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This stratagem can be found in any military dictionary: “Make a big show of attacking to the east, but actually attack to the west”. Its purpose is to confuse the enemy. For appearances sake, you make preparations to attack this side, but you actually want to attack somewhere else. This stratagem is extremely common in both military and Go applications. Be-cause of this, everyone knows about it. When you use this stratagem, the enemy can always recognize it and foil your plans, resisting with a suit-able response. In Go, the meaning of this stratagem is broader. In a spe-cific situation, tsuke-oshi, harassment, uchikomi, etc., could all be “feint to the east, attack to the west” tactics.

Because this stratagem is so well known, the level of difficulty in using it is higher. So you must be flexible. Give your opponent the impression that you really could go either way, and only then will you be able to confuse him.

Basic Figure: Selected from a domestic rapid-play tournament. When Black played +, his goal was not entirely to surround territory on the upper side.- He also intended to lead an attack against the White stones in the center. Right now, White can only consider the upper side and the right side for his next move. But the choice is still certainly difficult.

First, let's look at what mea-sures White can take inside Black's territory on the right side.

Diagram 1: The invasion at White 1 is often used against this shape.

The kosumi of Black 2 is forced to prevent the watari. White does not have any especially severe measures. Keima at White 3 is common. Making watari with Black 4 and after seems a nec-essary inconvenience, but actually it is not. Black only needs to play at a to make life, after which b becomes a weak spot in White's position. Thus, White cannot carry out this attack against Black, and as a result White cannot be pleased.

Diagram 2: If White changes his invasion point, this would normally be a severe move when White has no fear of attack from the rear. But in this game the string of White stones in the center is rather thin, so it is hard for this invasion to avoid being a little unreasonable. Black's kosumi-de at 2 attempts to close White in, so he can only press outward with 3, 5, and 7. Black follows the flow, staying ahead, being at an advantage. White has

to turn to 9 and 11 to look after his center, which is a little muddled. Black 12 closes White in, putting those four stones in a dangerous situation.

White is clearly at a disadvantage in the fighting to come.

Diagram 3: Since the White inva-sions on the right side are not too good, he can only consider play-ing on the upper side. The uchi-komi at White 1 is a bad choice.

After Black attacks with a hasami at 2, White is merely reducing the moyo, not affecting Black in the least. If White plays tobi at 3, then Black peeks at 4 and then puts his position in order with 6. White would probably play kosumi at 7 to maintain contact. Black then first plays 8 to shore up the right side, then waits for the White

res-ponse at 9 to grab the chance to play oba at 10, strengthening the corner.

Overall, the game has become very close. Black has the easier game.

Figure 1 - Actual Game Continuation: White cannot be satisfied with any of the variations shown in the pre-vious diagrams. There are errors in the direction of play and in the choice of points to play. From White's stand-point, the important contra-diction in the game is that the isolated stones in the center must avoid a fierce attack by Black.

The uchikomi of White 1 is the correct way to play. Pres-sing at Black 2 is a good point.

The tsuke-oshi at White 3 is an often-used approach, and hiki at Black 4 is also common. Now White 5, sacrificing some stones to seal in Black, is an absolutely outstanding move! From this move on, the contours of the tactic of “feint to the east, attack to the west” begin to become apparent.

Black captures the invading stone (White 1) with 6 to 12, gaining considerable territory. White makes the isolated stones near the center thick, then turns his attention back to the invasion of the right side, which is now severe. Now White is not afraid of being attacked in the center, so there is no advantage for Black in attacking as in Diagram 2. Therefore, Black can only utilize the submissive press at 14, followed by hiki at 16, allowing White to connect. The hane-watari of White 17 takes an extremely large amount of profit. Not only does it destroy about ten points of Black territory, but also increases the corner territory by almost ten points as well. Even more relevant is that the entire group of Black stones are without a base. This gain greatly outweighs the loss incurred by the sacrifice of a single stone on the upper side. After this campaign, White has established superiority across the whole board.

Diagram 4: When White invaded the upper side, if Black played on the outside, allowing White to live on the inside, perhaps he would be better off than in the actual game.

Black 2 is keima-oshi, and White crawls at 3 to make life. Black 4, 6, and 8 are played to build thickness in the center, but this is probably also the only choice for a reply.

After the White tobi at 9 in sente, he has achieved a basic living shape on the upper side (White can play de at a in sente, so he need not fear a Black oki at b). It would be expedient to bolster the center

group, but because there are plays around c and d in sente, they are not likely to be captured immediately. More important would be to play kakari on the lower side to seize the big point. From Black's viewpoint, this route is a little slower and longer, but as far as White is concerned, it is a success. He knocked down Black's territory on the upper side in sente. Later, if he can only find a way to settle his group in the center, then he will take the lead in actual territory, and it will be easy for him to control the course of the game.

Diagram 5: If we say that White 5 in Figure 1, sacrificing one stone, is the one move with full-board vision, then White 5 in this diagram, rescuing one stone, is just the opposite. This hiki at 5 is really ponderous! The kosumi of Black 6 is the perfect move, separat-ing White into two groups on the left and right. Now White has slipped into a situation where he is struggling to make life for both groups. White plays tobi at 7, and Black follows the flow with tobi at 8. So White again has to turn around and look after the right side. After Black makes the

di-agonal play at 12, he still can attack at a or b. It would be difficult for White to counter both threats. Forced into passive play, White is obviously at a disadvantage.

Conclusion: Because of his weak group in the center, White saw that it would be disadvantageous to directly invade on the right side. As a res-ult, he chose to first invade the upper side. Although the invasion on the right side is still the target here, this move gives Black an impression that

“he could do this or he could do that”, and that makes it hard for him to ascertain what White might do. White waited for Black to attack the in-vading stone, then he nimbly sacrificed that stone in order to build thick-ness in the center in sente. Only then did he turn back to invading the right side. Black could not be so forceful, and could only allow White to watari without a care in the world. White achieved his goal. (If you say that White should not sacrifice this stone, but instead should try mightily to handle two weak groups in the center, then you are piling one mistake on top of another.)

In this game Black fell into a passive position because + in the Basic Fig-ure was an overplay. Under the circumstances at that time, Black's correct play was a in the Basic Figure. After Black made this inaccuracy, White invaded the upper side, and then used a nimble, ingenious sacrifice to reach his main goal of invading the right side. This is one example of the successful use of “feint to the east, attack to the west”.