PROBLEMÁTICA DE LA CRIANZA Y PRODUCCION DE CUYES

The political arena of both the Middle East and the world underwent rapid changes during the period discussed in this chapter. These changes, particularly given the regime’s legitimacy issues, left Egyptian’s own politics subject to grave consequences. Hosni Mubarak had to contend with strong demand for political reform following the collapse of the Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Even before the invasion of Iraq, the George W. Bush administration employed a heavy-handed democracy promotion’s policy in the Middle East post- 9/11 attacks. The alliance between the American and Egyptian presidents was markedly impacted by these demands, and Mubarak’s yearly visits to Washington ceased. In a further surprising move, Mubarak was seen to leave the room once Bush began to speak at the World Economic Forum, which was held in Sharm el-Sheikh in May 2008 (Osman, 2011, p. 148). Indeed, the unprecedented pressures of the US on Egypt for more democratic opening created an ideal platform for the plight of the Egyptian opposition forces in its struggle against the regime (Xiaoqi, 2012, p. 79).

At the same time, the regime’s foreign policy in this period played a major role in shaking what was left of the regime’s ideological legitimacy. As it was explained in chapters 3 & 4, Sadat and Mubarak had to replace Nasser’s Arab nationalist foreign policy with a policy relying on ‘Egypt-First’ as the top determinant of the country’s foreign policy. This being said, Mubarak in particular was keen on keeping a balanced Arab nationalist tone in the foreign policy, as shown in chapter 4. Although it was clear in the street that Egypt was not the powerful regional player it was under Nasser, Mubarak was relatively successful in the 1980s and 1990s to reflect the image of an ‘internationally- respected’ Egypt to his people. However, the 2000s witnessed major changes in this image causing a significant damage in the regime’s ideological legitimacy that collided with loss in institutional legitimacy to create overall erosion in the regime’s legitimacy.

During this period, a predominant perception that Egypt became helpless in the region, and not influential, even diplomatically, was created. This period saw the rise of non-Arab regional powers on the expense of the Egyptian role in the region. Particularly, Turkey and Iran had taken every opportunity to lead the Middle East. Turkey vitalised its role in the Middle East under the leadership of Erdogan and Ahmet Davutoğlu, the foreign policy advisor and Minister of Foreign Affairs during this period, who established the ‘zero-problems’ policy with neighbouring lands allowing Turkey to focus more on the Middle East. Due to its alliance with the Kurdish Regional Government and central government of Iraq, Turkey steered itself to become highly significant to the Iraqi powers. Furthermore, Turkey has also organised discussions between Syria and Israel and, following the 2010 flotilla event after Israel’s 2009 attacks in Gaza, started to play a part in the Palestinian issue, appearing as a new champion of the Palestinian cause, with all the powerful Arab sentiments that are attached to this cause. Compared to Egypt, Turkey showed itself to be far more effective and opportunistic in taking advantage of a chance to rise within the region, not least of all through the leveraging the discord in Palestine (Pioppi et al., 2011, p. 72). In addition to Turkey’s repositioning, Iran is another state that has worked to raise its status in the Arab world on Egypt’s expense. Whilst Iran was relatively unsuccessful in leveraging delicate topics during the 1980s, an era that marked the height of the exportation of the Islamic revolution, it exhibited far more competence in its more recent attempts through its Islamic rhetoric and strong alliance with Syria, Hezbollah and the Palestinian factions.

Thus, it was evident that other countries – having demonstrated their skill in slipping onto the stage at a time of US interventionism and the globalisation of the economy – had replaced Egypt’s leadership position in the Arab world (Ahmed 2011). Whilst Iran was using the hegemony of the US to present itself as head of a resistance front to Washington and Israel, Turkey was

positioning itself not as an opponent of the US but as a comparable or alternative choice to Egypt for dealing with various problems based on the rapid globalisation and growth of its economy. During the 2000s, Turkey and Iran both achieved the greatest success in their roles in the Middle East. However, whilst Wikileaks cables confirmed that the Bush administration acknowledged Egypt for supporting the US in conflict with Iran, supporting the post-US invasion government of Iraq, and acting as a crucial mediator between Israel and the Palestinians, Egypt was seen by wide sectors of its society as unable to restore its position as a pivotal actor in the Middle Eastern arena (Ahmed, 2011).

The wars of Lebanon 2006 and Gaza 2008/9 were pivotal in transforming Egypt’s foreign policy image from being neutral’ between Israel and the Arabs (as a broker of peace negotiations) to an image of full complicity with Israel against the Arabs. The last two wars between Hezbollah, Hamas and Israel saw Egypt standing unprecedentedly firm, condemning the former two for their accountability in the conflict. Despite Egypt coming under the criticism of both the media and diplomats, as well as facing pressure from major protests outside its overseas embassies, Egypt did not agree to open the Rafah crossing between Sinai and Gaza; a stance that has been depicted particularly by the influential Qatari Al-Jazeera TV as a direct participation in Israeli siege of Gaza. In a television interview with Ahmed Abul-Gheit, the then-Egyptian foreign minister, Abul-Gheit was quoted as saying that Egypt would refuse to budge on its foreign policy, nor would the country allow foreign policy to be influenced by any form of propaganda. However adamant Egypt’s position was, it cost the regime a major loss of ideological legitimacy, with Al-Jazeera TV channel declaring a full propaganda war on the Egyptian regime’s foreign policy, and Hassan Nasrallah, the highly-respected figure among Egyptians, appeared on a televised speech asking the Egyptian army to force the President to open the Rafah Crossing to allow safe passage to the Palestinians in Gaza into Egypt (Shahin 2010, pp.38–39).

