Studies of popular politics after the Second World War have understood the protests against the first Indian National Army (INA) trials at the Red Fort as representing the consolidation of widespread anti-colonial resentment. Some historians consider the INA demonstrations in Calcutta in November 1945 as the apogee of this popular mood. Of the three INA officers who were tried at the Red Fort, one was a Muslim, one a Sikh and the third a Hindu. Historians have argued that this made people of all faiths come together to protest against the colonial government.1 Gautam Chattopadhyay goes on to insist that the protests had the potential to change the very nature of decolonization, had they been taken to their logical conclusion by the national leadership; the ‘bourgeois’ leaders, however, preferred compromises with imperialism to a radical revolutionary movement which could have endangered their own social dominance.2
1 Sumit Sarkar, ‘Popular Movements and National Leadership, 1945-47’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 17, no. 14/16, Annual Number, April, 1982, pp. 677-689. Also see Sohini Majumdar, ‘A Different Calcutta: INA Trials and Hindu-Muslim Solidarity in 1945 and 1946’ in Tanika Sarkar and Sekhar Bandyopadhyay (eds.), Calcutta: The Stormy Decades, New Delhi: Social Science Press, 2015, pp. 235-266.
2 Gautam Chattopadhyay, ‘The Almost Revolution: A Case Study of India in February 1946’
in Barun De (ed.), Essays in Honour of Prof. S.C. Sarkar, New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1976. Also see Gautam Chattopadhyay, ‘Bengal Students in Revolt against the Raj, 1945-46’ in Amit Kumar Gupta (ed.), Myth and Reality: The Struggle for Freedom in India, New Delhi: Manohar, 1987.
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Sumit Sarkar also celebrates the November agitations in Calcutta as ‘non-communal’ and ‘anti-colonial’, but recognizes that such agitations had their limits.
Protests against the trial of INA officers, he points out, were confined to only a few cities, and the vast majority of India’s population living in the countryside remained largely indifferent.3 Sucheta Mahajan is also critical of these agitations. She agrees that these were emotional outpourings of popular nationalism, but concludes that Congress leaders rightly distanced themselves from such ‘militancy’ as the agitations were ‘premature’. She prefers turning the ‘spotlight’ to the ‘vast, heroic, non-militant multitudes’ who were equally stirred by anti-colonial feelings, who went to nationalist meetings, subscribed to nationalist funds and rejoiced in nationalist celebrations. 4 Their support shows that far from being ‘bourgeois’ and
‘compromising’, the Congress leaders were, in fact, the true champions of popular, cross-communal, anti-colonial sentiments.
Instead of turning the spotlight away, this chapter hopes to intensify the focus on the precise unfolding of the November agitations in Calcutta. In so doing, it challenges the consensus that the agitations represented a ‘non-communal’ and ‘anti-colonial’ mood that rose above narrow communal or party-political affiliations.
The chapter begins by refuting the contention that the decision to try INA officers belonging to different religions and to hold the proceedings at the Red Fort was a misjudgement on the part of British India’s military establishment. The first two
3 Sarkar, ‘Popular Movements and National Leadership’.
4 Sucheta Mahajan, ‘British Policy, Nationalist Strategy and Popular National Upsurge, 46’ in Amit Kumar Gupta (ed.), Myth and Reality: The Struggle for Freedom in India, 1945-47, New Delhi: Manohar, 1987, p. 80. Also see Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition: The Erosion of Colonial Power in India, New Delhi; London: Sage, 2000.
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sections demonstrate that rather than being random, capricious and ‘autonomous’
decisions of state actors, these were products of negotiations between different layers within the colonial government who responded to a variety of pressures in the socio-political realm.
The last two sections delve deep into the details of the protest as it unfolded on the streets of Calcutta in November 1945. It shows that the dominant description of these protests as ‘non-communal’ and ‘anti-colonial’ obscures its underlying complexities, which reveal the nature of Calcutta’s politics in the post-war period, but also provide critical insights into the nature of mass mobilizations and popular politics.
Post-War Debates, Judicial Processes and the First Red Fort Trial
The trial of INA officers Shah Nawaz Khan, Gurbaksh Singh Dhillon and Prem Kumar Sahgal staged at the Red Fort – an insignia of precolonial Indian glory – backfired upon the colonial government. It allegedly provided the occasion for different communities and political parties to come together to agitate against the colonial state. Many historians assume that this decision was either borne out of imperial arrogance or the government’s lack of foresight.5 They hold the army, especially the Commander-in-Chief, Claude Auchinleck, responsible for the terrible lapse of judgment. Penderel Moon, for example, insists that the details of the trial
5 See, among others, Sarkar, ‘Popular Movements and National Leadership’; Chattopadhyay,
‘Bengal Students in Revolt against the Raj’; Leonard A. Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj: A Biography of Sarat and Subhas Chandra Bose, New Delhi: Viking, 1989; Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal, 1905-1947, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991.
