religious learning. It is in accord with this agenda that they carefully

62 “Sada in History,” 220. 63 “Sada in History,” 219. 64 “Sada in History,” 220. 65 Ibid.

filtered historical evidence, discarding facts which did not fall into the scida-domhmt&d conception of Hadrami history.66

Given the vastness of the Ba 'Alawi family in terms of numbers throughout the centuries, it is not far-fetched that somewhere in their history there would be those who over-extended the reach of the sayyids and denied others any involvement. Ultimately, Knysh’s article seeks to present evidence to this effect.

The fifth and last article in our look at Alexander Knysh’s studies on the A1 Ba ’Alawi is “The Tariqa on a Landcruiser: The Resurgence of Sufism in Yemen,” so called due to the main subject of the article—Habib 'Umar bin Salim bin Hafiz—and his “travelling across the country in a new Toyota Landcruiser and giving fiery public sermons and lectures at every stop.”67 The article examines “how the relatively free political atmosphere of the post-unification period has given rise to intensive public debates over the country’s future and religio-political identity.”68 What role do the Ba 'Alawi sayyids have in it?

As a preface to this, the nationalistic discourse of the early Twentieth Century (which we saw in the articles above with al-Yafi'I and Ba Kathlr) has been “supplanted by discourses that were couched in religious idiom.”69 The three main parties striving for the embetterment of Yemen are now the Zaydis, the Salafis, and the Sufis, with the article focusing on the latter two.70 The “SalafTs” include at least three sub-divisions, namely those with more Saudi leanings termed by their opponents as “Wahhabis,” those with Brethren leanings, i.e. the Muslim Brothers or I k h w d n, and lastly those who are somewhat less rigid in their definition. These may be the majority, who are loosely organized around mosque study circles at the grass-roots level. Geographically, the Salafis of Yemen can be

66 “Sada in History,” 221. 67 Knysh, “Landcruiser,” 406. 68 “Landcruiser,” 402. 69 “Landcruiser,” 403. 70 “Landcruiser,” 402-4.

found in the northern part of the country; politically, they tend to support the Isldh (Reform) Party, the most outspoken leader of which is ' Abd al-Majld al-Zindam.71 On the other side of the religio-political spectrum are the Sufis. “Their opponents describe them as ‘grave worshippers’ (cil-quburiyyuri) and ‘propogators of innovation and superstition (ashab at~bid (ci wa ‘l-khurafaf).”12 To refer to Sufis in Yemen, is mostly, to refer to the Ba 'AlawTs and their followrs. Geographically, their centers are to the south. But Knysh is careful to say that while many beliefs can be clearly outlined on paper,

the membership of all these groups and parties is in many cases informal and the lines between them are not as starkly drawn as it may appear from the ways in which they are portrayed in the Arab and Western press as well as analytical works. In fact, ordinary Yemeni Muslims may occasionally cross these lines without necessarilly being seen as traitors.73

Besides having a strong presence in the Yemeni parliament, Isldh Party, “in many areas, control the nomination of imams of the local mosques.”74 Moreover, many Zaydis lend their sympathies to the Party and are one with Salafis against Sufism. “The sufiyya leaders,” therefore, “find themselves at a very serious disadvantage.”75 But perhaps even more problematic is the Sufis’ “lack of strong

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personalities among its leadership.”

If anything, according to Knysh’s article, this lack is a thing of the past. Most of the rest of Knysh’s article focuses on the “truly charismatic and energetic leader...Sayyid 'Umar b. Muhammad b. Hafiz, poplarly known as Habib 'Umar,” and the movement he has created through his center (Dar al-Mustafa) and high-tech da'wci, which utilizes tapes, radio, television, and the Internet.

71 “Landcruiser,” 404. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 “Landcruiser,” 405. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid.

The religious direction of Yemen is thus varied into the two main paths of Salafism and Sufism. The Salafis, says Knysh, view themselves as the “representatives of Islamic ‘modernity5 [with] a ‘forward-looking, ‘progressive5 interpretation of Islam.5577 Furthermore, they lay the claim to being more global, as their roots lay in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. However, notes the author, this may be a hindrance as well, as thinkers from Egypt or Saudi Arabia are less relelvant to the local Yemeni Muslim. Further, “the Yemeni salafis make relatively little use of the rich legacy of either historical Wahhabism or the reformist programs of Muhammad 'Abduh and Muhammad Rashid Rida...[T]he salafis tend to focus on the reformist condemnation of anthropolatry, grave visitation, Sufism, and

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hereditary privelage.”

The Sufis, says Knysh, have history on their side, in that they can claim authenticity based on the precedent of centuries of Ba 'Alawl Sufism in Yemen. Also, the domed shrines and the visitations throughout the year lend tangible aspects that reinforce thier programme.79 While the sayyids of Yemen place great import upon local cities, they are not, notes Knysh, limited to the local. Their concern for the world outside Yemen, manifested through their use of technology, would refute any ideas of narrowness.

Lastly, Knysh notes how the movement of Habib 'Umar, in terms of its Sufism, differs from what may be found in classical Sufi literature. At Dar al-Mustafa, the author found no works “on Sufi metaphysics, epistemology or allegorical exegesis along the lines of Ibn 'Arabi and his followers.5580 In light of the “highly idealized model of Sufism that Western Islamicists borrowed,55 Habib

77 “Landcruiser,” 412. 78 “Landcruiser,” 413. 79 “Landcruiser,” 412-3 80 “Landcruiser,” 410.

'Umar’s movement’s “affiliation with Sufism...is tenuous at best...The Sufism we observe in real life is often dramatically different from its ideal image dutifully assembled for us by the classics of Sufi literature.”81

To conclude on Knysh’s studies, readers of his articles will possess a good idea of the main intellectual trends that existed in the early Twentieth Century and how they were altered in recent decades into more religious discourses. He has defined the major Yemeni developments in terms of Islamic movements, their ideological underpinnings and political directions. Furthermore, his Sada article offers a basic idea of the milestones of Ba 'Alawi history. Knysh is also a pioneer in studying the revival of Tarhn through Habib 'Umar’s da wa\ more of Knysh’s comments on that will be found in Chapter 7.

CHAPTER 1