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58 2.2.2 Desmovilización de las AUC y el origen de las BACRIM

2.2.5 Problemáticas de Seguridad en Buenaventura

At this point, it is well to recall that in our discussion of Marx's theory of history it was noted that there is a tension between human

autonomy in shaping its own destiny, in transcending alienation and creat­ ing its own free, human essence, and the dialectical understanding of historical materialism. Marx's thesis is: man creates in relation to

the possibilities inherent in the level of the economic mode and relations of production. Man is therefore both the subject of the historical process as well as the prime agent for historical change, Koren reminds us of Marx's dilemma of deciding between historical necessity and human freedom, i.e., whether the laws of historical development or human initiative and creativity take precedence over the other, in the historical transformation

of nature, society and man, when he says:

Marx’s key statement in this matter is that m an’s produc­ tion of his life is of necessity determined by the development of the material means of production. Is this development of production a physical process governed by laws that can be determined ’with the precision of natural science’? Or is it a development in which man’s freedom plays a role, a history that implies the exercise of contingent human activities? Marx disagrees with Marx in this matter. When he states his funda­ mental perspective, he opts for the former, but when he concretely describes the development of the means of production, he specifi­ cally introduces the human subject with his ideas, will, purposes and intentions. 19

According to Marx, man does not need to seek recourse to any higher agent or power than man himself in order to fulfil his messianic role. To do so would be tantamount to further enslavement. But, as we have already pointed out, dependence upon and subordination to God (’’Infinite Love”) is liberating and not a curb on human initiative. Nevertheless,

there are forms of dependence which Christian theology must reject. For example, Christian theology must reject that form of dependence upon God which has no place for human creativity in shaping the world and one’s own life in it. Dependence upon God does not mean that man is reduced to an instrument or thing. Ironically, in rejecting such a dependence, Christian theology is engaging in a form of "protest” atheism.

From the foregoing discussion, the following conclusion suggests itself: In response to Marx's world-view, Christian theology must therefore exercise a two-fold critical function - on the one hand, denouncing the limited one-dimensional conception of man, and on the other hand, rejecting any conception of the divine-human relationship which is contrary to the dialectic of love.

It should be clear by now that the concept of God which is being advocated here is one in which God is seen as pro—m a n . He is the God of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob ... and of Jesus Christ who is always

acting on man1 s behalf and with whom man can enjoy a relationship characterized by the "dialectic of love". With this concept of God in mind, it would seem reasonable to ask whether Marx would have still propounded an atheistic world-view,- This question gains increased signi­ ficance for a theological response to Marx’s world-view if we accept Koren’s argument that "Marx tacitly assumes Zeus is the typical image of God," Koren adds:

Zeus, however, is a primitive, intraworldly god, a god who is jealous of man’s aspirations for independence and self-sufficiency a god who wishes to keep man in slavery. In the eyes of an

authentic believer such a god is merely a pseudo-god, not the God who transcends the world, 20

The Christian should therefore not hesitate in joining the Marxist in his appreciation of Prometheus, who promotes human self-realization, and in his rejection of Zeus who enslaves man. However, in doing so, the Christian needs to remember that his/her stance is a response to the

transcendent God who has called him/her to "subdue the earth" (Genesis 1:28) It would seem reasonable to argue that Marx might have evaluated religion more positively if he had not conceived of God in terms of Zeus but in

terms of the free, liberating God who acts on man’s behalf, i.e., the God who is transcendent yet immanent, who has called man "to subdue the earth". But we have no conclusive evidence to suggest that Marx would have been less an atheist and a materialist whose view of the world would have been other than anthropocentric. Even if we were to speculate and suggest that Marx could have held a theistic world-view, in which God were seen as the God of the Bible, we must inevitably conclude that his

theistic world-view would have been ultimately transcended by an atheistic world-view - perhaps similar to the one he did in fact formulate. In the former, God would have become m a n ’s agent for humanization and would have therefore eventually rendered himself obsolete when man had attained

to M s "full stature”. We need constantly to remember that Marx's

atheism is inextricably tied to his fundamental assumption that historical materialism and anthropocentric reductionism constitute the dialectic of historical reality.