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were decided upon by the army ‘against the advice of the Home Member’.6 But Peter Ward Fay believes that the decisions were ‘practical’, and that Auchinleck ‘did not mean to send a signal’.7 The Red Fort was ‘a known and public place’, its walled enclosure made it secure, and its clerical staff could be easily mobilized to provide
‘logistical support’.8 The choice of a Hindu, a Muslim and a Sikh for the trial was also not deliberate. They were brought to trial, Fay argues, ‘because they were at hand and eminently triable’.9 He reiterates, ‘There was no guile in the business, no hidden agenda’.10
The accounts, while at odds with each other in some respects, both explain government decisions as if these were ‘autonomous’. In these narratives, state institutions or actors – ‘the army’ or the ‘Commander-in-Chief’ – emerge as free decision-makers, untouched by socio-political pressures. The exact discussions that led to fixing the precise details of the trial remain unavailable. But, through a contextual reading of debates that animated the post-war government, this section suggests that decisions about the first Red Fort trial, were, in fact, products of complex negotiations at different echelons of government. State actors at various levels had their own concerns and responded to pressures of many kinds – international opinion about British colonial policies in India, public opinion within India, opinion of Indian and British political leaders as well as concerns about ‘law and order’.
6 Penderel Moon (ed.), Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal, London: Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 173.
7 Peter Ward Fay, The Forgotten Army: India’s Armed Struggle for Independence, New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 1994, p. 471.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
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The INA issue came to the forefront of public debate in the context of a land-slide victory for the Labour Party in the British general election of 1945.11 In India, this raised hopes of a speedy advance towards India’s self-government, although the pronouncements of Labour leaders soon robbed them of their illusions.12 So as to
‘retain the initiative’, both London and New Delhi recognized the need for a ‘suitable gesture’.13 However, different echelons of government had different ideas about how Britain should proceed to address India’s future. Differences of opinion with London were fuelled, to some extent, by Viceroy Wavell’s personal apprehensions about Labour politicians. He feared that Pethick-Lawrence, the new Secretary of State, could have ‘fixed and old-fashioned ideas derived mainly from his Congress contacts’.14
Soon after assuming office, the new government in Britain invited Wavell to London to discuss issues concerning India’s problems.15 The meetings that followed exposed the deep differences in outlook between the Indian establishment and the India Office.
The priority of the Labour government, as became evident to Wavell during his meetings with the India and Burma Committee, was to relieve itself of the burden of
11 Telegram from Government of India, Information and Broadcasting Department to Secretary of State, dated 1 August 1945, Nicholas Mansergh (ed.), Transfer of Power, 1942-7 (Henceforth TP), vol. VI, London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1976, no. 1, p. 1.
12 ‘Press Adviser’s appreciation for the second half of August 1945’, L/PJ/5/152/45, India Office Records (Henceforth, ‘IOR’).
13 Telegram from Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, New Delhi, 6 August 1945, TP, vol. VI, no. 5, pp. 34-35.
14 Moon (ed.), Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal, p. 161.
15 Letter from Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell, dated 18 August 1945, TP, vol. VI, no. 38, p. 92.
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ruling India. War-ravaged Britain wanted to beat an honourable retreat as quickly as possible, while securing Indian cooperation in strategic sectors such as trade and commonwealth defence.16 The Labour ministry was keen to demonstrate to their wartime allies, especially the United States, as well as political parties in India and Britain, that they were taking energetic steps in that direction. But, even before a formal ‘transfer of power’ could be negotiated, London wanted to portray British rule in India as benevolent and just. It wanted immediate replacement of wartime emergency ordinances with peacetime laws, fair trial to all those who had been jailed during the war, a degree of political freedom and a free press. Through these measures, the Labour government in London hoped to convince international opinion and Indian leaders of their genuine desire to promote self-government in India and secure Indian cooperation for commonwealth strategic interests after British withdrawal from the subcontinent. In other words, the Labour government wanted to project its immediate post-war policy priorities in India as guided by ‘rule of law’ – conditions that facilitated impartial dispensation of justice through legally constituted courts and according to rational peacetime laws. They were motivated, therefore, by the desire to uphold the ‘sublime’ aspects of the state.17 They also wanted laws to be interpreted in the most generous terms to generate ‘goodwill’ among Indians; this, the government in London thought, would encourage Indian leaders to participate in a balanced dialogue on India’s future relationship with Britain with open minds.
