Guidance rules on how misconduct proceedings ought to be conducted are clearly laid out in The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012, thoughthe research revealed that these were not adhered to in every case. Interviewees said that, while chief officer misconduct may be investigated internally by the PSD in the officer’s own force, often there was a preference for
27 The notice is a protection for the officer to allow them to secure any evidence that may assist in their defence, and to seek appropriate advice from a staff association friend (who can provide peer support and advice) or a solicitor.
another force to investigate in the interests of transparency and justice. These appear to be discretionary decisions, which are likely to affect case outcomes.
We were told of a variety of approaches used to identify suitable candidates, as illustrated by the following quotations:
So somebody I’ve known 20 years say, who I used to work with in [named force area], saying pretty much, “Hello old boy, could you do me a favour?” (SIO) Post 2012 we have now got a reciprocal arrangement to investigate ACPO at all levels across our region… we’ve got an arrangement with different powers and they are cost free so you can do it. (IO)
We were told that in another example, the Appropriate Authority had asked a force to
conduct an investigation on another matter because they had found a previous investigation by them to be satisfactory.
Several respondents suggested that Appropriate Authorities – Police Authorities and as their successors, PCCs – had a preference to call in third party forces, or refer complaints to the IPCC (or previously HMIC28) as a starting point.29 In some cases, it was suggested that these decisions were motivated by risk-aversion, in that the authority could not then be accused of mishandling the process. Others interpreted these decisions as simply being motivated by a desire for transparency:
Bear in mind this is pre-PCC, the chair of the police authority just looked at the allegation and felt for transparency, it’s… he didn’t want to do an internal
investigation, not… do anything in force. (IO)
When the matter is brought to the attention of the IPCC, the make a judgement about
whether to investigate the case independently or ask another force to investigate. Although a few interviewees thought the IPCC was well-equipped to conduct good, independent
investigations, and cited high profile cases where they had done so, several expressed scepticism about the IPCC’s competence or capacity. Whilst some made the (familiar) argument that police officers have a unique competence as investigators, a more frequent observation was that IPCC has been insufficiently resourced to handle any volume of investigations of chief officer misconduct:
I don’t think the IPCC helped at all. I think that their investigation was really poor… if you’ve got people who’ve achieved high rank in the police service often, not always, but often they are very intelligent, they know about investigations, they’re not stupid and they will fight like anything to protect themselves and I simply don’t believe that the IPCC have sufficient people who have the
experience and the ability to deal with people who are as difficult to deal with as that. (IO)
If the IPCC decides to asks a third party force to mount a managed investigation, they (or in
28 As described above in Chapter 3, the role of HMIC in respect of chief officers has changed since 2012. Prior to then, we were told (for example, by a stakeholder) of cases in which HMIC was alerted to concerns about chief officer conduct and commissioned some initial “scoping work” to assess whether the complaints merited further examination, in which case they were referred to the IPCC. We were also told that HMIC was also previously involved in identifying third party investigators to conduct misconduct investigations.
some cases prior to 2012, HMIC) then brokers an arrangement between the Appropriate Authority and the third party force. The other route for selection is to ask the National Policing Lead for Professional Standards to recommend someone with the necessary experience, and without significant links to any of those involved.
While this process reportedly limited the pool of officers available to mount investigations; the role itself is also seen as an unwelcome one. One interviewee explained there were downsides to investigating other chief officers:
…no one wants to do it because it can be career-limiting and you might be ostracised by your mates, and also they don’t have the time for technical
investigations… Also on ACPO, it is an uncomfortable feeling that the person who is investigating is a peer and colleague. (Stakeholder and S/IO)
The decision to investigate a matter internally or involve a third party force could produce very different consequences according to the interviewees. One IO, who investigated a case of financial irregularities in the procurement process, said the following:
The assessment becomes critical, the initial assessment, so the fact that the DCC has commissioned me to do a review [of the procurement process] and not a misconduct or a criminal investigation is the key to it. If he had said, it is my belief that [the chief officer] may have committed a fraud, or misconduct in public office, or whatever, then because I’d be investigating a crime, then I would have had more prohibitive steps. (IO)
In other words, this officer would have had additional powers to access information from other agencies during the investigation if his mandate were more than a ‘review’.
Several interviewees said there was a risk whenever a decision was made to appoint an external chief as SIO, as doing so could amplify the perceived seriousness of the case and create negative publicity. For example:
…generally there’s an over-blowing of the enquiry rather than a minimising of it and actually there is always that suggestion of, is there a taint, is there?
Because, you know, it is a relatively small club. (Stakeholder)
One IO went on to say that the relationship between the Appropriate Authorities and officers under investigation was often close, which could affect decision-making:
You’ve got the PCC for discipline and criminal over the chief and then the chief over his or her very close colleagues, DCCs and ACCs and it is just a bit
incestuous to me… any complaints should be a mandatory referral to the IPCC who can then decide on the mode of investigation [depending on whether the matter is minor or of a serious nature]. (IO)
A downside of external investigations that some interviewees mentioned was that outside investigators lacked local knowledge, local contacts and, thus, found it hard to assess whether the information that they were provided was reliable. For example:
It is another trouble you are going to have from an outside force doing it is that you are very reliant on people within that organisation… I am reliant on someone I don’t know getting me the emails. I don’t really know, are those emails that came from the archive? That is what they told me, but I don’t know who those people are. There’s no way I can actually, realistically double-check that. If you wanted a real conspiracy theory, they could have fed me with what they wanted. I produce the report they want and it goes on from there. (SIO)
Some interviewees suggested that assessing the reliability of information was a particular problem for IPCC investigators who did not have adequate experience of conducting similar investigations.
One stakeholder suggested that a potential solution to some of these problems would be the establishment of a specialist team, based in a national body (e.g. the College of Policing or National Crime Agency), to investigate all senior officer misconduct cases.
…chief officer misconduct has to be investigated differently… You do need to get to the truth but I think the public confidence thing becomes more important. Because you are a figurehead, you are the chief as much as you are a police officer. I also think our misconduct is different… chief officers should be investigated by a single team of people. I don’t know why they can’t be
independent of everybody. There must be more than enough work to keep them going. (Stakeholder)
Thus, the lack of adherence, at times, to laid procedures and rules governing
investigations, as well as the discretionary nature of decision-making, could be a cause for concern in some cases.