Indeed, the impact of the regime’s foreign policy in the 2000s on its ideological legitimacy was profound. As it has been previously explained in the first chapter, foreign policy is crucial to ideological legitimacy. The main theme of the legitimacy deficit at the time was a perception that the regime was risking Egypt’s national security for the sake of securing the approval of the international powers for the tawreeth project. Egypt’s foreign policy was perceived among different elite circles as being harmful to the Egyptian interests and ‘betraying’ the Arab and Islamic identities of Egypt. More importantly, many perceived the status of Egypt in the region as declining and its importance diminishing. According to many activists, politicians and even members of the foreign service, Egypt’s foreign policy was degraded to the level of bluntly serving Israeli and US interests

to the detriment of the Egyptian national interests (Harb 2013; E.S. 2013); for example, one Egyptian diplomat resigned in protest at “unjustified submission” to foreign powers (Negm 2012).

To indicate the loss of ideological legitimacy of the regime to the favour of other Arab and Islamist ideologies, it is sufficient to explore the findings of a poll conducted by the prestigious Egyptian Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies on the most popular figures in the Egyptian street in 2006. The poll found that the most Middle Eastern popular figures in Egypt were as follows: 1) Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah (82%), 2) Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran (71%), 3) Khaled Mash’al of Hamas (60%), 4) Osama bin Laden of al-Qaida (60%), 5) Mahdi Akef of the MB (45%), 6) the Egyptian diplomat Amr Moussa of the Arab League (35%), 7) Marwan al-Bargouthi of Palestine (31%), the Islamic preacher Amr Khaled (30%), 9) the Egyptian opponent politician Ayman Nour (29%), and finally, the Egyptian-Qatari Islamist preacher Youssef al-Qaradawi (28%) (Al-Arab 2009; Elbaz 2006). Among the ten most Middle Eastern popular political figures in Egypt, only two Egyptians were in the list, with none from the government or pro-regime.

Finally, in this context, it could be argued that the personal traits of Mubarak and Gamal played an important role, after 2000, in diminishing the regime’s ideological legitimacy. Indeed, Mubarak’s public presence, especially after 2000, was perceived to be distant, formal and distinctly separate from the public. Mubarak made no genuine human connection with the people, and when thinking of him, one could only picture him attending state affairs and ceremonies (Osman 2011, p.183). Although he was reputed to be a fan of Egyptian folk music and squash matches, the Egyptian public was left at a loss when attempting to understand Mubarak’s character, emotions and thoughts due to his lack of public engagement in such activities (Osman 2011, p.183). Indeed, Mubarak was widely perceived to lack the statesmanship of Nasser and the charm of Sadat. However, he was exemplar in the realms of creating policies and implementing tasks (Osman, 2011, p. 180).

Additionally, Gamal was perceived to be too British to the Egyptian taste. Unlike many people his age, Gamal had been raised as the son of a vice president and, eventually, president. Whilst many of his peers faced difficulties in employment, healthcare, housing, transportation, or education,, Gamal had enjoyed a privileged upbringing. He never positioned himself as a voice of the people, likely understanding that he and they had not shared a similar life experience. Indeed, Gamal presented himself as Western-oriented, somewhat patronising, elitist and aloof: attributes that do not tend to foster widespread public support (Osman 2011, pp.151–152). Furthermore, as Gamal was linked to liberal capitalism, he carried on his shoulders the unpopularity of this ideology in Egypt. Legitimacy was indeed an area of weakness of Egyptian liberal capitalism, a force that

failed to spread beyond the top tiers of society. Liberal capitalism held little weight with the general public compared to Arab nationalism and Islamism, with its lack of legitimacy being personified by Gamal himself. It is true that Gamal demonstrated extreme conscientiousness and solid leadership abilities through his position within the NDP. The younger Mubarak had political tenacity, intellect and drive, as demonstrated through his successful command of the party. However, compared to others of his position in the economic and financial sectors, Gamal’s lack of edge and confident charisma left him unpopular with much of normal Egyptian society (Osman, 2011, p. 151).

In sum, this lack of personal, ideological and institutional legitimacy of the regime made the eudaemonic legitimacy the last resort of the regime to hold itself together. However, the latter was doomed to fail the regime as a consequence of the neoliberal reform of the economy in the 2000s, leaving the regime almost void of any level of coherent legitimacy and vulnerable for collapse under the pressure of the first serious test it will face.