This argument demonstrated as constructivism warns that rationality is a decision-making goal, to which all international actors aspire, but that it is difficult to determine when the criteria for rational choice have been met. This raises the question- what are the barriers to rationality?
SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2 What is rationality or rational choice?
58
interest and the wisest course of action. Reaching agreement is not easy, however, as reasonable people with different values, often disagree about goals, preferences and probably results of alternative options.
Thus the impediments to rational policy making are not to be underestimated.
Scrutiny of the actual process of decision making reveals other hindrances. Available information is often insufficient to recognise emergent problems accurately, resulting in decision made on the basis of incomplete information. Moreover, the available information is often inaccurate, because the bureaucratic organisations, political leaders, on advice, screen, sort and rearrange it.
Compounding the problem is decision maker’s susceptibility to cognitive dissonance- they are psychologically prone to block out dissonant or negative information and perceptions about their preferred choice, and look instead for information that justified that choice. They are also prone to decisions on the basis of “first impression, or intuition, or that amorphous blending of what is with what could be”. This is what we call imagination even though, there is a great body of data suggesting that formal statistical analysis is a much more better way of predicting everything than intuition, even of experts.
In addition, determining what goals best serve national interests are difficult, especially in the realm of foreign policy, which risks are high and there is much uncertainty. Decision making often revolves around the difficult task of choosing among values, so that the choice of one option means the sacrifice of others. Further, there is seldom a sufficient basis for confidently making choices. Consequently, so many decisions seem to produce bad unintended consequences. People tend to avoid the challenge of searching for option to realise priority goals.
This accounts for the tendency for after the-fact decisions to frequently require later re-evaluation. Decision makers are then disappointed to discover that what they thought was not nearly as valuable as other things are actually important.
There seldom exists a confident basis for making foreign policy decisions. Alongside uncertainty, many decisions tend to produce negative unintended consequences, what economists call externalities. Decision makers’ inability to rapidly gather and digest large quantities of information, constrains their capacity to make informed choices. Because policy makers’ work with overloaded policy agendas and short deadlines, the search for options is seldom exhaustive. In the choice phase, then decision makers rarely make value maximising choices. Instead of selecting the option with the best chance of success, they typically end their evaluation as soon as alternative appears that seems
59
superior to those already considered. Rather than optimising by seeking the best alternative, decision makers are routinely content to choose the first option that meets minimally acceptable standards.
Because they frequently face such difficult choices that make it impossible to choose without compromising competing preferences, often only choices that appear “good enough” and available are selected, costs and benefits are not carefully calculated.
In short, decision makers are prone to rush to judgment. They rapidly estimate whether rival options are good or bad, react to these nastily constructed classifications, and then are content to settle with the relative goods as opposed to the best.
SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 3
What are the impediments to rational decision making?
4.0 CONCLUSION
Many studies from political psychology and behavioural economics demonstrate that most individuals do not behave according to rational choice model of decision making. They do not cautiously evaluate all available options and choose the optimal solution. Instead, they tend to use “rules of thumb” that permit them to make quick choices to simplify complexities. These decision rules create biases and miscalculations in peoples’decision making capabilities.
Thus, rational foreign policy decision making is more an ideal than reality. However, we can still assume that policy makers aspire to rational decision-making behaviour, which they may occasionally approximate. But as a working proposition, it is useful to accept rationality as a picture of how decision process should work, as well as a description of key elements of how it does work.
5.0 SUMMARY
Policymakers often describe their own behaviour as resulting from a rational decision making process designed to reach the best decision possible. Despite the image that policy makers seek to project, and although they can sometimes absorb new information quickly under great pressure and take calculated risks through deliberate planning, more often the degree of rationality bears little relationship to the world in which officials conduct their deliberations.
Decision makers are those individuals greatly shaped by the socially accepted shared understanding of national interests and foreign policy
60
POL344 FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS
within their own policy-making community and culture.
Consequently these dominating ideas inevitable reduce their capacity to make fully rational choices.
6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT
1. All decision makers are essentially alike in their approach to foreign policy making. Discuss.
2. Discuss policy making in the light of rational choice.
3. What are the impediments to rational decision making?
7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING
Allison, G, & Philip Z (1999). Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crises (2nd Ed.). New York: Longman.
Kegley, C (2007). World Politics: Trend and Transformation (11th Ed.).
Belmont, U. S. A: Thompson Wadsworth.
Hermann, C.; Kegley C. & Rosenan, H. (1987). New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy. Boston: Allen & Unwin.
61