16 See Partha Sarathi Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914-1964, London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1975; Partha Sarathi Gupta, ‘Imperial Strategy and the Transfer of Power, 1939-51’ in Amit Kumar Gupta, Myth and Reality: The Struggle for Freedom in India, 1945-47, New Delhi: Manohar, 1987.
17 For a discussion on ‘sublime’ and ‘profane’ dimensions of the state, see: Thomas Blom Hansen, ‘Governance and Myths of State in Mumbai’ in Fuller and Benei (eds.), The Everyday State and Society in Modern India. Also see Thomas Blom Hansen, Violence in Urban India: Identity Politics, Mumbai and the Post-Colonial City, Delhi; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
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The priorities of the government of India were different. During the war, it had ruthlessly suppressed dissent, as was evident from the manner in which it crushed the Quit India movement in 1942.18 Its wartime economic policies unleashed a disaster that claimed lives and livelihoods of millions.19 It had replaced ordinary laws with draconian executive ordinances – including the infamous Defence of India rules – that enabled the state to throw thousands of political workers behind bars as a preventive measure, even before they attempted subversion.20 All these factors, the government of India feared, had eroded whatever legitimacy it presumed it had among its Indian subjects. It suspected that widespread dissension was brewing below the surface, which would erupt the moment wartime regulations were relaxed. It therefore preferred a cautious approach. The government of India wanted to regain its
18 Studies on the Quit India Movement include F.G. Hutchins, Spontaneous Revolution: The Quit India Movement, Delhi: Manohar, 1971; Gyanendra Pandey (ed.), The Indian Nation in 1942, Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi & Co., 1988; Gyanendra Pandey, ‘The Revolt of August 1942 in Eastern UP and Bihar’, ibid; David Hardiman, ‘The Quit India Movement in Gujarat’, ibid;
M. Harcourt, ‘Kisan Populism and Revolution in Rural India: The 1942 Disturbances in Bihar and East United Provinces’ in D.A. Low (ed.), Congress and the Raj: Facets of the Indian Struggle, 1917-47, London: Heinemann, 1997; Bidyut Chakrabarty, ‘Political Mobilization in the Localities: The 1942 Quit India Movement in Midnapur’, Modern Asian Studies, vol. 26, no. 4, 1992, pp.791-814; Bidyut Chakrabarty, Local Politics and Indian Nationalism:
Midnapore, 1919-1944, Delhi: Manohar, 1997; Stephen Henningham, ‘Quit India in Bihar and Eastern United Provinces: The Dual Revolt’ in Ranajit Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies:
Writings on South Asian History and Society, vol. II, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983.
19 Wartime economic policies precipitated the Great Bengal Famine in 1943 that, according to reliable estimates, claimed about three million lives. See Amartya K. Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982; Paul R.
Greenough, Prosperity and Misery in Modern Bengal: The Famine of 1943-44, New York the End of Empire, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.
20 Taylor C. Sherman has suggested that the colonial state always used a range of techniques other than proper court trials to punish its colonial subjects. However, such practices became acute during times of emergency, such as during the Second World War. See Taylor C.
Sherman, State Violence and Punishment in India, London; New York: Routledge, 2010.
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legitimacy by slowly buttressing Indian cooperation at various levels. Accordingly, the Viceroy recommended reconstitution of his Executive Council even before elections were held in India.21 Following elections to the provincial legislatures, he wanted to appoint a Development Council with elected Indian representatives to advise the central government on post-war reconstruction and development schemes.22 But given that his priority was to prevent violence at all costs, and ‘stiffen the morale’ of administrative functionaries, especially the police and the army, Wavell was reluctant to give up wartime emergency powers immediately. His commitment towards release of political (‘security’) prisoners or giving them a fair trial was tenuous. As opposed to the attitude of the new government in Britain, the main concern of the government of India was to maintain ‘law and order’.
Establishing ‘rule of law’, which Indian administrators interpreted merely as
‘appeasement’ of public opinion, was not Delhi’s priority.
Frictions between the India Office in Britain and the government in India were hardly a new feature of late colonialism. Wavell himself had faced considerable challenges dealing with the Churchill government during the war.23 Yet, the nature of antagonism between the post-war Labour government and the government of India was significantly different. During the War, the British government’s policy priorities involved maintaining the status quo in India and mobilizing its resources for the war effort. It was the government of India under Wavell which pressurized London to
21 ‘Agenda, Memoranda and Minutes of the Governors’ Conference’, 1-2 August 1945, TP, vol. VI, no. 2, p. 23.