Let us return to M arx’s one-dimensional conception of man. Here man is reduced to a worker and producer, Koren provides a perceptive critique of Marx's reduction of man to productive activity when he sayss

If man's self-realization is considered to be attained solely through productive work, man's existence is viewed as encom­ passed by being-a-worker. Work, then, is not merely a means of life but the way of life.... Marx, however, through his neglect of the other dimensions of a meaningful existence, practically reduces man to nothing but a worker. Thus the relative value of work is absolutized, which results in a distortion of man's being. 21

In spite of this limitation, Christian theology is confronted with a radical concept of work - the dynamic of praxis. It is with the view to change and transformation that man undertakes to understand history qua universal history. In this understanding, which is always a dia­ lectical process, man is constrained to act, to lead history to the realization of human liberation. Man is involved as both subject and object of the creative and shaping dialectical process of history. But it is man, Marx seems convinced, who will be able ultimately to take the reins of history and lead it to a liberating telos. Man's capacity to both perceive and understand, and act are seen as a unity. This concern with liberation and transformation of the Mst o r i c a l process is succinctly expressed by Donald MacKinnon when he says:

The Marxist is concerned less to understand than to change; his concern with understanding is the concern of a servant

of change, a servant who seeks to grasp the interior dialect­ ical movement of historical events, in order that he may work upon the opportunity which they provide to the effective mastery of their deepest tragedy. 22

argue that "there is a place for Prometheus in our teaching about God," "in our doctrine of evil" and "in the Christian message of grace and .justification," Lochman argues that when it is placed in the right perspective, human praxis is not in conflict with the will of God for man and the world. He adds that praxis for liberation is congruent with

the God of biblical faith [for He} does not intend to keep a man in his place in an ontocratic chains; the God of the exodus and resurrection opens up the way out of all the human captivity, also out of the captivity of death, God is the God of freedom, the liberating God, 24

Consequently, there is a place for Prometheus in Christian theology, i,e., in terms of ma n ’s creative response to God’s command to "subdue the earth", Grace calls to faith active in love. However, when the creaturely response of man becomes separated from the gift of God and is raised to an absolute position so that God is displaced, and man now becomes the centre of his existence and the sole architect of his own destiny, then there is no place for Prometheus in a theology of grace, Grace and human endeavour are not in congruence with each other, but in opposition to each other. Thus the dialectic of love is destroyed. This is precisely what happens in Marx’s Weltanschauung where we find human praxis is removed from the ethical realm - response to God - and made the central means towards human liberation and fulfilment.

This foists an "unnatural" burden upon man. Consequently, man’s work ultimately becomes enslaving rather than liberating. As Peter Hodgson reminds us, concerning Ebeling's sober reflections on the legacy

of the Reformation: "To be free from God would be the deepest bondage, for then we should have to judge and save ourselves, which is an impossi-

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bility," Ulrich Simon writes in the same vein as Ebeling when he sombrely reflects on the message of Auschwitz concerning man, Man, he argues, is made in the divine image, and, hence, to define human freedom

in totally anthropocentric and atheistic terms is a denial of real human freedom, Simon notes that to he made to he like God, though never God,

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places man in "a unique place in the divine economy," However, to argue for man's attainment of his authentic humanity outside of and apart from God, and thereby to make of man some "superman", is futile and

dehumanizing.

The doctrine of the divine superman died at Auschwitz, and with it anthropology as a disguise for theology. The self- exhaltation of man and the definition of reality in exclu­ sively human terms lead to the denial of freedom which obliterates the human image, 27

The promethean mission of man which Marx expounds is premised upon a one-dimensional understanding of man, Man's future is found entirely within history. According to Christian theology, however, man's humanity transcends history for it has a uniquely eschatological dimension that transcends the history of man. It is a history that is inseparable from the grace of God in the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ, This grace has an indispensable eschatological dimension, Lochman writes:

In Christian perspective, the hope of salvation is inseparably connected with the one name of Jesus Christ and with what his name stands for, that is, with the liberating involvement of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, He is the God of the exodus, and the Father of Jesus Christ, His hope of salvation means history; it is, however, not the sum total of that energy and work. It inaugurates an eschatological revolution; it is, however, an eschatological revolution: the possibilities of the Ultimate are not our ultimate possibilities. In one sentence: The hope of our salvation is in the liberating transcendence of God’s grace. 28

There is therefore a diametric difference between Marx's emphasis upon the "absolute" transcendence of human praxis and Christian theology’s confession of the transcendent grace of God, "The emphasis on the trans­ cendence of grace as the final dimension of human life is the essential point in which Christianity and Marxism part their ways in the inter-

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