22 Ibid., p. 17; Also, Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 6 August 1945, ibid., no. 5, pp. 36-37.
23 Moon (ed.), Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal. Also, R.J. Moore, Endgames of Empire:
Studies of Britain’s India Problem, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988; R.J. Moore, Churchill, Cripps and India, 1939-45, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979; Madhusree Mukherjee, Churchill’s Secret War: The British Empire and the Ravaging of India during World War II, New York: Basic Books, 2010.
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initiate dialogue with Indian political leaders to secure their cooperation during the War. After the War, under the Labour regime, the dynamic was reversed. As Wavell put it in his diary after several sessions of discussion with the new India and Burma Committee, ‘Compared with last time [during the Churchill regime], I have had to raise my right foot – the one on the accelerator pedal – and put down my left foot – the brake pedal… – gently but firmly.’24 Wavell thought that the Labour government needed to slow down; they seemed to be too much in a hurry to solve India’s complex problems.
Of course, differences between the government of India and the Labour government in Britain about immediate post-war policies were not irreconcilable. It is better understood as a difference of priorities and emphases. Despite advocating a cautious approach, Wavell knew all too well that he had to return to peacetime administrative arrangements soon enough, and ensure press freedom and promote fair trial, however limited in scope this might be. Neither did the British government want a violent flare-up or an administrative breakdown. The way post-war ‘India policy’
played out, therefore, was the outcome of give-and-take between different policy imperatives, all of which aimed at projecting the ‘sublime’ dimensions of state-power, albeit at different paces and in different ways. Also, all of these imperatives emanated from concerns about socio-political dynamics – international opinion, the need to secure ‘goodwill’ of Indian leaders or prevent outbreak of ‘disorder’. These compromises and negotiations provide vital clues about how the government of India arrived at the controversial decisions about the first Red Fort trial.
24 Moon (ed.), Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal, p. 171.
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The INA trials, therefore, cannot be understood in isolation. They need to be contextualized in their full entanglement with a range of other issues concerning the sanctity of judicial processes that claimed the attention of India’s post-war administration. One such issue was that of punishments for those accused of violent crimes during the Quit India Movement of 1942.
As is well-known, Congress, the largest all-India political party had opposed India’s involvement in the Second World War. In 1942, the Congress had launched a Quit India movement to force Britain to grant India immediate independence. This had invited state repression. The government of India imposed a ban on the Congress and other allied organizations, confiscated their property and arrested their leaders and activists.
Among the cases concerning Quit India violence, those linked to incidents at Chimur and Ashti gained considerable publicity.25 The Chimur case involved two connected incidents: in the first instance, a magistrate and a revenue officer were dragged out of a rest house and were ‘battered to death’; in the other, a mob chased down a retreating police party and murdered an Inspector and a Constable. Twenty death sentences were passed in this case, of which five were still standing in court in August 1945.26 In the Ashti case, an entire police station was ‘over-run and burnt’;
one Sub-Inspector was killed on spot, while a Head-Constable and two Constables
25 Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 11 August, TP, vol. VI, no. 13, pp. 44-45.
26 Ibid.
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were beaten up and burnt alive. Another Constable was killed and thrown into a pond.27
Government of India knew that the decisions on Chimur and Ashti cases would also affect at least three others. In the Fatwa district of Bihar, two pilot officers of the Royal Air Force were dragged out of a train and murdered in the railway station.
Seven death sentences were originally passed in this case, out of which four were standing.28 Similarly, at Kulasekharapatnam, two death sentences were passed in connection with the attack and murder of an Assistant Inspector in a salt factory.29 Again, there was a case in Jaunpur District in Uttar Pradesh, where three Constables on duty in a village were attacked by a mob; two of them were brutally beaten to death. This case differed from the rest in that the incidents occurred after the Quit India agitations had passed its peak. Thus the trials on the last case, which led to five
Seven death sentences were originally passed in this case, out of which four were standing.28 Similarly, at Kulasekharapatnam, two death sentences were passed in connection with the attack and murder of an Assistant Inspector in a salt factory.29 Again, there was a case in Jaunpur District in Uttar Pradesh, where three Constables on duty in a village were attacked by a mob; two of them were brutally beaten to death. This case differed from the rest in that the incidents occurred after the Quit India agitations had passed its peak. Thus the trials on the last case, which led to five